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A b s t r a c t . 
I t i s the i n t e n t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s t o propose a monistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of Hegel's t h e o l o g i c a l system, and t o analyse the mechanics of t h i s 
s t r u c t u r e w i t h p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on Hegel's use of d i a l e c t i c and the 
manner i n which the h i s t o r i c a l , phenomenal world subsists w i t h i n the 
monistic framework proposed, Thus, i t i s a t h e s i s which concentrates 
l a r g e l y on i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r a t h e r than evaluation, and the maj o r i t y of 
i t s c r i t i c a l analysis w i l l focus on a l t e r n a t i v e understanding's of 
Hegel's theology r a t h e r than the theology I t s e l f . 
Owing t o l i m i t a t i o n s imposed on the length of the thesis, I have 
r e l u c t a n t l y had t o omit many important aspects of Hegel's theology, most 
notably the T r i n i t y , c r e a t i o n , and the F a l l . I have instead selected 
issues which I f e e l most cover the workings of the system, and how these 
workings e f f e c t an immanent deity. Broadly speaking, the th e s i s moves 
from an e x p o s i t i o n of the t r i a d i c s t r u c t u r e , t o the r o l e and status of 
the phenomenal world, and i t concludes by discussing how Hegel views 
God's being v i s - S - v l s time and h i s t o r y . I have also Included a section 
on Hegel's o n t o l o g i c a l argument as a means of cementing h i s theology as 
a p l a u s i b l e p r o p o s i t i o n . 
The m a j o r i t y of primary t e x t m a t e r i a l i s taken from Hegel's Logic and 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. I n terms of h i s development, I 
have t h e r e f o r e t r i e d t o confine the expos i t i o n t o h i s l a t t e r period when 
i n B e r l i n (c.1824-31), and the t r a n s l a t i o n of the Logic i s of the t h i r d 
e d iton of 1830. 
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1. Some an c i e n t h i s t o r i c a l I n f l u e n c e s . 
(1) Parmendldlan monism. 
So f a r as we know monism found i t s f i r s t , d e f i n i t i v e form i n Western 
thought i n the philosophy of Parmenides <c500BC), ' and Hegel awards t o 
the E l e a t i c the grand compliment that from "Parmenides began philosophy 
proper." (LHP 1.254) Such a statement i s , of course, remarkable f o r i t s 
e x c l u s i v i s t nature; the philosophies p r i o r t o Parmenides are i m p l i c i t l y 
r elegated t o what one might even, term an amateuer status, and a 
r e j e c t i o n of t h i n k e r s such as Anaximenes and, most notably, Pythagoras 
makes Hegel's claim seem almost outlandish. But the suggestion that 
only from Parmenides d i d philosophy f i n d i t s proper s t a r t i n g point leads 
t o an important i n s i g h t regarding what philosophy a c t u a l l y was t o Hegel, 
namely a complete system, and he w r i t e s " i t i s the p r i n c i p l e of genuine 
philosophy t o contain a l l p a r t i c u l a r p r i n c i p l e s w i t h i n i t s e l f . " (.Logic, 
§14) 
This idea of philosophy then, i s f i r s t found f o r Hegel w i t h i n 
Parmenides' absolute system, a system (here meaning ' t o t a l i t y ' ^ ) which 
r u t h l e s s l y s t a t e s that there i s no-thing beyond being, and that being i s 
whole, complete, and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . Moreover, Hegel understands 
Parmenides' being as synonymous w i t h thought, and thus he notes w i t h 
approval i n h i s commentary on the E l e a t i c t h a t ; 
"Thought p r o d u c e s i t s e l f , and what i s produced i s a Thought, Thought 
i s 'thus i d e n t i c a l w i t h Being, f o r t h e r e i s n o t h i n g b e s i d e Being, t h i s 
g r e a t a f f i r m a t i o n , " 1,253) 
For Hegel, t h i s i s a most a t t r a c t i v e proposition; thought possesses 
unbounded p o s l t i v i t y , and i s complete w i t h i n i t s e l f as what i t p o s i t s i s 
p r e c i s e l y i t s e l f . There i s nothing external t o thought i n t h i s context, 
i e . as pure, l o g i c a l thought, because thought i s equatable with nothing 
but being. To t h i n k of sensory t h i n g s i s not genuine thought, and Hegel 
stresses Plotlnus' comment that Parmenides " d i d not place Being i n 
sensuous t h i n g s . " (LHP 1.253) I n other words, pure thought i s i n i t s e l f 
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whole, a c t i n g simply t o i n s p i r e the emergence of I t s e l f . But there are 
dif f e r e n c e s . Of course, there i s the important d i f f e r e n c e i n that, f o r 
Parmenides, thought i s purely s t a t i c (as i t can r e f e r only t o the 
constant and unchanging being), whereas f o r Hegel i t I s very much an 
a c t i v e t h i n g , p o s i t i n g and u n r a v e l l i n g i t s e l f ; hence he w r i t e s 
"philosophy (as science) i s a development of untrammelled t h i n k i n g . " 
(.ILHP, p87) Yet f o r Parmenides, thought p e r t a i n s s o l e l y t o the system, 
indeed i s synonymous w i t h the system, and w h i l s t Hegel i s able t o f i n d 
many f a u l t s w i t h i n t h i s system, he shares the broad concept of the u n i t y 
of pure, l o g i c a l thought and philosophy: 
" C I t s h o u l d ] be noted f i r s t of a l l t h a t God and r e l i g i o n e x i s t i n and 
thro u g h thought - s i m p l y and s o l e l y i n and f o r thought, And even though 
r e l i g i o u s s e n s a t i o n (nay s u b s e q u e n t l y Ctake u p] t h i s o b j e c t a g a i n and t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o i t a s f e e l i n g , t h e u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d u n i t y [ i s ] j u s t t he 
u n i t y of thought w i t h i t s e l f , " (Z/'-f 1,208) 
Thus, what we see i s Hegel's a t t r a c t i o n t o Parmenides' system, namely 
the completeness of a s i n g l e whole, l o g i c a l l y cognisant through pure 
thought, 
Of course, i n many other ways, Hegel's Absolute i s a v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t 
concept from Parmenides' n o t i o n of being. Indeed, Kaufmann qu i t e 
r i g h t l y p o i n t s out that "any attempt t o go back t o Parmenides i n modern 
times and t o e x t o l being i n any comparable manner would have struck 
Hegel as u t t e r l y perverse and as evidence that anyone proposing t o do 
such a t h i n g had not p r o f i t e d from over two thousand years of 
ph i l o s o p h i c a l thought. "=" C e r t a i n l y t h i s comment i s not misplaced f o r , 
as we s h a l l see i n chapters eight and nine, Hegel viewed the u n r a v e l l i n g 
of h i s t o r y as rep r e s e n t a t i v e i n i t s e l f of the (or rath e r h i s ) 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l system, and thus f o r Hegel there must be some development 
of thought. So, w i t h t h i s i n mind, what according t o Hegel can be 
disputed i n Parmenides' p h i l o s o p h i c a l theory? 
For Parmenides, the fundamental tenet of philosophy i s that t r u e being 
must be permanent and unchanging; i f being changes, then i t must move 
from one s t a t e of being and pass v i a a s t a t e of not-being t o i t s new 
state, and he w r i t e s "how might what i s then perish? How might i t come 
i n t o being? For I f i t came i n t o being i t i s not, nor i s i t i f i t i s 
ever going t o be. "-* Thus, he argues t h a t something cannot become 
because i t can only derive from nothing, and nothing i s not, and from 
t h i s we f i n d the summary t r a d i t i o n a l l y a t t r i b u t e d t o Parmenides 
(although he d i d not a c t u a l l y employ the phrase h i m s e l f ) that "being i s , 
not-being i s not." 
The second c e n t r a l teaching of Parmenides i s tha t being i s an undivided 
whole, the s i n g l e b e i n g - l t s e l f , " f o r nothing e i t h e r i s or w i l l be other 
than what i t i s , since f a t e has f e t t e r e d I t t o be whole and unmoving. "^ 
Here, then, we f i n d t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n t o being maintaining a permanent, 
unchanging state, i t i s also deemed t o be "whole and unmovlng, " and t h i s 
must q u a l i f y Parmenides' theory as monistic - indeed perhaps the most 
pure argument f o r monism - because there I s nothing beyond the one, 
unchanging whole, nothing e x t e r n a l t o i t and nothing t o determine or 
a f f e c t i t , l e . no force t o which the One i s subject. Being cannot be 
considered as a p l u r a l i t y because t h i s would mean that between being-A 
and being-B would again be not-being, and hence we f i n d a genuine 
monistic p r i n c i p l e , j u s t as being's permanency ensures i t maintains no 
causal or t e l e o l o g l c a l roots, rendering i t wholly independent and 
e x i s t i n g purely I n and f o r i t s e l f . As A l l e n puts i t , "the primary 
object of Parmenides' poem i s t o demonstrate th a t the common-sense 
b e l i e f i n the r e a l i t y of the physi c a l world, a world of p l u r a l i t y and 
change, i s mistaken, and t o set i n i t s place a One Being, unchanging, 
ungenerated, i n d e s t r u c t i b l e , shaped as a sphere."'^ 
( i i ) Hegel's critique of Parmenides. 
The point t h a t being i s "shaped l i k e a sphere" i s an i n t e r e s t i n g one, 
and leads t o the f i r s t of several notable c r i t i c i s m s of Parmenides' 
theory t h a t Hegel himself stressed, only two of which are discussed i n 
t h i s chapter.^ (1) Although an Issue s t i l l i n dispute, i t seems l i k e l y 
t h a t Parmenides declared being t o be f i n i t e through h i s adoption of the 
l i m i t e d side of Pythagoras' t a b l e of opposites. C e r t a i n l y there i s a 
c l e a r resemblance, and Parmenides' l o g i c f o l l o w s the odd gnomons that 
Pythagoras devised. The E l e a t i c proposes that "necessity holds i t f i r m 
w i t h i n the bonds of the l i m i t t h a t keeps i t back of every side, because 
i t i s not l a w f u l that what i s should be unlimited; f o r i t i s not i n need 
- i f i t were, i t would need a l l . But since there i s a f u r t h e s t l i m i t , 
i t i s bounded on every side, l i k e the bulk of a well-rounded sphere, 
from the centre equally balanced i n every d i r e c t i o n ; f o r i t needs must 
not be somewhat more here or somewhat less there. For neither i s there 
th a t which i s not, which might stop i t from meeting i t s l i k e , nor can 
what i s be more here and less there than what i s , since i t i s a l l 
i n v i o l a t e ; f o r being equal t o i t s e l f on every side, i t r e s t s uniformly 
w i t h i n i t s l i m i t s . "® 
What Parmenides proposes then, i s a d i r e c t p o s i t i v e / negative scenario, 
w i t h being maintaining a necessarily f i n i t e character t o e s t a b l i s h i t s 
p o s i t i v e , m a t e r i a l i d e n t i t y , against which i s only the negative nothing; 
as the negative i s , however, q u i t e l i t e r a l l y no-thing, being thereby may 
be said t o be s e l f - l i m i t i n g . This i s how Parmenides attempts t o 
describe h i s monism. I t e x i s t s purely w i t h i n the confines of i t s e l f , 
possessing i t s being not by v i r t u e of what e x i s t s outside of I t s l i m i t s 
- t h i s would, Parmenides argues, mean that an other must be existent -
but by what one might term the p o s i t i v e content of i t s e l f . The emphasis 
regarding being's l i m i t t h e r e f o r e l i e s e n t i r e l y on i t s physical 
extension; " i t i s as f a r as i t extends," i t i s f e a s i b l e t o say, "and the 
no-thing beyond has <of course) no power to determine t h i s extension." 
Such emphasis thus again h i g h l i g h t s Parmenides' i n s i s t e n c e on a monistic 
One, s e l f - l i m i t i n g and content w i t h i n i t s e l f . 
The problem w i t h t h i s l i e s i n i t i a l l y i n being's m a t e r i a l and s p a t i a l 
form. Parmenides' absolute r e j e c t i o n of the no-thing beyond the 
m a t e r i a l One was an attempt t o destroy the Pythagorean and Heraclitean 
use of opposites, t o argue w i t h remarkable s i m p l i c i t y merely "what i s , 
i s ; what i s not, I s not." I n f a c t what h i s theory produces i s an 
abstract form of dualism, because the p o s i t i v e ' i s ' stands l o g i c a l l y 
over and against the negative ' i s - n o t ' ; by arguing the negative t o be 
wholly detached from the p o s i t i v e , he renders i t a n a t u r a l and absolute 
( i f a b s t r a c t ) other t o being, and thus i t i s arguable that Parmenides 
i n e v i t a b l y comes t o opposites again. Furthermore, the supposedly s e l f -
imposed f i n i t u d e of being necessarily implies a genuine opposite, f o r i t 
i s t h i s t h a t acts t o enclose being w i t h i n i t s l i m i t s ; i f no-thing was 
not beyond being, then being would be compelled t o extend i t s e l f 
i n f i n i t e l y , and thereby i t can only be said that being i s dependent on 
not-being f o r I t s form. To suggest that because no-thing cannot l i m i t 
as i t i s not-being, I s an i n v a l i d proposition; l o g i c a l l y no-thing has an 
abstract, a n t i t h e t i c a l q u a l i t y , a status as 'that which i s the other of 
being'. 
This c r i t i c a l point i s alluded t o by Hegel i n h i s discussion of q u a l i t y , 
and w h i l s t he acknowledges the value of Parmenides' general idea, he 
continues t o assert the r o l e of otherness: 
"Parmenides ,,, s a y s t h a t , " o n l y b e i n g i s , and n o t h i n g i s n o t , " T h i s must 
be t a k e n a s t h e proper s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r p h i l o s o p h y ,,, 
The E l e a t i c s a r e famous a s d a r i n g t h i n k e r s ; but t h i s a b s t r a c t 
a d m i r a t i o n i s o f t e n c o u p l e d w i t h t h e remark t h a t , a l l t h e same, t h e s e 
p h i l o s o p h e r s s u r e l y went too f a r , b e c a u s e they r e c o g n i s e d o n l y b e i n g a s 
what i s t r u e , and d e n i e d t r u t h t o e v e r y o t h e r o b j e c t of our c o n s c i o u s n e s s , 
And, of c o u r s e , i t i s q u i t e c o r r e c t t h a t we must not s t o p a t mere being; 
but i t shows o n l y l a c k of thought t o t r e a t t h e f u r t h e r c o n t e n t of our 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s a s d i s c o v e r a b l e somewhere ' b e s i d e ' and ' o u t s i d e ' being, or a s 
something t h a t i s j u s t g i v e n ' a l s o ' , On th e c o n t r a r y , t h e t r u e s i t u a t i o n 
i s t h a t b e i n g a s s u c h i s n o t f i r m and u l t i m a t e , but r a t h e r something t h a t 
o v e r t u r n s d i a l e c t i c a l l y i n t o i t s o p p o s i t e - which, t a k e n i n t h e same, 
immediate way, i s nothing," (.Logic, §86A2) 
What Hegel c o n t r i b u t e s t o the issue at t h i s stage i s , therefore, that 
Parmenides was q u i t e correct t o i n t e r p r e t being as the whole, absolute 
t r u t h ; t h i n g s which are not at f i r s t glance compatible w i t h the One 
should not be understood as e x t e r n a l i t i e s . But he then disputes 
Parmenides' r i g i d s t r u c t u r e , and avoids the d u a l i s l t i c problem 
Parmenides causes himself by arguing that being and not-being t u r n i n t o 
each other. This, Hegel claims, i s the case because each i s grounded i n 
i t s other as, f o r example, l i g h t i s grounded I n dark, and only i s 
' l i g h t ' because i t i s 'not-dark', and vice versa. S i m i l a r l y , being i s 
by v i r t u e of nothing, because without nothing the concept of being 
cannot be apprehended. What t h i s creates, therefore, i s an i m p l i c i t 
p o s i t i v e / negative r e l a t i o n , and these states are applicable t o e i t h e r 
of the two antagonists, so that when being i s p o s i t i v e , nothing i s the 
negative, and when nothing i s the p o s i t i v e , being i s the negative. I n 
other words, each i s i t s other because of t h e i r capacity f o r a l t e r a t i o n , 
and the bare content ( i e . the q u a l i t y which i s given e i t h e r a p o s i t i v e 
or negative attachment, the 'essence') of each i s the same. Whereas 
Parmenides argues that being I s s t r i c t l y s e l f - l i m i t i n g then, Hegel 
i n s i s t s t h a t l i m i t ( w h i l s t s e l f - p o s i t e d by the Absolute) i s that which 
has an I n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n : 
" L e t u s now c o n s i d e r more c l o s e l y what a l i m i t i m p l i e s , We f i n d t h a t 
i t c o n t a i n s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n i t s e l f , and so p r o v e s to be 
d i a l e c t i c a l , T h a t i s t o say, l i m i t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e r e a l i t y of b e i n g -
t h e r e LOassjn'], and, on the o t h e r hand, i t i s the n e g a t i o n of i t , 
But, f u r t h e r m o r e , a s t h e n e g a t i o n of the something, l i m i t i s not an 
a b s t r a c t n o t h i n g i n g e n e r a l , but a n o t h i n g t h a t i s , or what we c a l l 
an ' o t h e r ' , " (Logic, §92A) 
Thus, i n Hegel's understanding, l i m i t possesses a concrete value; i t I s 
the q u a l i t y of being the s u b s t a n t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n of a thing, and also 
the other of the t h i n g , because each, the t h i n g and i t s other, contains 
t h i s l i m i t e d character; each, th a t i s , f i n d s I t s e l f bound by the one 
l i m i t . The inner c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h e r e f o r e becomes q u i t e clear, f o r l i m i t 
can now be seen as having one element on t h i s side, and the other on 
that side. 
(11) This leads t o the second c r i t i c i s m Hegel holds against the Elea t i c . 
By a s s e r t i n g "being i s , not-being i s not," Parmenides f a l t e r s by 
proposing what proves t o be purely a s u b j e c t i v e concept of being, which 
remains u n o b j e c t l f l e d because he simultaneously maintains there i s no 
other t o the One. I w i l l discuss t h i s f u r t h e r l a t e r i n t h i s and, more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , the next chapter, but again we may note Hegel's disdain 
f o r the prospect of an u n o b j e c t l f l e d Absolute as he comments "stopping 
short at t h i s k i n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e f i n i t i o n means tha t no a c t u a l i t y 
at a l l i s ascribed t o i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s , " (LPR 1.377) This i s t o say 
t h a t , by denying any value to apparent otherness, the t r u e being i t s e l f 
remains vacuous because i t i s not i n r e l a t i o n and i s thereby undefined. 
For being t o be d e f i n i t i v e l y concrete, i t must be o b j e c t i f i e d by an 
a n t i t h e t i c a l r e l a t i o n , regardless of whether such r e l a t i o n be abstract 
or m a t e r i a l , because I n order t o say ' t h i s i s X', X must be o b j e c t i f i e d 
by being f u r t h e r defined as not-Y. D e f i n i t i o n , one might assert, occurs 
as a consequence of d i s c r i m i n a t i n g the object against a l i e n things; we 
understand a c h a i r t o be a chair because i t does not have the character 
of a t a b l e , f o r instance. Notably, however, Hegel's employment of 
d i a l e c t i c f o r such o b j e c t l f i c a t i o n i s applied e x c l u s i v e l y to opposites, 
the reason f o r which I w i l l t r y t o unravel i n the progress of t h i s 
chapter. 
( i l l ) Hegel's debt to Heraclltus. 
The above c r i t i q u e i s l a r g e l y rooted i n the works of Parmenides' 
predecessor, H e r a c l i t u s of Ephesus, and the I n f l u e n c e of t h i s ancient on 
Hegel i s c e r t a i n l y profound. As Flndlay writes, "there are, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , many o f t e n recognised resemblances between Hegellanism and 
the thought of Heraclitus. To look on the world as an ' e v e r - l i v i n g 
f i r e ' which I s at once 'want and s u r f e i t ' , which can only burn by 
generating the products which must u l t i m a t e l y serve as i t s own f u e l , i s 
c e r t a i n l y t o frame a m a t e r i a l analogue of Hegel's S p i r i t ; so too does 
the H e r a c l i t e a n n o t i o n of a constancy which depends on f l u x , and of a 
harmony which depends on opposing tensions. "'^  
Of most importance I s the r e l a t i o n between the d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c used by 
these two philosophers. H e r a c l i t u s developed a v i t a l philosophical 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t i s i m p l i c i t w i t h i n v i r t u a l l y every aspect of Hegel's 
theology, commonly known as the ' S t r i f e and Unity of Opposites'. 
I n i t i a l l y , one may look upon t h i s p r i n c i p l e as e f f e c t i v e l y an 
o b j e c t i f y i n g law, arguing t h a t AA only I s because of i t s r e l a t i o n and 
o p p o s i t i o n t o AB; as I b r i e f l y touched upon above, l i g h t f o r example i s 
only so because of dark - without the other, the one cannot be, and t h i s 
i n t u r n i m p l i e s a common ground, the essence. S i m i l a r l y , north i s so 
only because of i t s contextual p o s i t i o n over against south, heat i s 
knowable only because of a knowledge of cold, and so f o r t h . This then 
extends, d i a l e c t l c a l l y , t o assert that the c o n f l i c t between AA and AB, 
by v i r t u e of t h e i r e s s e n t i a l i d e n t i c a l n e s s , r e s u l t s i n a common home 
being discovered, what we may here simply c a l l A - the underlying, 
n e u t r a l essence. I n comparison, we may comfortably say north and south 
i l l u m i n a t e t h e i r common essence, understood as ' d i r e c t i o n ' , w i t h each's 
e s s e n t i a l and t r u e feature being pr e c i s e l y , and only, t h i s . I n other 
words, every element i s o b j e c t i f i e d by i t s other, or opposite, and i s 
th e r e f o r e not simply so on i t s own^account, but e x i s t s owing t o i t s 
ground upon which i t r e s t s , i e . the system's univer s a l ; north e x i s t s by 
v i r t u e of i t s grounding on i t s universal, d i r e c t i o n , and thus north i s 
an element of a wider system. For Hegel, t h i s i s perhaps the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e on h i s theology, and the l o g i c upon which h i s 
d i a l e c t i c operates. Thus, he wr i t e s : 
" H e r a c l i t u s s a y s f u r t h e r , " B e i n g i s no more than n o t - b e i n g " ioudsn 
maJlon to on tou me ontos esti)) what t h i s e x p r e s s e s i s p r e c i s e l y the 
n e g a t i v i t y of a b s t r a c t being, and the i d e n t i t y , p o s i t e d i n becoming, 
between i t and not h i n g , which, i n i t s a b s t a c t i o n , i s e q u a l l y u n s t a b l e , 
We have here, too, an example of t h e ge n u i n e r e f u t a t i o n of one 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m by ano t h e r , The r e f u t a t i o n c o n s i s t s p r e c i s e l y i n the 
f a c t t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e r e f u t e d p h i l o s o p h y i s e x h i b i t e d i n i t s 
d i a l e c t i c and re d u c e d t o an i d e a l moment of a h i g h e r c o n c r e t e form of the 
I d e a , " Uogic, §88A) 
Here then, we can see how the d i a l e c t i c a l process emerges from 
opposition. Being has an absolute other, not-being, i t s a n t i t h e s i s , but 
rat h e r than regarding t h i s opposite as something e x t e r n a l or extra, 
H e r a c l i t u s and Hegel both argue th a t i t i s instead unlvocal w i t h the 
t h e s i s because a) the a n t i t h e t i c a l r e l a t i o n i s necessary t o define the 
t h e s i s ( i e . I t - l s - t h l s - b e c a u s e - i t - i s - n o t - t h e - o t h e r ) and, b) the the s i s 
and a n t i t h e s i s are both grounded on a common essence. Just as we say 
north and south are wholly dependent and grounded on d i r e c t i o n , so good 
and bad - again, both opposites - are dependent and grounded on t h e i r 
common essence of mor a l i t y , and so f o r t h . Indeed, Hegel's adoption of 
t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s made e x p l i c i t when we note h i s a s s e r t i o n that "pure 
being i s the pure abstraction, and hence i t i s the absolutely negative, 
which when taken Immediately, Is equally nothing. " (Logic, §87) The 
case argued, therefore, i s that pure being, l e . being stripped of any 
predicate, proves i t s e l f t o be the same as nothing, and here the 
un i v e r s a l essence, namely noumenaiity, i s q u i t e patent. 
Most of H e r a c l i t u s ' philosophy comes t o us second-hand, w i t h only a few 
fragments of h i s w r i t i n g s being extant,^'' but, u n l i k e others, our 
p i c t u r e of him i s q u i t e r e l i a b l e owing t o the number of ancient 
commentators who are I n agreement as regards h i s utterances, the l i s t 
i n c l u d i n g A r i s t o t l e , Hippolytus, Sextus Empirlcus, Diogenes Laertius, 
Clement, and a host of other equally revered authors. Please note that 
i n the f o l l o w i n g excerpts, the i t a l i c i s e d p a rts of the quotations are 
thought by t h e i r authors t o be precise c i t a t i o n s from Heraclitus. 
Hippolytus quotes H e r a c l i t u s as fol l o w s , and w r i t e s " H e r a c l i t u s says 
t h a t dark and l i g h t , good and bad, are not d i f f e r e n t but one and the 
same. For example, he reproaches Hesiod f o r not knowing day and night 
- f o r day and night, he [ H e r a c l i t u s ] says, are one, expressing i t thus; 
A teacher of most Is Hesiod: they are sure he knows most who did not 
recognise day and night - for they are one," Hippolytus continues h i s 
c i t a t i o n s by quoting what i s known t o be a genuine fragment, which reads 
"The path up and down Is one and the same. And he [ H e r a c l i t u s ] says 
tha t the p o l l u t e d and pure are one and the same, and tha t the drinkable 
and the undrinkable are one and the same. " ^  =^  S i m i l a r l y , we may c i t e 
A r i s t o t l e , who a t t r i b u t e s t o H e r a c l i t u s the f o l l o w i n g sentiments, 
w r i t i n g " s u r e l y nature longs f o r the opposites, and e f f e c t s her harmony 
from them ... tha t was also said by H e r a c l i t u s the Obscure; Combinations 
- wholes and not wholes, concurring differing, concordant discordant, 
from all things one and from one all things. I n t h i s way the s t r u c t u r e 
of the universe - I mean, of the heavens and the earth and the whole 
world - was arranged by one harmony through the blending of the most 
opposite p r i n c i p l e s , " and " H e r a c l i t u s says that opposition concurs and 
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the f a i r e s t connection comes from things that d i f f e r and everything 
comes i n accordance w i t h s t r i f e . " " ' ^ 
H e r a c l i t u s ' s t h e s i s then i s th a t , f o r any given X, X's c o n s t i t u t i o n and 
existence derive from i n t e r n a l , c o n f l i c t i n g properties, and i t i s 
p r e c i s e l y such c o n f l i c t t h a t o f f e r s d e f i n i t i o n and a c t u a l i t y t o X; with 
heat and cold, f o r instance, these two elements c o n f l i c t but serve i n 
r e a l i t y t o h i g h l i g h t the existence of 'temperature', As Barnes puts i t , 
" H e r a c l i t u s believed I n the u n i t y of opposites. The path up i s the same 
as the path down, and i n general, e x i s t i n g things are characterised by 
p a i r s of contrary proper t i e s , whose b e l l i c o s e coexistence i s essenti a l 
to t h e i r continued being. "'^ 
I t i s , then, He r a c l i t u s ' form of d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c - AA and AB being 
grounded, purely and e s s e n t i a l l y , i n A despite the co n t r a s t i n g 
appearance - th a t I propose i s the governing Influence on Hegel's 
Absolute and, indeed, h i s philosophy i n general, Hegel himself ascribes 
the f o l l o w i n g p o s i t i o n t o H e r a c l i t u s (so l i k e h i s own): 
"Becoming, t h e t r u t h of Being; s i n c e e v e r y t h i n g i s and i s not, 
H e r a c l i t u s h e r e b y e.xpre5sed t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s Becoming, Not merely 
does o r i g i n a t i o n b e l o n g t o i t , but p a s s i n g away a s w e l l ; both a r e not 
indep e n d e n t b u t i d e n t i c a l , I t i s a g r e a t advance i n thought t o p a s s from 
B e i n g t o Becoming, even i f , a s t h e f i r s t u n i t y of o p p o s i t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , 
i t i s s t i l l a b s t r a c t , B e c a u s e i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p both must be u n r e s t f u l 
and t h e r e f o r e c o n t a i n w i t h i n t h e m s e l v e s the p r i n c i p l e of l i f e , t h e l a c k of 
motion which A r i s t o t l e h a s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n the e a r l i e r p h i l o s o p h i e s i s 
s u p p l i e d , and t h i s l a s t i s even made to be the p r i n c i p l e , T h i s p h i l o s o p h y 
i s t h u s not one p a s t and gone; i t s p r i n c i p l e i s e s s e n t i a l , and i s t o be 
found i n t h e b e g i n n i n g of my L o g i c , " (ZA'/'1,283) 
The major s i m i l a r i t i e s then i n what H e r a c l i t u s and Hegel assert are, 
b r i e f l y , t h a t u n i t y i s derived form an inner c o n f l i c t of opposites 
( t h i s , of course, i s the shared d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c , each proposing that 
the synthesis emerges from the antagonism between the t h e s i s and 
a n t i t h e s i s ) , and th a t , w i t h i n the inner c o n t r a d i c t i o n , the two 
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antagonists prove eventually t o be unlvocal. The second of these issues 
w i l l be dealt w i t h i n d e t a i l s h o r t l y , but the f i r s t , what we may term as 
the composition of the u n i f i e d Absolute, requires our immediate concern; 
a f t e r a l l , i f we are t o examine Hegel's system under the assertion that 
i t i s monistic, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o define more thoroughly the pinnacle 
of such a system, namely the Absolute Idea. 
Notes 
1. So f a r as Western thought i s concerned. I t i s possible t o argue 
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advocated a form of monism. 
2. See ILHP, p87. 
3. Kaufmann, p214. 
4. Barnes, pl34. 
5. Barnes, pl35. 
6. All e n , p l l . 
7. The second and t h i r d c r i t i c i s m s are discussed i n more length i n 
chapter two. 
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12 2. The pure being of the Absolute. 
I n my b r i e f discussion and c r i t i c i s m of Parmenides, I r e f e r r e d t o h i s 
monism as ' s i a t i c ' , and by t h i s I meant t o h i g h l i g h t the I s / is-not 
d i s t i n c t i o n i n i t s opposition t o any kind of system. This i s t o say that, 
f o r Parmenides, there i s no r e l a t i o n , e i t h e r abstract or concrete, between 
existence and not-existence, no grey areas i n which a confusion or 
c o r r u p t i o n regarding t r u e being may be posited, as i s the case with someone 
l i k e Sankara and h i s concept of maya, ^ Or, i n more Hegelian terminology, 
I Parmenides' concept of being and not-being i s wholly indeterminate and 
t h e r e f o r e collapses, or as Stace puts i t , "being i s r e a l , but i t i s nowhere 
and nowhen. I t does not e x i s t , " ^ because i t i s argued to be one-sided, and 
i s thus imprisoned i n (presupposed) s u b j e c t i v i t y . This forms the basis of 
Hegel's c r i t i c i s m against such philosophy as that of the Ele a t i c , le. the 
presupposed nature of Parmenides' theory ( i t s f a i l u r e t o apprehend the One 
' both s u b j e c t i v e l y and o b j e c t i v e l y ) , and i t s i n a b i l i t y to. be concretely 
i d e n t i f l e d .via d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and determination. 
Now, the question that needs t o be addressed I s whether Hegel f i n d s 
Parmenides' p r o p o s i t i o n I n general wholly, or only p a r t l y , at f a u l t . 
C e r t a i n l y Hegel c a r e f u l l y avoids the methodological e r r o r of Parmenides, 
namely the l e t t e r ' s r e f u s a l t o allow d i s t i n c t i o n on any grounds, but the 
grounds which Hegel permits are without doubt s t r i c t l y regulated by the 
all-encompassing nature of the Absolute, i t s p u r i t y i n i t s i d e a l of I t s e l f , 
and i t s expressive, diremptive process w i t h i n the Absolute as system. 
• Here, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o understand that by 'system' Hegel does not r e f e r 
t o a l i n e a r path of any kind, w i t h the Absolute engaged i n a chronological 
system which s t e a d i l y enhances i t u n t i l completion, something which would 
render i t as no more than a ' f i n a l product', assembled l i k e a motor car. 
As Hegel c l e a r l y states, "we u s u a l l y suppose th a t the Absolute must l i e f a r 
beyond; but i t i s p r e c i s e l y what I s wholly present," (Logic, §24A2); and he 
observes " i t i s the very concept of a whole t o contain parts; but i f the 
whole i s posited as what i t i s according t o i t s concept, then, vrfien i t i s 
divided. I t ceases t o be a whole. " (Logic, §135A) I n other words, the 
• Absolute, by being the sole, u l t i m a t e realm of being, cannot be created by 
a v a r i e t y of diverse p a r t i c u l a r s ; as Croce puts i t , " i t i s not the 
13 mechanical aggregate, but the organic whole. "'^  Rather, the Absolute as 
system I s engaged i n an e t e r n a l , c i r c u l a r type of system, never abandoning 
i t s e l f <as indeed i t cannot) as the t o t a l i t y , but c o n t i n u a l l y maintaining 
i t s end w i t h i n i t s beginning so th a t the e f f e c t of the system i s merely t o 
make l u c i d the sole, pure t r u t h of the Absolute S p i r i t . 
Thus, i t must be stressed that the system does not create something new, 
but instead i l l u m i n a t e s the omnipresent t r u t h , w i t h the beginning 
i m p l i c i t l y c o n t a i n i n g the end, and the end being the clarified beginning, 
i e . the objectified being of the Absolute Idea i n and f o r i t s e l f - Mure 
notably remarks "the system, being a c i r c l e , might be said to have no 
beginning."^ Nonetheless, the Absolute must f o r i t s o b j e c t i f I c a t i o n 
express a d i s t i n c t i o n and, furthermore, a d i s t i n c t i o n which must be 
i n t e r n a l as nothing l i e s e x t e r n a l t o i t . 
But, despite the recognised necessity of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , t h i s becoming 
i n t o apparent otherness t o o b j e c t i f y the Idea, a number of c r i t i c a l points 
surge t o the fore, d i s p u t i n g i t s l o g i c a l p l a u s i b i l i t y . For example, I f the 
Absolute i s a l l , can there be any genuine difference; that i s , i n the f i n a l 
a nalysis, can X be meaningfully d i f f e r e n t from X? I f the Absolute i s 
"wholly present," and i f "when i t i s divided, i t ceases to.be a whole," can 
i t t h e r e f o r e be also e s s e n t i a l l y divergent? Surely, as Grisea argues, " i f 
the Absolute achieves i t s completion and i t s u n i t y by v i r t u e of Hegel's 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l act, then the Absolute i s t r u t h by v i r t u e of a t r u t h which i s 
achieved in one of its parts - namely, i n Hegel's p h i l o s p h i c a l act, which 
i s not the Absolute."?-^' Also, i s i t not the case that the i n f i n i t e being 
i s n ecessarily o b j e c t i f i e d by what i s f i n i t e , and can we r e a l l y f a i l t o 
regard t h i s as a severe i r r e g u l a r i t y ? 
( 1 ) Pure being, nothing, and becoming. 
Let us begin t h i s part of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n by examining Hegel's concept of 
being or, more precisely, the abstract i d e a l of t h i s , namely pure being. 
With pure being, we f i n d ourselves entangled w i t h Parmenides once more as 
pure being, by i t s very d e f i n i t i o n , means being that i s devoid of any 
determination, i e . being which p e r t a i n s t o nothing. Here we f i n d a clue t o 
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Hegel's d i a l e c t i c a l analysis, because as pure being p e r t a i n s t o nothing, I t 
i s t h e r e f o r e the same as nothing because i t s indeterminate content i s 
p r e c i s e l y the same as the more obvious nothing: 
" T h i s p u r e b e i n g i s t h e purs adsiractlon, and hence i t i s absolutely 
negative, w h i c h when t a k e n i m m e d i a t e l y i s e q u a l l y nothing. 
"From t h i s , t h e second d e f i n i t i o n of t h e A b s o l u t e i s f o l l o w e d , t h a t 
i t i s nothing, i n f a c t , t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s i m p l i e d when i t i s s a i d 
t h a t t h e t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f i s t h a t which i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e , a b s o l u t e l y 
w i t h o u t form and t h e r e f o r e w i t h o u t c o n t e n t - or a g a i n when i t i s 
s a i d t h a t God ; s just t h e supreme essence and no more than t h a t , 
f o r t o c a l l him t h a t e x p r e s s e s t h e same n e g a t i v i t y ; t h e not h i n g , 
which t h e Buddhists siske i n t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of e v e r y t h i n g ( a n d i n t o 
t h e u l t i m a t e end and go a l of e v e r y t h i n g t o o ) , i s t h i s same 
a b s t r a c t i o n , " ilogic, §^7) 
Notably then, we can see here the e a r l i e r c r i t i c i s m of Parmendies; pure 
being, by v i r t u e of i t s indeterminate nature, i s synonymous w i t h nothing, a 
theory despised by Parmendies. Moreover, we can also see that the Absolute 
i s argued t o possess a noumenal form, a p u r i t y without p r e d i c a t i o n and that 
t h e r e f o r e the Absolute also encompasses the abstract notion of nothing. 
Thus, one can even say that Hegel i s propounding a more authentic form of 
monism than Parmenides because, although nothing i s q u i t e l i t e r a l l y no-
th i n g , whereas Parmenides t r u t h f u l l y employs i t as that-which-ls-not-being 
<le. as a q u a l i f i e r f o r being),® Hegel ventures forward f u r t h e r and says 
such I s indeed the a n t i t h e s i s of being and th e r e f o r e not only an 
o b j e c t i f y i n g element, but i n f a c t i s Included w i t h i n the whole i t s e l f . 
Now, l e t us be precise about Hegel's meaning here. The argument i s that 
pure being, because i t has no determination, i s e s s e n t i a l l y univocal w i t h 
nothing, equally Indeterminate and i n s u b s t a n t i a l (pure being, we must note, 
cannot be the being of some-thing (Dasein) because t h i s would s a c r i f i c e i t s 
p u r i t y ) . Or, i n other words, we are provided w i t h absolute noumenality, 
pure being and nothing b e r e f t of any predicate or determination that would 
c h a r a c t e r i s e i t . 
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But s u r e l y t h i s means that we are l e f t w i t h a stagnant deadlock, an empty 
a b s t r a c t i o n of sheer nothingness? No, argues Hegel, because from pure 
being and nothing emerges becoming - "nothing, as t h i s immediate [term] 
t h a t I s equal t o I t s e l f , i s the same as being. Hence, the t r u t h of being 
and nothing a l i k e i s the unity of both of them; t h i s u n i t y i s becoming." 
(.Logic, §88) 
Hegel argues t h i s because w i t h i n being and nothing i s an i n s t a b i l i t y , a 
tension because, despite the abstract equivocalness ( i e . the shared content 
of noumenality), being suggests p o s i t i v i t y ( i s ) and nothing n e g a t i v i t y ( i s -
no t ) . As Mure puts i t , "a world of becoming i s more than the sheer 
o s c i l l a t i o n of Being and Nothing i n one another. I t i s and i s not, but i t 
i s r a t h e r than i s not. I n other words, w i t h i n pure being and nothing i s 
an i m p l i c i t content and, w h i l s t being and nothing are'the same because not 
even the ' i s ' p e r t a i n s t o anything, Hegel asserts that t h i s means also that 
pure being and nothing are wholly d i f f e r e n t ; 
"But c o r r e c t a s i t i s t o a f f i r m t h e u n i t y of b e i n g and noth i n g , i t i s 
SQuaJJy coTTeci t o s a y t h a t tAey are absolutely diverse too - t h a t the one 
i s not what t h e o t h e r i s , B u t b e c a u s e t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n h a s h e r e not y e t 
d e t e r m i n e d i t s e l f , p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e b e i n g and n o t h i n g a r e s t i l l the 
immediate, i t i s , a s b e l o n g i n g t o them, u/fiat cannot de said, what i s merely 
meani (Logic, §88) 
This i s a h i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l a s s e r t i o n on Hegel's behalf as what he i s 
suggesting i s that i m p l i c i t l y w i t h i n t h i s being / nothing deadlock i s a 
hidden meaning of being r e f e r r i n g t o the more conventionally assumed 
a n t i t h e s i s of nothing, namely something. This something i s not at t h i s 
p o i n t p a r t i c u l a r i t y , but a general reference t o substance. Hegel 
continues; 
"As t h e i r u n i t y , tteco/slng i s t he t r u e e x p r e s s i o n of t h e r e s u l t of be i n g 
and n o t h i n g ; i t i s not j u s t t h e unity b e i n g and noth i n g , but i t i s 
inwa r d unrest - a u n i t y which i n i t s s e l f - r e l a t i o n i s not s i m p l y 
m o t i o n l e s s , b u t which, i n v i r t u e of t h e d i v e r s i t y of b e i n g and n o t h i n g 
which i t c o n t a i n s , i s i n w a r d l y t u r n e d a g a i n s t i t s e l f , Being-there, on 
16 t h e c o n t r a r y , i s t h i s unity or becoming i n t h i s form of u n i t y ; t h a t i s 
why i t i s one-sided iud finite," (Logic %W 
So, put crudely, because being and nothing s t r u g g l e i n t h e i r absolute 
d i f f e r e n c e as the i s and is - n o t (or the p o s i t i v e and negative), what occurs 
i s the emergence of a h i t h e r t o presupposed meaning, a vague and obscure 
d r i v e towards s u b s t a n t i a l being; the c o n f l i c t of opposition, that i s , 
creates a c t i v i t y (hence the u n i t y being "not simply motionless"), and 
t h e r e f o r e an e f f e c t of becoming surfaces. I n other words, Hegel asserts 
th a t from pure being and nothing determination arises, determination that 
was at f i r s t I m p l i c i t and presupposed, but that now f l o u r i s h e s because of 
i t s p r o p u l s i o n from the inner c o n f l i c t and tension. Croce o f f e r s an 
analogy: " t h i s c o n f l i c t (which i s also a union, since two wrestlers, i n 
order t o wrestle, must lay hold of one another!) i s becoming."® 
I n t r u t h , t h i s i s a hard t o f o l l o w argument, f o r what Hegel attempts i s t o 
leap from a s t a t e of pure. Indeterminate being, equatable with nothing, 
s t r a i g h t through t o determinate being, that which i s becoming and d r i v i n g 
i t s e l f forward. How s e r i o u s l y can one take such a proposition? Pure being 
and nothing are such because of t h e i r very noumenality, t h e i r complete lack 
of d r i v e or pr e d i c a t i o n , I f Hegel says - as the above quotations 
e x p l i c i t l y show - that being and nothing can e f f e c t becoming because they 
have w i t h i n them an i m p l i c i t meaning ( i e , the p o s l t i v l t y and n e g a t i v i t y ) , 
then he i s at once removing the very p u r i t y and nothingness that they 
require. Or, put another way, how can pure being contain the predicate 
which an ' i m p l i c i t meaning' undoubtedly Indicates? I f pure being i s Indeed 
pure being, i t I s surely absurd t o say that i t has an i m p l i c i t reference 
f o r t h i s i s undeniably a predicate and unquestionably i n d i c a t e s 
determination. Croce q u i t e r i g h t l y acknowledges t h i s , and comments "a = a 
remains a, and does not become t,"'^ but then he mistakes Hegel's meaning by 
suggesting that "being and nothing are not I d e n t i c a l , but prec i s e l y 
opposite, and i n c o n f l i c t w i t h one another. "^ '^  That i s t o say, +A * -A, 
which i s reasonable i n I t s e l f but c l e a r l y not w i t h regard t o Hegel who i s 
I n s i s t e n t t h a t nothing " i s the same as being." (Logic, §88) 
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The s o l u t i o n Hegel o f f e r s t o t h i s problem i s th a t pure being e x i s t s as 
abstract noumenality (necessarily abstract because of i t s lack of 
p r e d i c a t i o n ) alongside itself as determinate being. I n i t s i d e a l , the 
Absolute i s i n a c t i v e and harmonious, complete as the i d e a l , but i n i t s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( i e . how i t i s apprehended by man) i t I s determinate. Like 
a man, theref o r e , the Absolute i s e s s e n t i a l l y nouraenal s e l f , what Hegel 
c a l l s the ' I ' or 'ego', but t h i s s e l f , l i k e the man's body i s also a c t i v e l y 
expressive: 
" I n i t s t r u t h , a s the i d e a l i t y of what i m m e d i a t e l y i s , i d e n t i t y i s a l o f t y 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n both f o r our r e l i g i o u s c o n s c i o u s n e s s and f o r t h e r e s t of our 
t h i n k i n g and c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n g e n e r a l , I t c a n be s a i d t h a t t h e t r u e 
knowledge of God b e g i n s a t t h e p o i n t where he i s known a s I d e n t i t y , i e , a s 
a b s o l u t e i d e n t i t y ; and t h i s i m p l i e s , a t t h e same time, t h a t a l l the power 
and t h e g l o r y of t h e w o r l d s i n k s i n t o n o t h i n g b e f o r e God and can s u b s i s t 
o n l y a s t h e s h i n i n g [ f o r t h ] of his pover and A;s g l o r y , 
" S i m i l a r l y , i t i s h i s i d e n t i t y a s c o n s c i o u s n e s s of h i m s e l f t h a t 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s man from n a t u r e i n g e n e r a l , and p a r t i c u l a r l y from a n i m a l s , 
which do n o t a c h i e v e a g r a s p of t h e m s e l v e s a s ' I ' , i e , a s pure s e l f - u n i t y , " 
Uogic, i l l S A ) 
Thus, what Hegel contends i s th a t God i s content and pure w i t h i n himself 
and t h a t a l l phenomenality "sinks i n t o nothing." I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , 
however, i s the a c t i v i t y of God, h i s expression and 'shining'. To draw an 
analogy from human experience, i f , I stood before a stranger and said 
nothing, the stranger would not know who I was; i f , however, I said "my 
name i s Michael," t h i s would e n l i g h t e n the stranger as t o my person, but 
c r u c i a l l y i t would not a f f e c t me and, having spoken, I could r e t u r n t o 
si l e n c e no d i f f e r e n t from before. 
But analogies are not the same as metaphysical laws, and an important point 
i s missed i f we simply accept that God can be purely at rest, as pure, 
abstract being, and then also express himself, f o r as soon as we say "can," 
or h i n t at h i s p o t e n t i a l (see below), then we are Immediately awarding him 
a predicate and denying him the st a t u s of being t r u l y noumenal. I f , that 
i s , God i s genuinely pure being, he cannot have the p o t e n t i a l or a b i l i t y t o 
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i l l u m i n a t e himself v i a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n as t h i s i s an actual predicate, 
a l b e i t one Hegel claims i s i n t h i s context only p o t e n t i a l . 
This problem i s something Hegel never s a t i s f a c t o r i l y resolves, but his 
i n s i s t e n c e on t h i s p e c u l i a r co-existence of p u r i t y and d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n 
the Absolute I s unwavering. The r i g i d 'being i s , not-being i s not' 
p r o p o s i t i o n has t o be r e j e c t e d and replaced w i t h an active, dynamic 
s t r u c t u r e , but Hegel demands tha t higher than t h i s i s the ideal , 
noumenality of the Absolute, the p r i n c i p l e f o r v ^ l c h a l l a c t i v i t y has i t s 
purpose; 
"To t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t b e i n g i s the p a s s i n g i n t o n o t h i n g and t h a t 
n o t h i n g i s t h e p a s s i n g i n t o b e i n g . - t o the p r o p o s i t i o n of becoming, 
. i s opposed t he p r o p o s i t i o n ; 'from nothing, nothing comes, " " s o m e t h i n g 
o n l y comes from something," t h e p r o p o s i t i o n of the e t e r n i t y of matter, 
or of pantheism, The A n c i e n t s made t h e s i m p l e r e f l e c t i o n t h a t t h e 
p r o p o s i t i o n ; "something comes from something," or "from n o t h i n g , n o t h i n g 
comes," does i n d e e d s u b l a t e becoming; f o r t h a t from which t h e r e i s 
becoming and t h a t which comes to be a r e one and the same; a l l we have 
h e r e i s t h e p r o p o s i t i o n of t h e a b s t r a c t i d e n t i t y of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
But i t must s t r i k e one a s amazing to s e e the p r o p o s i t i o n s ; "from nothing, 
n o t h i n g comes," or "something comes o n l y from something," advanced q u i t e 
n a i v e l y , w i t h o u t any c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t t h ey a r e the f o u n d a t i o n s of 
pa n t h e i s m , " (Logic, §88) 
Wallace notably r e f e r s t h i s t o the more developed metaphysics of 
A r i s t o t l e , q u o t i n g h i s comments that the E l e a t l c s "say none of the things 
t h a t are, e i t h e r come t o be or pass out of existence, because what comes t o 
be must do so e i t h e r from what i s or from what i s not, both of which are 
impossible. For what i s cannot come t o be (because something must be 
present as a substratum). So too they exaggerated the consequence of t h i s , 
and went so f a r as t o deny even the existence of a p l u r a l i t y of things, 
maintaining t h a t only Being i t s e l f ' i s . "''^  
( l i ) Noumenality and Aristotle's potentiality. 
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A r i s t o t l e ' s s o l u t i o n t o the problem posed by Parraenidian monism i s probably 
a governing f a c t o r behind Hegel's; indeed Hegel acknowledges h i s debt t o 
the Greek, suggesting the Absolute Idea i n and f o r I t s e l f " i s the noesls 
noeseos, which was already c a l l e d the highest form of the Idea by 
A r i s t o t l e . . " (Logic, §236A)'^ The key s i m i l a r i t y between the two I s found 
i n A r i s t o t l e ' s p r o p o s i t i o n that "motion i s the possession of the end of 
what I s i n power as such ... CthusI when the b u i l d a b l e has i t s end i n 
i t s e l f , i t i s being b u i l t , and t h i s i s con s t r u c t i o n . .. the a c t i v i t y of the 
bu i l d a b l e as b u i l d a b l e i s c o n s t r u c t i o n ... co n s t r u c t i o n i s the a c t i v i t y , 
and c o n s t r u c t i o n i s a kind of process."^^ The s i g n i f i c a n c e here i s the 
concept t h a t a process, or system, contains i t s end w i t h i n i t s e l f , and 
that t h i s system continues throughout t o possess the p o t e n t i a l i t y of i t s 
i d e a l s t a t e (entelecheia'); thus one may say that an acorn, f o r instance, 
contains i t s i d e a l of becoming an oak t r e e w i t h i n I t s e l f - the being of 
'oak t r e e ' , that i s , e x i s t s a b s t r a c t l y w i t h i n the u n f u l f i l l e d acorn. 
This p r i n c i p l e i s of no small importance t o t h i s discussion, f o r the 
p a r a l l e l drawn here w i t h A r i s t o t l e i l l u m i n a t e s Hegel's understanding of the 
id e a l i s e d , noumenal s t a t e of the Absolute. A r i s t o t l e develops h i s theory 
t o i d e n t i f y a permanent q u a l i t y which has the p o t e n t i a l t o assume 
d i f f e r e n t , m a t e r i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s so that " a c t i v i t y i s r e l a t e d t o 
p o t e n t i a l i t y i n some cases i n the way coming-to-be I s r e l a t e d t o the power 
t o become; and I n other cases i t i s r e l a t e d i n the way r e a l i t y i s r e l a t e d 
t o i t s matter. "^""^  This point, of course, must be considered only as a 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r i n c i p l e , and not be confused w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s own, d i s t i n c t 
understanding of God i n r e l a t i o n t o Hegel's, but, as a philosophical point, 
one may t h e r e f o r e see that the c h i e f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r e a l i t y f o r 
A r i s t o t l e i s a c t i v i t y , the adoption of matter that works towards the form's 
goal, so th a t the energetic being of matter i s i t s form. Compare t h i s with 
Hegel, who wr i t e s : 
" I n t h e p r o g r e s s i o n of the I d e a t h e b e g i n n i n g p r o v e s to be what i t 
a l r e a d y i s i n - i t s e l f , namely, what i s p o s i t e d and mediated and not 
what s i m p l y and i m m e d i a t e l y is," (.Logic, §239A) 
Here, then, Hegel proposes that by 'beginning' what i s r e f e r r e d t o i s not 
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any immediate type of 'point-A' but rather that which i s I t s e l f also the 
r e s u l t , because t h i s i s necessarily contained i n the whole. Thus, j u s t as 
an acorn contains the p o t e n t i a l oak tree, so does the f i r s t apprehension of 
the Absolute contain the i l l u m i n a t e d , c o g n i t i v e Absolute - the " l a s t stage 
of the l o g i c a l process proves at the same time t o be what i s genuinely 
f i r s t and what i s only through i t s e l f . " (Logdc, §215A)'^ Hence, the 
becoming of the Absolute can here be seen not so much as a process of X 
becoming Y, but rat h e r the Absolute revealing Itself further as X v i a such 
becoming: 
" E v e r y o n e has a n o t i o n of becoming and w i l l a l s o admit moreover t h a t i t i s 
One n o t i o n ; and f u r t h e r t h a t , i f i t i s a n a l y s e d , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of being, 
but a l s o t h a t of nothing, t h e s t a r k Other of being, i s found t o be c o n t a i n e d 
i n i t ; f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e s e two d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a r e u n d i v i d e d i n t h i s One 
n o t i o n ; hence t h a t becoming i s the u n i t y of b e i n g and noth i n g . Another 
example t h a t i s e q u a l l y ready to hand i s the beginning, the ma t t e r [ i t s e l f ] 
Is not yet i n i t s b e g i n n i n g , but the b e g i n n i n g i s not merely i t s nothing on 
the c o n t r a r y , i t s being i s a l r e a d y t h e r e , too. The b e g i n n i n g i t s e l f i s a l s o 
becoming, but i t e x p r e s s e s a l r e a d y t h e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s i o n , " 
(Logic, §88) 
What the above quotations t h e r e f o r e aim t o h i g h l i g h t i s that the Absolute 
i s found wholly w i t h i n the beginning, the becoming, and the r e s u l t ; the 
pure Absolute, that i s , e x i s t s as the permanent q u a l i t y upon which apparent 
d i f f e r e n c e l i e s . Here, then, i s the pure Absolute which 'becomes' only i n 
the sense th a t i t enlightens i t s e l f through the adoption of matter ( i e . the 
dlremptive process), and again t h i s i n d i c a t e s form being the a c t i v e element 
as i t i s t h i s t h a t determines i t s e l f through i t s use of material being. 
Thus, the form determines i t s i d e n t i t y by i t s apparent d i s t i n c t i o n from the 
posited matter: 
"As t h e Immediate unity oi e x i s t e n c e w i t h i t s e l f , Matter i s a l s o 
i n d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o de t e r m i n a c y ; t h e many d i v e r s e m a t t e r s 
t h e r e f o r e merge i n t o the One matter ( o r e x i s t e n c e i n the r e f l e c t i v e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of i d e n t i t y ) . As a g a i n s t t h i s One matter, t h e s e [ o t h e r ] 
d i s t i n c t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s and t h e e x t e r n a l relation vhicU they have to 
21 e a c h o t h e r i n t h e t h i n g a r e the form - t h e r e f l e c t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
of d i s t i n c t i o n , but a s e x i s t i n g and a s t o t a l i t y , " (Logic, §128) 
What Hegel argues, therefore, i s t h a t X possesses a v a r i e t y of d i s t i n c t 
determinations that act together t o compose the u n i t y of X's material 
existence and, as wi t h A r i s t o t l e , the basis of t h i s composition i s 
described as form. Indeed, Findlay goes as f a r as t o say " i t seems p l a i n 
t h a t Hegel has pushed the D i a l e c t i c i n the present d i r e c t i o n i n order t o 
take I n the A r i s t o t e l i a n concept of Form and Matter. So, with the 
Absolute, one may regard t h i s as the u l t i m a t e l y sole, noumenal (or pure) 
form, but that which can possess determinations that a f f e c t i t s apparent 
s t a t e of being, being which i s encountered v i a the diremption. However, 
also w i t h i n t h i s category l i e s the noumenal Absolute, that i s d i s t i n c t from 
i t s apparent form i n the sense that i t i s free from i t s r e s t r i c t i v e 
appearance, and e x i s t s as an Incorporeal, permanent q u a l i t y , termed by 
Hegel as the Absolute Idea, and " t h i s Idea i s f o r - i t s e l f the pure form of 
the Concept, " (.Logic, §237) Thus, when one examines the Absolute s o l e l y as 
pure, noumenal form, disregarding i t s apparent dimensions, one f i n d s a 
t r u l y nouraenal existence which i s d i s t i n c t from i t s r e f l e c t i o n - i n t o - s e l f , 
l e . d i s t i n c t from i t s s e l f - o b j e c t i f y i n g form and matter which characterises 
i t . 
Here i t i s Important t o view the Absolute as not only having the potential 
t o be f r e e as pure being, but also maintaining such as a l o g i c a l necessity; 
th a t i s , i t i s an i n t r i n s i c and e s s e n t i a l element of the Absolute's system, 
as the i d e a l Absolute Idea i s both what a l l derives from, and what.all 
seemingly s t r i v e s t o r e t u r n to, i e . i t i s the absolute ground of being. 
(Logic, §121ff) Thus, when one reads the f o l l o w i n g , one cannot but help 
i d e n t i f y the noumenal being as that which matter and form mirror: 
"What a p p e a r s e x i s t s i n s u c h a way t h a t i t s subsistence i s 
i m m e d i a t e l y s u b l a t e d , and i s o n l y One moment of the form i t s e l f ; t h e 
form c o n t a i n s s u b s i s t e n c e or m a t t e r w i t h i n i t s e l f a s one of i t s 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . Thus, what a p p e a r s h a s i t s ground i n the form a s 
e s s e n c e , or a s i t s inward r e f l e c t i o n v i s - ^ i - v i s i t s immediacy - but 
t h a t o n l y means t h a t i t h a s i t s ground i n ano t h e r d e t e r m i n a c y of the 
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form. T h i s ground of what a p p e a r s i s j u s t a s much s o m e t h i n g - t h a t -
a p p e a r s (ein Erscheinendes), so t h a t a p pearance p r o c e e d s to an 
i n f i n i t e m e d i a t i o n of i t s s u b s i s t e n c e by i t s form, hence by 
n o n - s u b s i s t e n c e a s w e l l . T h i s i n f i n i t e m e d i a t i o n i s a t t h e same time 
a u n i t y of r e l a t i o n to s e l f ; and e x i s t e n c e i s d e v e l o p e d i n t o a totality 
and a iDorldoi appearance, or of r e f l e c t e d f i n i t u d e , " (Logic, §132) 
I m p l i c i t , then, i s the pure being, nothing, towards which the f i n i t e being 
of the d i s t i n c t i v e Absolute i s r e f l e c t e d , and i f such was not e t e r n a l l y 
present as the supreme Idea w i t h i n the system i n general, then there would 
be n e i t h e r any basis f o r the apparent, nor anything the apparent could 
d r i v e back towards or r e f l e c t . 
What emerges, therefore, i s th a t Hegel o f f e r s the Absolute as a pure form 
th a t I l l u m i n a t e s i t s e l f v i a the adoption of matter w h i l s t r e t a i n i n g i t s 
i d e a l , noumenal state. I n t h i s i d e a l state, the Absolute Idea i s Indeed 
equatable w i t h nothing as i t p e r t a i n s as such t o no determinate being, but 
i t s s e l f - p o r t r a y a l as m a t e r i a l existence i n another moment provides the 
req u i r e d d l f f - e r e n t i a t l o n and subsequent o b j e c t i f l c a t i o n . 
Of course, t h i s must not be understood as a promotion on Hegel's behalf of 
any s t y l e of n i h i l i s m , as may be charged, f o r example, u l t i m a t e l y against 
Parmenides whose absolute being should (according t o Hegel) be negated 
owing t o i t s one-sidedness; the p o s i t i v e aspect ( l e . the activity) of the 
Absolute ensures against t h i s t h r e a t . Rather, what Hegel propounds i s that 
w i t h i n the e f f e c t i v e l y diverse nature of the one Absolute, l i e s a pure, 
chara c t e r l e s s state, i n nature akin t o Parmenides' being and A r i s t o t l e ' s 
pure form but o b j e c t i f i e d and given determination v i a i t s diremptive 
action , and thus we may deduce the Absolute Idea as follows: 
The Absolute Idea i s e t e r n a l as pure being, equatable w i t h nothing, but ( i n 
a s p e c i f i c moment of the diremptlon) assumes both a form ( i t s t a n g i b l e 
being) and matter (phenomenal p a r t i c u l a r i t y ) . From t h i s , one i s compelled 
to agree t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n the Absolute i s present or else one could 
not p o s s i b l y encounter the sensible world nor, f o r that matter, i d e n t i f y 
w i t h any c e r t a i n t y the Absolute Idea I t s e l f . However, one must also admit 
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the supreme, i d e a l s t a t e of the Absolute, i e. the noumenal realm of being 
i n and f o r i t s e l f from which everything i s born and re t u r n s to. To 
conclude t h i s point that I have touched upon only too b r i e f l y , one may 
consider Hegel's own summary; 
"As a p r o c e s s , t h e I d e a r u n s t h r o u g h t h r e e s t a g e s i n i t s development, 
The f i r s t form of the I d e a i s life, i e , t h e Id e a i n i t s form of 
immediacy. The se c o n d form i s t h a t of m e d i a t i o n or d i f f e r e n c e , ' a n d t h i s 
i s t h e I d e a a s cognition ,,, The r e s u l t of the p r o c e s s of c o g n i t i o n i s 
the r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g of u n i t y e n r i c h e d by d i s t i n c t i o n ; and t h i s g i v e s the 
t h i r d form of t h e ( h e r e w i t h ) absolute Idea, T h i s l a s t s t a g e of t h e 
l o g i c a l p r o c e s s p r o v e s a t t h e same time t o be what i s g e n u i n e l y f i r s t and 
what i s o n l y through i t s e l f , " (Logic, §215A) 
What the above attempts t o argue then i s that, w i t h i n the system I n 
general, an i d e a l , l o g i c a l l y encountered s t a t e i s ex i s t e n t whereby the 
Absolute i s pure, noumenal being, and i t i s t h i s s t a t e from which a l l 
apparently proceeds and s t r i v e s back towards. However, from i d e n t i f y i n g 
t h i s i d e a l , we must now consider the manner i n which d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
i n t e r n a l l y present w i t h i n the Absolute. 
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3. Internal distinction. 
The most Important aspect of Hegel's theology t h a t must be kept i n mind 
when discussing the Absolute's d i s t i n c t i o n i s that the "Idea I s the One 
T o t a l i t y , " (Logic, §242) and th a t , when one discusses d i s t i n c t i o n or 
d i f f e r e n c e , " t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n concerns the determination of the u n i t y . " 
(Logic, preface (p8)) Hence, one may b r i e f l y surmise that the purpose 
of d i s t i n c t i o n i s t o give the Absolute concrete, meaningful existence 
and, f u r t h e r , t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n i s s t r i c t l y a s e i f - o b j e c t i f y l n g moment of 
the Absolute's system, as opposed t o an absolute dualism. I n more 
simple terms, the Absolute seeks t o i d e n t i f y i t s e l f by i t s adoption of 
apparent otherness that r e f l e c t s i t s being, as a man, so t o speak, may 
i d e n t i f y himself by h i s appearance i n a mirror, r a t h e r than by v i r t u e of 
an external r e l a t i o n . Hegel's own terminology i s s i m i l a r , and he 
proposes th a t the Absolute as essence'' "shines within itself, or i s pure 
r e f l e c t i o n . I n t h i s way i t i s only r e l a t i o n t o s e l f . . . identity with 
Itself." (Logic, §115) Thus, when we speak of ' d i s t i n c t i o n ' , we must do 
so i n the knowledge that such i s d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n one thing, and not 
of one i n r e l a t i o n t o an ex t e r n a l other. 
This r a i s e s the question of how X can be meaningfully said to be 
a u t h e n t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from what i s , a f t e r a l l , X. This i s t o propose 
that the Absolute simply cannot o b j e c t i f y i t s e l f by ah apparent other, 
when t h i s 'other' i s i n f a c t merely the s e l f - p o s i t e d Absolute i t s e l f . 
Although Taylor exclaims "so f a r so good," when acknowledging that "the 
red object i s also e s s e n t i a l l y not-blue; i t can only be grasped as red 
i f i t i s grasped as not-blue,"^ the problem that l u r k s i s that the 
Absolute i s supposed t o be, as the t o t a l i t y , blue as wel l . Hegel's 
attempt t o resolve t h i s problem derives from h i s employment of Flchte's 
understanding of r e f l e c t i o n . Basically,' the p r i n c i p l e Flchte applied 
rested upon the c l a s s i c a l understanding of i d e n t i t y and difference, the 
two simple laws of X = X and -X ?^  X respectively. The former of these 
i s the p o s i t i v e (or p o s i t i o n ) , and the l a t t e r the negative (or 
o p p o s i t i o n ) , and the problem f o r Flchte was how t o l e g i t i m a t e l y u n i t e 
these. Although the content of the two i s the same, so that a u n i t y of 
t h i s content which synthesises the two formal elements occurs, f o r 
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F i c h t e t h i s was i l l e g i t i m a t e because I t could not be viewed, according 
t o h i s c r i t e r i o n , as i n t e l l i g i b l e i n I t s e l f ; any analysis of the unity, 
t h a t i s , would at once expose the d i v i s i o n of the p o s i t i o n and 
opposition.® 
I t was t h i s conclusion that Hegel was u n w i l l i n g t o accept, and 
understandably so since each of the two elements are i n themselves q u i t e 
vacuous. The p r i n c i p l e t h a t X = X, i f regarded as a d i s t i n c t universal 
law, r e s u l t s only i n the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of X's a b i l i t y t o d i s t i n g u i s h and 
thereby o b j e c t i f y I t s e l f ; because X = X i s wholly exclusive, that I s , i t 
cannot form a r e l a t i o n that can concretely I d e n t i f y i t via 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n because there i s no other ( i e . Y) f o r i t t o r e l a t e to. 
However, nor i s i t possible t o simply assert t h a t not-X / X as t h i s 
e f f e c t i v e l y renders both X and not-X as wholly unrelated and therefore 
s t i l l not o b j e c t i v e l y encountered because d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n requires 
r e l a t i o n which t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n denies; the equation merely argues that 
one i s not the other, and neglects t o portray what X a c t u a l l y i s . 
The i m p l i c a t i o n s that a r i s e from t h i s are c e r t a i n l y notable. I f , on one 
hand, X = X, then a l l that emerges i s a r e p e t i t i o n of Parmenides' 
inadequate "being i s , not-being i s not." Yet i f , on the other, not-X t 
X, then i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s impossible unless f u r t h e r , reJated information 
i s given ( f o r example, not-X = Y), and from t h i s p o s i t i o n only p l u r a l i s m 
can be advocated because Y i s absolutely d i s t i n c t from X. Thus, Hegel's 
answer i s t o propose th a t the Absolute contains I n t e r n a l d i s t i n c t i o n by 
v i r t u e of opposition, most concisely described as p o s i t i v i t y and 
n e g a t i v i t y . This p r o p o s i t i o n operates on a purely d i a l e c t i c a l format, 
arguing t h a t the opposite of one is contained within the one. For 
example, the I n f i n i t e ( s u b j e c t i v e p o s i t i v e ) i s o b j e c t i f i e d and given 
concrete meaning p r e c i s e l y because i t i s not the f i n i t e ( s ubjective 
negative); that i s , i n f i n i t y contains w i t h i n i t f i n i t u d e p r e c i s e l y 
because f i n i t u d e i s the a n t i t h e s i s of I n f i n i t u d e . Or, put another way, 
i n f i n i t u d e i s self-related because i t i s n o t - f i n i t e - i t s very being as 
i n f i n i t u d e i s defined exactly by i t s negative a n t i t h e s i s , f i n i t u d e , so 
tha t I t i s n o t - l i m i t e d , not-bound, etc: 
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" D i s t i n c t i o n In its own self i s t h e essential [ d i s t i n c t i o n ] , t h e positive 
and t h e negative/ t h e p o s i t i v e i s t h e i d e n t i c a l r e l a t i o n to s e l f i n s u c h 
a way t h a t i t i s not t h e n e g a t i v e , w h i l e t he n e g a t i v e i s d i s t i n c t on i t s 
own a c c o u n t i n s u c h a way t h a t i t i s not the p o s i t i v e . S i n c e e a c h of 
them i s on i t s own a c c o u n t o n l y i n v i r t u e of not being the other one, 
e a c h shines (Schein) w i t h i n t h e o t h e r , and i s o n l y i n s o f a r a s the o t h e r 
i s . Hence, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of e s s e n c e i n opposition through which what 
i s d i s t i n c t does not have an other In general, but lis tJ(c/7 o t h e r f a c i n g 
i t ; t h a t i s t o say, e a c h h a s i t s own d e t e r m i n a t i o n o n l y i n i t s r e l a t i o n 
to t h e o t h e r ; i t i s o n l y i n w a r d l y r e f l e c t e d i n s o f a r a s i t i s r e f l e c t e d 
i n t o t h e o t h e r , and the o t h e r l i k e w i s e ; t h u s each i s the o t h e r ' s ottn 
o t h e r , " (Logic, §119) 
What becomes apparent from t h i s then, i s that the Absolute Idea can be 
viewed as t r u e because i t i s n o t - f i n i t e , not-temporal, not-blue, and so 
on, ad infinitum. However, t h i s draws us back t o the e x i s t e n t i a l 
c r i t i c i s m of Parmenides; the Absolute can only be not-thls-and-that i f 
th i s - a n d - t h a t are ex i s t e n t i n t h e i r own r i g h t . Here, however, Hegel 
makes a most c r i t i c a l point. One may argue that although the Absolute 
i s not ( f o r example) f i n i t e , t h i s i n I t s e l f i d e n t i f i e s an other t o the 
Absolute, l e . f i n i t u d e , and t h e r e f o r e the Absolute, i f i t i s the sole 
realm of being, must Incorporate f i n i t u d e , and Indeed everything else. 
Thus, what one a r r i v e s at I s the p r o p o s i t i o n that the Absolute i s 
i n f i n i t e and n o t - i n f i n i t e , blue and not-blue, and so f o r t h or, as Hegel 
himself would put i t , that d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s w i t h i n unity. 
I t i s , though, seemingly Impossible not t o f i n d t h i s l o g i c at f i r s t 
glance q u i t e absurd; a f t e r a l l , s u rely something e i t h e r i s blue or i t i s 
not, but c e r t a i n l y never both at once? Or, i n other words, i s i t not 
bordering on the r i d i c u l o u s t o suggest that a monistic Absolute i s both 
the a bstract, conceptual realm of being, and also the f i n i t e phenomenal 
world? Emile Fackenheim i s j u s t one commentator who picks up on t h i s 
point, and he w r i t e s "how can philosophy, i d e n t i f i e d w i t h Reason, 
recognise any actual world besides i t s e l f , toward which i t i s directed? 
Or does philosophy recognise such a world, namely, the contingent and 
fragmented world of human experience? How then can i t take that world 
'as being e s s e n t i a l l y Notion [ i e . concept, Begriffl' ? From the outset 
and throughout, the Hegelian system seems faced w i t h the choice between 
saving the claims of an absolute and the r e f o r e all-comprehensive 
philosophic thought, but at the p r i c e of loss of any actual world 
besides i t , and saving the contingent world of human experience at the 
p r i c e of reducing philosophic thought i t s e l f t o f I n i t e n e s s . 
But Hegel sees h i s argument as being applicable s t r i c t l y t o opposites, 
the p o s i t i v e and negative, so that one cannot argue not-blue I s another 
colour, only that i t i s 'negative-blue' (see Logic, §119). Thus, when 
we say the Absolute contains d i s t i n c t i o n , i n every possible concept the 
d i s t i n c t i o n must be regarded I n the appropriate sense, ie. +A = -A, and 
-A = +A; the p o s i t i v e i s always i d e n t i f i e d and thus o b j e c t i f i e d by the 
negative, and what cannot be stressed enough i s that the p r i n c i p l e i s 
wholly aligned t o the p o s i t i v e and negative, and not p a r t i c u l a r i t y prima 
facie. I f one considers temperature, f o r instance, a reading may say 
+10° or -10°, but e i t h e r way the d i f f e r e n c e from zero i s 10° and, 
whatever the case, i t i s one because I t i s not the other w h i l s t 
correspondingly the other i s not the one f o r p r e c i s e l y the same reason; 
+10° and -10° stand equally opposed, and yet the i d e n t i f i e d ( i e . 10°) 
e x i s t s w i t h i n both the p o s i t i v e and the negative. 
From t h i s , we can see what one may term as the common content, l e . the 
10°. C e r t a i n l y , i n the e x p e r i e n t i a l sense, -10° and +10° hold a marked 
d i f f e r e n c e and are undoubtedly d i s t i n c t , but also there e x i s t s the 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t both the p o s i t i v e and the negative possess the same 
d i f f e r e n c e , and thus they "are both d i s t i n c t and yet i d e n t i c a l . ^ 
Furthermore, the p o s i t i v e and negative, the i s and is- n o t , remain wholly 
dependent upon each other so th a t X cannot be unless there i s negative-X 
t o maintain i t ; one can only say, f o r example, " t h i s i s a pi n t of beer" 
i f n ot-a-pint-of-beer i s a p o s s i b i l i t y . This i s not t o argue so much 
that a p i n t of beer i s so only because i t i s not a sandwich, but rather 
because i t s genuine other ( i e . not-beer) i s a p l a u s i b l e assertion; 




Of course, t h i s I s e n t i r e l y abstract and seemingly bears no r e l a t i o n t o 
the ' r e a l world', but i f the p r i n c i p l e i s viewed i n reverse, so t o 
speak, t h i s problem begins t o unfold. I f we imagine the phenomenal 
world, we see posltive-A. Positive-A i s , however, wholly dependent on 
i t s other, negative-A, f o r o b j e c t l f i c a t i o n , and therefore, i n 
I d e n t i f y i n g p o s i t l v e - A <the phenomenal) we are also i d e n t i f y i n g 
negatlve-A (not-the-phenomenal, i e . the noumenal). So, i n i d e n t i f y i n g 
the sensible world, we are simultaneously and unavoidably also 
acknowledging the i d e n t i c a l (though a n t i t h e t i c a l ) nouraenal realm. Each, 
as the a n t i t h e s i s of the other, stands i n a peculiar, over and against 
p o s i t i o n so that the p o s i t i v e i s I d e n t i c a l l y mirrored by the negative, 
as l i g h t I s by dark. The phenomenal, therefore. I s i d e n t i c a l t o the 
noumenal (and vice-versa) because i t i s p r e c i s e l y the same i n abstract 
content, although d i s t i n c t because one i s p o s i t i v e and the other 
negative. A i s the phenomenal because i t i s not the noumenal, and A i s 
also the noumenal because i t i s not the phenomenal: 
The positive i s t h a t diverse [ t e r m ] , which has t o be on i t s own 
a c c o u n t and a t the same time not i n d i f f e r e n t v i s - e i - v i s i t s r e l a t i o n io 
its other, The negative, a s n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n to self, has t o be 
e q u a l l y independent, I t h as to te on its oitn account buX a t t h e same 
time a s s t r i c t l y n e g a t i v e , i t has t o have i t s p o s i t i v e , t h i s r e l a t i o n 
t o s e l f t h a t b e l o n g s t o i t , o n l y i n t h e ot h e r , Both of them, t h e r e f o r e , 
a r e t h e p o s i t e d c o n t r a d i c t i o n , both a r e in-theaselves the same. And 
both a r e t h e same for-themselves, too, s i n c e e a c h i s t h e s u b l a t i n g of 
t h e ' o t h e r and of i t s e l f , " {Logic, §120) 
What the above t h e r e f o r e shows i s that the p o s i t i v e and negative are 
simultaneously united, d i s t i n c t , and also mutually dependent. 
Furthermore, they are each other in t h e i r r e f l e c t i o n because the 
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emergence of +A immediately i d e n t i f i e s the simultaneous emergence of -A 
and v i c e versa. The p o s i t i v e and negative attachments belong always t o 
the ' t h i s ' and the 'other' r e s p e c t i v e l y so th a t , from the other's 
standpoint, i t i s i t s e l f now the p o s i t i v e and the one i s the negative, 
because now the one has s h i f t e d t o being the other. I n more simple 
language, i f two people sat at a t a b l e one might overhear " I am one, you 
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are the other," but the one and the other (the p o s i t i v e and negative) 
attachment depends on which of the two speaks, and i s applicable e i t h e r 
way. A b s t r a c t l y then, a l l that remains i s an interchangeable p o s i t i v e 
and negative. 
Flndlay argues against t h i s p o s i t i o n . He w r i t e s of Hegel that "he i s 
not saying that X i s yj i n one sense, but not A i n another, that i t i s A 
from one point of view but not from another, t h a t i t i s A In so far as 
It is A" but not i n so f a r as I t i s something else. A l l these devices 
f o r avoiding c o n t r a d i c t i o n are e x p l i c i t l y disowned by Hegel. The 
reason why Findlay r e j e c t s the p r o p o s i t i o n i s i m p l i c i t w i t h i n t h i s 
quotation, namely he fears that what one might term a 'perseptive 
d i s t i n c t i o n ' " ' ' i s not an example of genuine opposition, and so he 
continues "Hegel makes i t as p l a i n as possible, t h a t i t i s not some 
watered-down, equivocal brand of c o n t r a d i c t i o n , but st r a i g h t - f o r w a r d , 
head-on c o n t r a d i c t i o n . " ^ ' 
But Hegel does not employ the p o s i t i v e and negative as "devices f o r 
avoiding c o n t r a d i c t i o n . " Rather, the p o s i t i v e and negative attachments 
( l e . A perceived here as +A and there as -A) are the purest expression 
of c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i n p r e c i s e l y the same manner as ' i s ' and 'i s - n o t ' , or 
pure being and nothing; the p o s i t i v e and negative, that i s , do indeed 
provide "head-on c o n t r a d i c t i o n . " C e r t a i n l y i t i s t r u e that one cannot 
argue X i s both A and not A simultaneously i n the sense that God cannot 
be t h i s object and yet also not t h i s object! However, t h i s i s a clumsy 
reverse of Hegel's a s s e r t i o n on Flndlay's behalf, because what i s rather 
advocated i s tha t +A i s absolutely d i s t i n c t from -A i n so fa r as i t i s , 
q u i t e l i t e r a l l y , not-A, but i s also -A i n that -A i s the absolute 
a n t i t h e s i s t o +A, As Hegel c l e a r l y states, "the p o s i t i v e makes no sense 
by i t s e l f ; rather, i t i s s t r i c t l y r e l a t e d t o the negative. And the 
s i t u a t i o n i s the same w i t h the negative." (.Logic, §111A) Again, t^ere 
must be implicitly within a thing its absolute negative (or opposite) 
for the thing to be actual and vice versa. 
Thus, from t h i s , we may adduce the conclusion.that X i s A i n one sense, 
i n t h a t ( f o r example) God i s being, and not A i n another, not because 
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God i s simultaneously also not-being, but because God i s also the 
absolute negative c o n t r a d i c t i o n of being. And, rather than declaring 
from t h i s a nonsensical conclusion such as Flndlay f i n d s above, what 
emerges i s a s t a t e by which the p o s i t i v e and negative are each other and 
as one, despite maintaining also a d i s t i n c t i o n through t h e i r oppositon: 
" I n t h e p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e we t h i n k we have an a b s o l u t e d i s t i n c t i o n , 
Both terms, however, a r e i m p l i c i t l y t h e same, and t h e r e f o r e we c o u l d c a l l 
t h e p o s i t i v e 'the n e g a t i v e ' i f w e , l i k e d , and c o n v e r s e l y we c o u l d c a l l t h e 
n e g a t i v e 'the p o s i t i v e ' a s w e l l , C o n s e q u e n t l y , a s s e t s and d e b t s a r e not two 
p a r t i c u l a r , i n d e p e n d e n t l y s u b s i s t i n g s p e c i e s of a s s e t s , What i s something 
n e g a t i v e f o r t he debtor i s e q u a l l y something p o s i t i v e f o r t he the c r e d i t o r , 
The same a p p l i e s t o a road t o the E a s t ; i t i s e q u a l l y a road t o the West, 
Thus, what i s p o s i t i v e and what i s n e g a t i v e a r e e s s e n t i a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d by 
one a n o t h e r , and a r e [what they a r e ] o n l y i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o one another, 
T h e r e c a n n o t be t h e n o r t h p o l e of a magnet w i t h o u t t h e s o u t h p o l e nor the 
s o u t h p o l e w i t h o u t t h e n o r t h p o l e , I f we c u t a magnet i n two we do not have 
t h e n o r t h p o l e i n one p e i c e and the s o u t h p o l e i n the o t h e r , " 
i Logic, §119A1) 
Thus, i t i s c l e a r that X i s +A on one hand, and -A on the other because, 
as Hegel analogises, assets equal debts. East equals West, and so f o r t h . 
+A = -A, and i f X = A, i t may as the subject 'select' which aspect i t 
l i k e s , e i t h e r +A or -A, which prove to be the same so that X = +A = -A. 
Because u n i t y i s composed as +A = -A, i t i s patent that the u n i t y i s 
r e l i a n t on i t s inner d i s t i n c t i o n , and thus d i s t i n c t i o n i s perennial. 
This i s a p r i n c i p l e many, and very notably Findlay, f i n d d i f f i c u l t t o 
accept. Findlay w r i t e s , " i t i s t h e r e f o r e a l l - i m p o r t a n t t o stress that 
Hegel does not t h i n k t h a t the harmonies of Reason Cie. the pure, i d e a l 
Absolute] i n v o l v e any mere r e j e c t i o n of the disharmonies and 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of d i a l e c t i c a l thought. These disharmonies may be 
' overcome' but t h e i r overcoming i s also t h e i r perpetual preservation. 
For they are overcome only i n the sense that they are seen to be 
necessary c o n d i t i o n s of a reasonable r e s u l t , and so, i n a sense, not 
overcome at a l l . " ' ^ This i n i t s e l f i s q u i t e accurate, f o r the Absolute's 
3? u l t i m a t e i d e n t i t y i s r e l i a n t on i t s objective being .(derived from 
d i s t i n c t i o n ) , but Findlay continues by commenting th a t " i t i s supremely 
uncomfortable t o believe i n the presence of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s as 
'preserved' permanently i n the highest forms of r e a l i t y and t r u t h . 
There, at l e a s t , one may cry w i t h t h i n k e r s l i k e McTaggart or Bradley, 
they should be banished a l t o g e t h e r . " " ^ 
But i f c o n t r a d i c t i o n were t o be banished, the Absolute Idea could not be 
encountered, as i t s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ( l e . i t s i l l u m i n a t i n g o b j e c t i v i t y ) 
r e s t s wholly upon such. Nor could one possibly suggest that, once 
i d e n t i f i e d as being i t s other, the t h e s i s could 'give up' i t s 
c o n f l i c t i n g nature as t h i s i s q u i t e implausible; I d e n t i t y through 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s not a chronological process, and -A must continue t o 
oppose +A f o r +A t o be sustained. McTaggart i s t h e r e f o r e correct t o 
w r i t e "the d i a l e c t i c a l process of the Logic i s the one absolutely 
e s s e n t i a l element i n Hegel's system. I f we accepted t h i s and r e j e c t e d 
e v e r y t h i n g else t h a t Hegel has w r i t t e n , we should have a system of 
philosophy ... on the other hand, i f we r e j e c t the d i a l e c t i c a l process 
which leads t o the Absolute Idea, a l l the rest of the system i s 
destroyed."'' I n other words, Hegel's t h e o l o g i c a l framework, w h i l s t 
p e r t a i n i n g t o a pure whole, i s able only t o breathe because of i t s 
a c t i v e and d i s t i n c t i v e d i a l e c t i c a l nature. 
Findlay believes such a continuum of d i s t i n c t i o n erases the goal of the 
Absolute, w r i t i n g of McTaggart th a t he I s "forced t o J e t t i s o n the whole 
of the remaining system,"'^ and f i n d s candid support from Kaufmann who 
claims t h a t "he [McTaggart] i s wrong on t h i s point."'-'' But t h i s I s a 
l e g i t i m a t e c r i t i c i s m only i f we consider (as McTaggart admittedly does) 
t h a t t h e re i s nothing of the Absolute except a dynamic d i a l e c t i c , and 
neglect the u n i t y of the harmonious Idea. That i s t o say, a perennial 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y conclusion i f i t i s not seen also as 
e f f e c t i n g a u n i t y . 
Christensen o f f e r s one s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem by proposing that 
Hegel's d i a l e c t i c i n f a c t w i l t s (the exact reverse of McTaggart's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) . He w r i t e s "the method as a goal as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
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the Notion has only a p r o v i s i o n a l status. This i s t o say, as subject 
and object regarded as d i s t i n c t and separate have only a p r o v i s i o n a l 
status, method as p e r t a i n i n g t o e i t h e r or both has only a p r o v i s i o n a l 
status."^'* Now, c e r t a i n l y i t can be argued that the purpose of the 
d i a l e c t i c a l format i s t o o b j e c t i f y the Absolute Idea, and therefore i t 
i s only proper that the means are subservient t o the end, but i t i s 
q u i t e improper t o suggest that the d i a l e c t i c a l format loses i t s 
d i s t i n c t i v e nature, because- the u n i t y ' s very being i s dependent on such, 
as a man's self-consciousness i s r e l i a n t on the thought " I am myself 
because I am not something else." And, i f we t h i n k simply i n terms of 
i n t e r p r e t i n g rather than e v a l u a t i n g Hegel, we can hardly ignore the 
clea r p r o p o s i t i o n that " c o r r e c t as i t i s t o a f f i r m the u n i t y of being 
and nothing, i t i s equally correct t o say that they are absolutely 
diverse too." (.Logic, §88) 
Christensen continues by then suggesting "Hegel f a i l e d t o define h i s 
method i n such a way as t o maintain unambiguously such a d i s t i n c t i o n as 
would be required were a d i a l e c t i c a l account t o be f a l s i f l a b l e . I n the 
Notion a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s are overcome and contained, as discriminations, 
i n c l u d i n g the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between method and the subj e c t i v e and 
o b j e c t i v e contents t o which i t pertains."'-^ I n other words, Christensen 
argues that the d i a l e c t i c a l method i s unable t o sustain a perennial 
d i s t i n c t i o n , and that d i s t i n c t i o n r a t h e r obscurely becomes mere 
" d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . " E f f e c t i v e l y then, Christensen attempts' t o adopt a 
p o s i t i o n between the ' a n t i - d i s t i n c t i o n i s t s ' ( f o r example Findlay and 
Kaufmann), and the ' p r o - d l s t i n c t i o n i s t s ' ( f o r example McTaggart), by 
arguing t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n i s superseded by u n i t y but not e n t i r e l y cast 
o f f , merely relegated t o the very vague proposed area he c a l l s 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 
However, t h i s o f f e r i n g , l i k e Findlay's desired amendment, must be 
r e j e c t e d as i t i s surely s t i l l i n c o r r e c t t o say that +A bears no 
d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms of -A, or that l i g h t i s no d i f f e r e n t from dark, and 
r e - c l a s s i f y i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n i s no s o l u t i o n because the d i s t i n c t i o n 
must p r e c i s e l y r e f l e c t the u n i t y which i s I t s e l f inexorably bound t o 
absolute c o n t r a d i c t i o n . The as s e r t i o n that +A i s also the same as -A 
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cannot be made i f d i s t i n c t i o n i s not present because the u n i t y i s 
founded on the d i s t i n c t i o n , and i f the foundation i s removed the u n i t y 
f a l l s w i t h i t , Stace i s absolutely r i g h t , therefore. I n h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which argues that "the u n i t y i s concrete because i t s t i l l 
c ontains the d i f f e r e n c e preserved w i t h i n i t . I t i s not a mere abstract 
u n i t y l i k e the o r d i n a l r y 'concept', which includes what i s common t o the 
th i n g s of a class, but excludes t h e i r differences. Becoming Includes 
the d i f f e r e n c e s as we l l as the i d e n t i t y . Being and nothing are 
i d e n t i c a l , and t h i s gives us the category of becoming. But we must not 
deny t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e merely because of t h e i r I d e n t i t y . They are at 
once ab s o l u t e l y i d e n t i c a l and abso l u t e l y d i s t i n c t . Becoming involves 
both. "'^ • 
The u n i t y , that i s , e x i s t s i n v i r t u e of i t s paradoxical d i s t i n c t i o n , and 
vi c e versa. Each contains the other, and cannot be without the ( i t s ) 
other. The very basis of d i s t i n c t i o n i s that +A = -A because each i s 
abs o l u t e l y r e l i a n t on i t s other, and the u n i t y i s only concrete and 
o b j e c t i v e because of I t s inner c o n f l i c t , 
Notes 
1. Hegel means by 'essence' (.Wasen) a noumenal, abstract " t r u t h of 
being," so that "God i s not merely an essence, and not even merely 
the highest essence e i t h e r . He i s the essence." (Logic §112A) 
2. Taylor, p234. 
3. Flchte, p l 0 6 f f . 
4. Fackenelm, p76. 
5. I t could be argued that t h i s analogy i s not q u i t e precise as the 
elements are r e l a t i v e and thus not authentic opposites. However, 
w h i l s t i t i s t r u e that degrees are r e l a t i v e , my use of t h i s analogy 
i s v a l i d as I am employing i t a b s t r a c t l y i n the sense of -10 / 0 / 
+10 being equatable w i t h -A / A / +A, 0 and A a c t i n g as the 'pass 
through' points. 
6. Findlay, p77. 
7. By t h i s phrase I mean t o r e f e r t o how the Absolute can be viewed 
d i f f e r e n t l y (as, f o r example, phenomena or noumena). 
35 
8. Flndlay, •p77. 
9. Flndlay, p67. 
10. Flndlay, p77, 
11. McTaggart, §2. 
12. Findlay, p75. 
13. Kaufmann, pl74. 
14. Christensen, p224. 
15. Christensen, p224. 
16. Stace, pl37. 
36 
4. The c i r c u l a r i t y and 'axis' of the Absolute Idea. 
(1) Hegel's circle. 
When Hegel argues h i s theology "shows i t s e l f as a c i r c l e that goes back 
i n t o i t s e l f , " (Log-lc, §17) although denying a l i n e a r progression, he 
acknowledges a seeming s p l i t w i t h i n the Absolute Idea, such that the Idea 
becomes two, opposing others. By 'other', we are again dealing w i t h t r u e 
opposites, not X as an other t o Y, but the p o s i t i v e and negative 
perspectives of what i s u l t i m a t e l y one. Again, what we must remember i s 
that the p o s i t i v e i s i n t u r n the negative, and the negative the p o s i t i v e , 
so that when we say 'other' t h i s u l t i m a t e l y r e f e r s not simply t o opposition 
but t o the pure Idea. 
What t h i s leads t o i s a f i r s t instance of what Hegel describes as a 
'moment', and loo s e l y t h i s i s i n reference t o a given perspective of the 
Absolute, ' namely the moment of otherness, the diremptlon when the i n f i n i t e 
appears as the f i n i t e , the e t e r n a l as the temporal, and so f o r t h . Thus, 
the Absolute moves, so t o speak, t o otherness (although t h i s serves also t o 
enhance by v i r t u e of o b j e c t i f y i n g the u n i t y ) before r e t u r n i n g t o I t s e l f on 
i t s c i r c u l a r route. This suggests a movement of A > B > A (which would 
appear t o make the r o l e of B point less, because i f the Absolute begins at 
any point on the c i r c l e , and then r e t u r n s t o t h i s point a f t e r moving 
through B, we have no d i f f e r e n c e I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , merely a change i n i t s 
expression. 
Here, however, we must remember tha t Hegel does not advocate one c i r c u l a r 
journey, but th a t "the whole presents i t s e l f ... as a c i r c l e of c i r c l e s , 
each of which i s a necessary moment," (Logic, §15) What i s therefore 
r a t h e r the case then, i s t h a t the otherness of the Absolute, a moment, acts 
in a circular fashion within the whole: 
A X I S 
37 
The above diagram i s designed t o I l l u s t r a t e Hegel's meaning here. 
Immediately, what one may n o t i c e i s an a l l - i n c l u s i v e c i r c l e , the whole, 
which contains w i t h i n i t two other c i r c l e s which stand opposed t o each 
other, r e f l e c t e d i n the diagram by the app e l l a t i o n s provided of +A and -A. 
One may consider +A as ( f o r example) concept, and -A as being, or vice 
versa, or one as f i n l t u d e and the other i n f i n i t u d e , or, indeed, any 
ap p l i c a b l e p a i r of genuine opposites. What i s also h i g h l i g h t e d i s what I 
have termed as the 'axis', the c e n t r a l point of the whole where both 
c o n f l i c t i n g , inner c i r c l e s meet i n t h e i r oneness: 
" I n n a t u r e , i t i s not so m e t h i n g - o t h e r than the Id e a t h a t i s C r e ] c o g n i s e d , 
b u t t h e I d e a i n the form of [ i t s ] u t t e r i n g lEntsuBsrungl, j u s t a s i n the 
s p i r i t we have t h e same I d e a as being for-itself, and coming to be in and 
for itself, A d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h i s k i n d , i n which t h e I d e a appears, i s a t 
the same time a moment that flovs, hence, the s i n g l e s c i e n c e i s j u s t a s much 
the c o g n i t i o n of i t s c o n t e n t a s an o b - j e c t that is, a s i t i s t h e immediate 
c o g n i t i o n i n t h a t c o n t e n t of i t s p a s s a g e i n t o i t s h i g h e r c i r c l e , The 
representation oi division i s t h e r e f o r e i n c o r r e c t inasmuch a s i t p u t s the 
p a r t i c u l a r p a r t s or s c i e n c e s side by side, a s i f they were o n l y immobile 
p a r t s and s u b s t a n t i a l i n t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n , the way t h a t species are," 
Uogic, §18) 
When we examine t h i s passage, the diagram's meaning becomes more l u c i d . To 
begin w i t h , we see the appearance of the Absolute i n f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y -
not the whole, but one of the two opposites standing against i t s other, 
f i n i t u d e versus i n f i n i t u d e . But t h i s i s only h a l f the story, an untruth, 
and because the p o s i t i v e and negative are u l t i m a t e l y also each other, when 
we see what appears only as one aspect of the Idea, we are i n t r u t h 
apprehending both the s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e because of t h i s synthesis. 
On the diagram, what we f i n d i s +A against -A, but the common, ess e n t i a l 
f a c t o r , the s y n t h e t i c Absolute Idea i n and f o r i t s e l f remains A; i n other 
words, A holds i t s e s s e n t i a l s t a t u s regardless of the i n f e r i o r p o s i t i v e or 
negative attachment, Thus, we may see that we can look at A from one side 
( f o r example, as p o s i t i v e t h e s i s ) , and then from the other (negative 
a n t i t h e s i s ) , but also apprehend a supreme content of pure, i d e a l being, the 
e s s e n t i a l u n i t y of the one A. When Hegel w r i t e s " i n nature, I t i s not 
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something-other than the Idea t h a t i s [re]cognised, but the Idea i n the 
form of [ i t s ] u t t e r i n g , " we may, therefore, r e c o n c i l e t h i s notion of the 
Idea i n i t s "form" w i t h the seemingly incompatible statement that the 
Absolute " i s p r e c i s e l y what i s wholly present." (.Logic, §24A2) 
(11) The 'higher' circle. 
The second, notable f e a t u r e extends from t h i s . Hegel proposes that the 
Absolute as an object f o r - i t s e l f ( i e . the Absolute i n the moment of 
apparent otherness as phenomenal being) passes i n t o a "higher c i r c l e , " 
namely the whole, the Absolute S p i r i t . This echoes the above, f o r +A = -A, 
and t h e r e f o r e they are one and form the enveloping c i r c l e o u t l i n e d i n the 
diagram. They do not, that i s , simply stand over and against each other as 
two, absolutely d i s t i n c t c i r c l e s , but are also each other and thus the one, 
all-encompassing whole, +A = -A t h e r e f o r e means, i n the most candid of 
language, simply A, the s y n t h e t i c Absolute Idea. 
Third, we may note that Hegel argues: 
"The representation of division i s t h e r e f o r e i n c o r r e c t inasmuch a s i t p u t s 
t h e p a r t i c u l a r p a r t s or s c i e n c e s side by side, a s i f they were o n l y 
immobile p a r t s and s u b s t a n t i a l i n t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n , t he way t h a t species 
a r e , " • (Logic, §18) 
This i s t o say that, again, +A and -A are not i n t r u t h absolute antagonists 
( l e . +A ^ -A), standing d i v i d e d and "side by side," but rather that they 
r e t a i n t h e i r e s s e n t i a l and uniquely t r u e u n i t y . On the diagram, I have 
represented t h i s by the axis, the meeting point which i s equatable with the 
enveloping 'whole' c i r c l e , and here one may t h e r e f o r e see the axis as the 
essence, the underlying which appears t o be the r e s u l t of the synthetic 
process, but which i n fa c t i s the beginning of the system, and Indeed i s 
mirrored throughout. Hence, what we f i n d i s a continual union of the 
t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s , and thus also the synthesis as being not merely a 
r e s u l t , but e t e r n a l l y and wholly present. 
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We may draw s i m i l a r f i n d i n g s from another passage. Hegel w r i t e s "each of 
the p a r t s of philosophy i s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l whole, a c i r c l e that closes upon 
i t s e l f ; but i n each of them the p h i l o s o p h i c a l Idea i s i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
determinacy or element." (.Logic, §15) Here, we can see that each 'part' I s 
d i s t i n c t from i t s other; the thesis, that i s , stands opposed t o the 
a n t i t h e s i s , 'whole' as the thesis, but awaiting, so t o speak, i t s 
r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t i t i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y unlvocal w i t h i t s other, seemingly 
content i n I t s e l f but Inexorably united w i t h i t s other. For example, 
consider heat: i t i s at f i r s t seemingly a whole, d i s t i n c t i n i t s own r i g h t . 
But, when one considers t h i s f u r t h e r , heat only enjoys t h i s status because 
of i t s o p p o s i t i o n t o cold, and Indeed a reasonable d e f i n i t i o n of 'heat' 
could be given as 'not-cold'. Thus, i n other words, we f i n d ourselves 
again r e t u r n i n g t o H e r a c l l t u s ' ' s t r i f e and u n i t y of opposites'; heat I s so 
only because of cold and vice-versa, and, moreover, heat i s cold i n t h i s 
sense because each i s merely a d i f f e r e n t appearance of the essence of each, 
ie . temperature. Each i s mutually dependent on i t s other f o r the i n i t i a l 
c o g n i t i o n of i t , each e x i s t s by v i r t u e of the object i f I c a t i o n given by i t s 
other, and each eve n t u a l l y shows I t s e l f t o be i t s other. 
This point i s again represented on the diagram by the inner c i r c l e s , a l i n e 
on which can be drawn from the axis, along the c i r c l e s and back t o the 
axis, each then "a c i r c l e that closes upon I t s e l f , " the dynamism of which 
i s h i g h l i g h t e d on the diagram by the arrows. But, what we f i n d at the axis 
i s the u n i t y , when +A and -A are wholly united owing t o the negation of 
t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e (at t h i s point there i s not p o s i t i v e and negative, merely 
n e u t r a l i t y ) , and they thereby reveal themselves as the Absolute Idea i n and 
f o r i t s e l f , where t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s do not contrast but are synthetic. 
Furthermore, when t h i s l i n e i s drawn along +A and i t s opposite, t h i s i s 
c o n t i n u a l l y mirrored - one opposite p r e c i s e l y matching i t s other - and, 
again, the d i f f e r e n c e i s t o be found merely i n the perspective, the 
p o s i t i v e and negative attachments, rather than the e s s e n t i a l content of 
n e u t r a l A. 
I t i s e x a c t l y t h i s precise opposition, mirrored through every s i n g l e aspect 
of the one Idea, t h a t enables Hegel t o then comment: 
" E v e r y s i n g l e c i r c l e a l s o b r e a k s through the r e s t r i c t i o n of i t s element a s 
w e l l , p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e i t i s i n w a r d l y [ t h e ] t o t a l i t y , and i t grounds a f u r t h e r 
s p h e r e , The whole p r e s e n t s i t s e l f t h e r e f o r e a s a c i r c l e of c i r c l e s , " 
{Logic, §1S) 
The breaking through of the element occurs " p r e c i s e l y because i t i s 
inwardly [ t h e ] t o t a l i t y , " so t h a t here +A and -A, seemingly i n d i v i d u a l 
elements, prove themselves t o be each other, and thus the whole, the 
e s s e n t i a l Absolute, the a l l encompassing ' c i r c l e ' of the Absolute Idea. 
This then, forms the passage I n t o the "higher c i r c l e , " (Logic, §18) 
because, w h i l s t each element can be viewed as d i s t i n c t , they prove not t o 
be d i v i d e d but the same, +A = -A. Hence, we discover the presentation of 
the " c i r c l e of c i r c l e s , " A possessing +A and -A as d i s t i n c t opposites. 
But, when we examine A - the Absolute Idea i n and f o r I t s e l f - as a 
complete system, we discover the elements t o be t r u l y two characters that 
are l o g i c a l l y rooted and committed t o each other and thus the Idea. And, 
because each I s i t s other, and thus the e n t i r e t y of the Idea I t s e l f , we may 
also see tha t +A = A, and -A = A, thereby r e c o n c i l i n g a seemingly 
Independent, d i s t i n c t facet w i t h the omnipresence of the Idea. 
( i l l ) Problems and parallels with Hegel's 'circular' concept. 
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s by no means u n i v e r s a l l y popular, and one of the most 
candid c r i e s of opposition i s from Terry Pinkard. Plnkard believes that 
the only category or notion that i s compatible w i t h such a c y c l i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e i s th a t of pure being, t h i s the exception by v i r t u e of I t s lack 
of predication.-'^ He wr i t e s , "Hegel thus speaks of a ' c i r c l e ' of 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , although such t a l k i s not e n t i r e l y accurate. I t i s not 
c i r c u l a r i n that the end i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h the beginning (although Hegel 
e u p h o r i c a l l y says that a l s o ) , nor i s i t c i r c u l a r i n the sense i n which some 
coherence t h e o r i e s of t r u t h are c i r c u l a r , that i s , the same pro p o s i t i o n 
t h a t appears at least once as a premise appears l a t e r on as a conclusion, 
thereby j u s t i f y i n g i t s e l f . " ' * I n fai r n e s s , Pinkard can be seen t o have a 
point. For can an active, dynamic system t r u t h f u l l y f i n d i t s r e s u l t w i t h i n 
40 
41 
i t s beginning? Surely i t s very dynamism banishes i t s beginning i n t o a 
d i s t a n t h i s t o r y , and leads the Idea t o a new home? 
However, t h i s i s t o misunderstand Hegel's i n t e n t i o n here. The notion that 
Hegel i s attempting t o convey i s t h a t the Absolute does not traverse 
literally away from, and then back to, i t s r e s t i n g place, but rather i t 
reveals i t s e l f f u r t h e r v i a t h i s purely logical t r i a d . I t i s no d i f f e r e n t 
from any other c o g n i t i v e process (according t o Hegel) i n that f i r s t we have 
immediate understanding of a subject, and then a mediate form of 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the subject from what i t i s not, before reaching an 
o b j e c t i f i e d , reasoned account.^ What i s c r i t i c a l i s t h a t the subject does 
not change, but i s merely o b j e c t i v e l y comprehended and affirmed by t h i s 
l o g i c a l process. Indeed, were act u a l development t o occur, i t would be 
Impossible t o discover the r e s u l t as the necessary t h e s i s would have 
evaporated; i f I was t o be conscious of myself by v i r t u e of acknowledging 
not being somebody else, i t would be extremely d i s t u r b i n g t o then f i n d that 
I was not i n f a c t my o r i g i n a l s e l f ! ^ 
Digressing s l i g h t l y , one notable f e a t u r e of t h i s understanding i s that a 
strong s i m i l a r i t y i s perhaps now present between Parmenides' f i n i t e sphere 
of pure being, and Hegel's c i r c l e ; indeed, as has j u s t been noted, Hegel 
himself employs the phrase "a c i r c l e of c i r c l e s , " and uses terminology such 
as "grounds another sphere." The d i f f e r e n c e s that f i r s t appeared as q u i t e 
s r t i k l n g , may i n f a c t not be q u i t e so powerful despite Parmenides' 
m a t e r i a l i s t i c form of monism, f o r though Parmenides indeed w r i t e s that 
being " r e s t s uniformly w i t h i n i t s l i m i t s , " ' ^ and so f o r t h as was discussed 
i n chapter one, t h i s leads only t o a nonsensical n o t i o n of being having t o 
stand against i t s abstract, l o g i c a l l y necessary, other of not-being f o r the 
term ' l i m i t ' t o be p l a u s i b l y employed. The problem f o r Parmenides, then, 
I s that e i t h e r not-being i n f a c t maintains a c t u a l i t y , or pure being i s not 
s e l f - l i m i t i n g and f i n i t e , but i n t r u t h i n f i n i t e (because there i s no 
opponent t o l i m i t i t ) , both of which Parmenides s t r i v e s t o r e j e c t . 
Parmenides' p o s i t i o n , however, despite i t s f a i l i n g s , i s I believe i n many 
ways comparable w i t h the aspect of Hegel's t h e o l o g i c a l system being 
considered here, and perhaps even i n d i c a t e s the s t r e n g t h of Heraclitus' 
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i n f l u e n c e on both the ancient E l e a t l c and the nineteenth century German. 
Hegel, as I have argued the case, professes the Absolute Idea t o be 
i n f i n i t e , but i n f i n i t u d e i s something only possible t o comprehend as a 
r e s u l t of the i n i t i a l c o n f l i c t and subsequent u n i t y of th e s i s and 
a n t i t h e s i s . The o b j e c t i f I c a t i o n of the whole r e s t s e n t i r e l y on the 
d i a l e c t i c a l system of the a n t i t h e s i s o b j e c t i f y i n g the thesis, an i n i t i a l 
c o n f l i c t and appearance of l i m i t a t i o n serving u l t i m a t e l y t o remove a l l 
notions of l i m i t . Thus, i f we may consider Parmenides' being as 
o b j e c t i f i e d by the ( i l l o g i c a l ) not-being, as must be the case If being Is 
to be objectified, we are l e f t w i t h a not e n t i r e l y d i s s i m i l a r idea. 
Of course, t h i s should i n i t s way not be a t o t a l surprise; a f t e r a l l , both 
Parmenides and Hegel are monists; each argues, that i s , a philosophy that 
p e r t a i n s t o a whole, a t o t a l i t y , and each bases h i s case on contrast. But 
the s t r e n g t h of the s i m i l a r i t y i s e x c i t i n g . On one hand, we have 
Parmenides proposing t h a t only being i s , and i t i s s e l f - l i m i t i n g w i t h i t s 
other of not-being a c t i n g as a peculiar, wholly abstract other t o 
s u b s t a n t i a t e i t . " ^ Thus, from t h i s we have d i a l e c t i c , being c o n t r a s t i n g 
w i t h not-being. However, w i t h Parmenides, not-being i s not, and a l l that 
t r u l y remains i s the One, being, declared t o be t r u e because of i t s 
d i s t i n c t i o n from what i s not. I n other words, the potential abstract 
r e l a t i o n between being and not-being o b j e c t i f i e s being through synthetic 
means, despite the eventual r e j e c t i o n of the abstract not-being. On the 
other hand, w i t h Hegel, we have h i s assertion that the whole appears as 
otherness, such appearance of ( f o r example) f i n l t u d e and i n f i n i t u d e , the 
p o s i t i v e and negative, and so f o r t h , a l l serving t o i l l u m i n a t e the Absolute 
Idea. I n both cases then, we see the system of the t r u e being o b j e c t i f i e d 
by the untrue, the only d i f f e r e n c e being, not so much the method or r e s u l t , 
but simply the v a l i d i t y of the apparent other. For Hegel, i t i s untrue 
because i t i s a h a l f - p i c t u r e of the Absolute, whereas f o r Parmenides i t 
simply (and i l l o g l c a l l y ) i s not. 
P a r a l l e l s may also be drawn between Hegel and Spinoza. This I s of no small 
importance owing t o the many assertions made, from Hegel's l i f e t i m e t o the 
present, t h a t Hegel was ( i n S o i l ' s words) " f o l l o w i n g Spinoza."'^ Jaeschke 
w r i t e s "Spinoza's thought acquires a preeminent and at the same time 
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l a s t i n g importance f o r Hegel's philosophy. " ^ T a y l o r , w h i l s t t a k i n g care 
t o e l u c i d a t e the d i f f e r e n c e s between the two, claims "Spinoza thus comes 
very close t o the Hegelian p o s i t i o n . " ^ ' Thus, w h i l s t exactly how a l i k e 
some of the ideas of Spinoza and Hegel i n fact are i s a matter of continual 
debate, there are undoubtedly considerable and thought-provoking 
s i m i l a r i t i e s . 
.Let us consider, very broadly, Spinoza's system which argues that the 
noumenal and phenomenal are i d e n t i c a l , two aspects of the one substance, 
i e . God. I n d i v i d u a l l y , n e i t h e r the noumenal or phenomenal i s substance 
as t h i s would at once render them Independent of each other; rather, 
substance i s the u n i t y of these, the u n i t y of thought and extension. 
However, the two are e s s e n t i a l l y associated as the One, and the a c t i v i t y of 
God (thought) i s represented i n m a t e r i a l form (extension). I n other words, 
God, the sole t r u t h , f o r Spinoza i s t h i s one substance, but such substance 
e x i s t s w i t h inward, absolute mediation. Although there i s nothing but the 
One ( l e . there i s nothing e x t e r n a l to, or not a perspective of, substance), 
i n t e r n a l l y there remains a profound d i s t i n c t i o n ; the noumenal and 
phenomenal, th a t i s , are d i s t i n c t a t t r i b u t e s t h a t form substance. Although 
these a t t r i b u t e s are considered t o be simply two d i f f e r e n t aspects of the 
one substance, and t h e r e f o r e may be considered t o be eventually unlvocal, a 
co n t i n u a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s necessarily present because of the i n t r i n s i c 
nature of each. Thus, a mental event cannot be i d e n t i c a l l y matched 
p h y s i c a l l y (thought matched in actuality by extension), or vice-versa. 
Spinoza r a t h e r argues that thought and extension are absolute 
representations of each other - "the human mind i s the idea of the human 
body, and so f o r t h . 
Spinoza admits t h i s point q u i t e f r e e l y , and r e l a t e s the d i f f e r e n c e through 
what he terms as 'modes', e f f e c t i v e l y the p a r t i c u l a r forms which the 
a t t r i b u t e s express, themselves through. The modes, although always 
maint a i n i n g c o r r e l a t e s , are actual I n themselves but t h i s a c t u a l i t y i s 
dependent on t h e i r place w i t h i n the whole and, as i n Hegel's theology, such 
are t h e r e f o r e only f u l l y r e a l i s e d and genuine only i n t h e i r e s s e n t i a l 
being; " i n the nature of th i n g s nothing contingent i s admitted."^-* 
Spinoza, t o analogise, argues th a t the t a l l side of a penny, and the head 
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side of a penny, are what c o n s t i t u t e s the one, s i n g l e coin; they are 
c e r t a i n l y united, but r e t a i n a co n t i n u a l element of d i f f e r e n c e w i t h i n . 
Hegel i s r e c e p t i v e t o t h i s argument (see Logic, preface, p8-10) because 
(c o n t i n u i n g w i t h the analogy), although each side p e r t a i n s t o the o v e r a l l 
being of the penny, there i s an Inward antagonism between the two sides 
which i s never wholly resolved. Thus, both Hegel and Spinoza propose a 
system whereby a) phenomenality i s not simply regarded as i l l u s i o n (as i s 
the case w i t h Bradley, f o r example) but i s actual, b) that phenomenality i s 
only f u l l y revealed i n i t s t r u t h when seen as being of the whole, and c) 
that despite such phenomenality being of the whole, i t continues t o 
st r u g g l e t o maintain i t s d i s t i n c t i o n from noumenality. As Stanley Rosen 
says i n h i s discussion of Hegel "the t r u t h of l i f e as absolute negative 
u n i t y i s the a s s i m i l a t i o n of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n the genus or Absolute 
S p i r i t . The i n d i v i d u a l s are l i k e the modes i n Spinoza's substance."'^ 
Applying t h i s t o the diagram, we may t h e r e f o r e see a s i m i l a r t r i a d w i t h 
Spinoza, thought and extension being subsumed w i t h i n the 'higher c i r c l e ' of 
substance. Thought and extension r e t a i n a d i s t i n c t i o n from each other (as 
+A and -A do f o r Hegel), but they are also committed t o t h e i r higher, 
c o l l e c t i v e status. 
Of course, t h i s comparison can only work i n a rough sense - important 
d i f f e r e n c e s are present between Hegel and Spinoza (most notably w i t h regard 
negation) - but a s i m i l a r i t y i n the framework's of each i s evident, and 
enough t o prompt Stace t o comment tha t "the roots of Hegel's teaching ... 
l i e here i n Spinoza.""^ H a r r i s too w r i t e s "what Hegel c a l l s 'the supreme 
Essence' becomes recognisable as Spinoza's God."'"-' Yet the p a r a l l e l barely 
extends beyond t h i s very s i m p l i f i e d framework, and w h i l s t we may the r e f o r e 
take note of the Influence of Spinoza, i t i s Important to observe that, f o r 
Hegel, the t h e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e continues so that the opposing elements 
d l a l e c t i c a l l y pass i n t o each other as univocal i d e n t i t i e s , whereas 
Spinoza's system i s r i g i d and undynamic. As Reardon surmises, "Spinozism 
was c o r r e c t i n holding that every determination i s a negation, but i t 
overlooks the i n e v i t a b l e negation of negation, which supplies the dynamic 
of advance i n r e a l i t y as i n thought. Spinoza's Absolute i s an i n f i n i t e 
r eceptacle t h a t merely contains f i n i t e beings. Hegel's on the other hand. 
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i s subject r a t h e r than substance; r e a l i t y I s process, becoming, 
development. " I f we continue w i t h the diagram, therefore, and the 
c i r c l e s w i t h i n the 'higher' c i r c l e , we may consider such t o be s t a t i c f o r 
Spinoza, the outer c i r c l e being a 'receptacle that merely contains f i n i t e 
beings'. 
( I v ) Distinction collapsing Into ground. 
Returning d i r e c t l y t o the diagram, such a p r o p o s i t i o n I s p l a u s i b l e only I f 
an abstract, n e u t r a l point e x i s t s , an axis, whereby +A and -A may pass i n t o 
each other. Hegel implies t h i s when he argues that the mutual dependence 
of the p o s i t i v e and negative r e s u l t s i n each being the ground of the other, 
so that the d i s t i n c t i o n between them collapses, as each i s e f f e c t i v e l y no 
more than t h e i r t o t a l dependence on the other. He writes: 
" Ground is t h e u n i t y of i d e n t i t y and d i s t i n c t i o n ; t h e t r u t h of what 
d i s t i n c t i o n and u n i t y have shown t h e m s e l v e s to be, the inward r e f l e c t i o n 
w hich i s j u s t a s much re/Jecihw-inio-anoi/tsr s.nd v i c e v e r s a , I t i s 
essence posited B.Z totality." (Logic, §121) 
What t h i s advances then I s that, when the p o s i t i v e I s the ground, the 
negative i s the grounded, and when the negative i s the ground, the p o s i t i v e 
i s the grounded; the 'ground' i s I n e f f e c t the dependence of one on the 
other. This i n t u r n i m p l i e s two c o r o l l a r i e s , namely: a) that a d i s t i n c t i o n 
i s c o n t i n u a l l y present f o r there i s always the ground and the grounded, but 
also b) t h a t the ground and the grounded are I d e n t i c a l f o r , as each i s the 
ground of the other as w e l l as i t s e l f as the grounded <+A on -A and, 
simultaneously, -A on +A), so, by v i r t u e of being both at once the ground 
and grounded, +A grounded on +A, and -A grounded on -A. I n other words, 
something only i s because i t i s grounded i n i t s other, and yet the other, 
which sustains the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the thi n g , only i s because i t 
correspondingly i s grounded i n i t s other. Thus, each aspect of the thing, 
i n order t o be grounded, must act also as the ground f o r the other and 
thereby f o r I t s e l f . +A = fA because of -A, but simultaneously, 
-A = -A because of +A, so that each, +A and -A, both assert the value of 
each other, and i n doing so assert t h e i r own values; 
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" E x i s t e n c e i s t h e immediate u n i t y of inward r e f l e c t i o n - i n t o - a n o t h e r , 
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e m u l t i t u d e of e x i s t e n t s a s i n w a r d l y 
r e f l e c t e d , w h i c h a r e a t t h e same time, and j u s t a s much, s h i n i n g - i n t o -
a n o t h e r , or relational', and they form a leorldoi i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and of 
an i n f i n i t e c o n n e c t e d n e s s of grounds w i t h what i s grounded, The grounds 
a r e t h e m s e l v e s e x i s t e n c e s , and the e x i s t e n t s a r e a l s o i n many ways grounds 
a s w e l l a s grounded," {Logic, §123) 
Stace explains t h i s point w i t h great c l a r i t y i n h i s commentary, but 
c u r i o u s l y adds "the category of ground turns out t o be empty and useless. 
I t gives, as explanation, or ground, of a thi n g , only that very same t h i n g 
over again. I t explains a t h i n g by saying ' i t i s so because i t i s ' . " ^ ^ 
Now, c e r t a i n l y the explanation of A i s found w i t h i n i t s e l f , but, as we are 
discussing what I understand t o be a monistic Absolute, t h i s I s pre c i s e l y 
the only p l a u s i b l e option open t o our consideration. However, t o say the 
employment of the p o s i t i v e and negative by Hegel t o o b j e c t i f y A r e s u l t s i n 
a scenario that i s both "empty and useless" i s , t o say the least, somewhat 
harsh, f o r Hegel has manipulated what I s e s s e n t i a l l y a point of l o g i c t o 
i d e n t i f y what one may comfortably term a p r i n c i p l e of being, or, i n Hegel's 
words ' existence'. ^"^  Existence i s , e f f e c t i v e l y , the r e s u l t of the 
d i s t i n c t i o n being reconciled i n i t s u n i t y and id e n t l c a l n e s s v i a such mutual 
grounding; i t i s the pure point i n which that which i s d i s t i n c t becomes i t s 
other t o produce a t r u e and genuine unity; 
"The term ' e x i s t e n c e ' ,,, p o i n t s t o a s t a t e of emergence Idsutet auf sin 
Hervorgegangenseinl, and e x i s t e n c e i s b e i n g t h a t has emerged from the 
ground and become r e - e s t a b l i s h e d through the s u b l a t i o n of m e d i a t i o n . As 
s u b l a t e d b eing, e s s e n c e h a s p r o v e d i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e to be s h i n i n g w i t h i n 
i t s e l f , and t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of t h i s s h i n i n g a r e i d e n t i t y , d i s t i n c t i o n , 
and ground, Ground i s the u n i t y of i d e n t i t y and d i s t i n c t i o n , and a s such 
i t i s a t t h e same time t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g of i t s e l f from i t s e l f . But what 
i s d i s t i n c t from the ground i s not d i s t i n c t i o n anymore t h a n t h e ground 
i t s e l f i s a b s t r a c t i d e n t i t y . The ground i s s e l f - s u b l a t i n g and what i t 
s u b l a t e s i t s e l f toward, the r e s u l t of i t s n e g a t i o n , i s e x i s t e n c e , 
E x i s t e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , which i s what h a s emerged from the ground, c o n t a i n s 
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the l a t t e r w i t h i n i t s e l f , and t h e ground does not remain b e h i n d e x i s t e n c e ; 
i n s t e a d , i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s p r o c e s s of s e l f - s u b l a t i o n and t r a n s l a t i o n 
i n t o e x i s t e n c e , " (Logic, §123A) 
Hence, the system can be seen t o have driven through, so t o speak, the 
d i s t i n c t i o n i t necessarily and l o g i c a l l y contains, t o h i g h l i g h t the 
emergence of t h i s point, or axis, that i s termed e x i s t e n c e , T h i s i s t o 
say t h a t , through the d i s t i n c t i o n provided by the p o s i t i v e and negative 
aspects of the thi n g , a d i s t i n c t i o n which o b j e c t i f i e s the t h i n g by o f f e r i n g 
also a paradoxical i d e n t i t y , and the subsequent u n i t y of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
and i d e n t i t y ( l e . the mutual ground), what comes forward i s a pure s t a t e of 
existence i n and f o r i t s e l f . From each aspect, which analysed as a s i n g l e 
part I s merely r e f l e c t l o n - i n t o - l t s - o t h e r , emerges the l o g i c a l consequence 
that each i s aiso i t s other by v i r t u e of the mutual grounding, and t h i s i n 
t u r n t r a n s l a t e s i n t o an Id e a l , l o g i c a l l y abstract axis, l e . the existence 
of the t h i n g . This, of course, does not abandon the p o s i t i v e and negative 
aspects from which the i d e n t i f i e d axis derives, f o r such would eliminate 
the e n t i r e p l a u s i b i l i t y of the t h i n g because I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n u n i t y t h a t o b j e c t i f i e s the thing. Thus, i t must be 
asserted th a t while d i s t i n c t i o n remains i m p l i c i t throughout, the system 
i t s e l f , as a system, indicates the axis, or pure existence, of the thing. 
"The r e f l e c t i o n - i n t o - a n o t h e r of what e x i s t s i s not s e p a r a t e from i t s 
inward r e f l e c t i o n ; t h e ground i s the u n i t y of t h e two, out of which 
e x i s t e n c e h a s gone f o r t h . Hence, what e x i s t s c o n t a i n s r e l a t i o n a l i t y and 
i t s own m a n i f o l d c o n n e c t e d n e s s w i t h o t h e r e x i s t e n t s i n i t s e l f ; and i t i s 
refJectedvithin i t s e l f a s ground. Thus what e x i s t s i s t h e t h i n g , " 
(Logic, §124) 
<v) A return to pure (qualified) being. 
What Hegel argues, therefore, i s that the i d e n t i f i e d , pure t h i n g continues 
t o be dependent on I t s dual. Inner r e f l e c t i o n - i n t o - a n o t h e r (more precisely. 
Its other. Its own), i n both i t s p o s i t i v e and negative aspects, f o r i t s 
very s t a t u s as the thing; i t i s , that i s t o say, wholly r e l i a n t on i t s own, 
i n t e r n a l d i s t i n c t i o n f o r i t s a u t h e n t i c i t y and i d e n t i t y as a thing. I n 
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h i g h l i g h t i n g pure existence then, Hegel i s not constructing, or composing, 
so much as p i n p o i n t i n g , or revealing, the axis as the l o g i c a l r e s u l t , and 
t o c l a i m ther e f o r e , as Stace does, that I t i s "empty and useless" i s t o 
assert t h a t the t h i n g as system is vacuous; but I f the system (which i s 
u l t i m a t e l y the Absolute S p i r i t I t s e l f ) i s vacuous then Hegel's e n t i r e 
theology must also be so. C e r t a i n l y the axis i s empty I n that, as an 
abstract i d e a l , I t I s , as we have seen, equatable w i t h nothing, but the 
a n t i t h e s i s of nothing (and thus nothing i t s e l f ) i s pure being - God - which 
has proved I t s value through i t s r e l a t i o n w i t h concrete being, or at least 
i n as much as i t has l o g i c a l l y o b j e c t i f i e d I t s e l f . I n t h i s sense, then, 
one may even venture so f a r as t o say that the abstract, i d e a l Absolute 
contains l o g i c a l concreteness by v i r t u e of the necessary i m p l i c a t i o n s that 
pure being contains which p e r t a i n t o actual, concrete b e i n g . A s Hegel 
c l e a r l y states: 
" M i s t a k e n i s t h e n o t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o which t h e I d e a i s o n l y what i s 
abstract. T h a t t h e I d e a i s a b s t r a c t i s t r u e enough i n the s e n s e t h a t 
e v e r y t h i n g untrue [ s e e c h a p t e r 63 i s consumed i n i t , but i n i t s own 
r i g h t t h e I d e a i s e s s e n t i a l l y concrete becciuse i t i s the f r e e Concept 
t h a t d e t e r m i n e s i t s e l f and i n d o i n g so makes i t s e l f r e a l Isic/i seJbst 
und heimit zur Realiiat bestimende Segriffl. I t would o n l y be what i s 
f o r m a l l y a b s t r a c t i f the Concept, which i s i t s p r i n c i p l e , were t a k e n to 
be t h e a b s t r a c t u n i t y , and not how i t r e a l l y i s , i e , a s the negative 
return into itseJf and as subjectivity," (.Logic, §213) 
Thus, the p r i n c i p l e of pure existence I s concrete because, although i n one 
sense i t i s abstract owing t o i t s l o g i c a l genetics, i t s status as the 
r e s u l t of the o b j e c t i f y i n g process gives I t a defined nature. The r e s u l t , 
one must remember, I s contained I n the beginning (Logic, §17), but here i t 
has been enhanced from a merely subjec t i v e , abstract status to what one may 
term a confirmed p o s i t i o n , where the dynamics of the system have carved out 
i t s place w i t h i n d i s t i n c t i o n and un i t y . I t s i t s , therefore, as the p i v o t a l 
point from which the s e l f - o b j e c t i f y i n g system stems and returns t o through 
negation, l e . as the axis upon which the system c i r c u l a t e s , the system 
working t o e l u c i d a t e i t s s t a t u s and t r u t h . 
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What one t h e r e f o r e may conclude I s that there e t e r n a l l y e x i s t s the noumenal 
Absolute Idea, pure being, upon which d i s t i n c t i o n 'grows' between the two 
opposing sides of the Absolute (the I n f i n i t e and f i n i t e , noumenal and 
phenomenal, etc, l e , the p o s i t i v e and negative antitheses). These aspects 
prove t o be, however, also univocal, and the system shows them to be the 
same as each other by each being the sustenance of the other, and t h i s I n 
t u r n r e s u l t s I n a unity, r e a s s e r t i n g the pure being of the Absolute. 
Hence, the Absolute shows I t s e l f t o be both a p u r i t y I n and f o r i t s e l f as 
the beginning and the end, but also e s s e n t i a l l y diverse i n i t s l o g i c a l l y 
necessary system of c o n t i n u a l l y p o s i t i n g i t s a n t i t h e s i s . 
Notes 
1. Hegel's employment of the term 'moment' does not imply that t h i s should 
be considered as a point on a l i n e a r progression, but rather as a 
p a r t i c u l a r , f i n i t e aspect of the Idea. 
2. See chapters eight and nine, 
3. One might again assert, given the arguments of the previous two 
chapters, t h a t Hegel's n o t i o n of pure being must e n t a i l predication. 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e somewhat s u r p r i s i n g t o note t h a t Pinkard neglects t o 
employ t h i s l i n e of c r i t i c i s m . 
4. Taken from the essay The Logic of Hegel's Logic i n Inwood's Hegel, p92, 
5. I s t r e s s the term 'reason' as t h i s d i f f e r s from understanding by v i r t u e 
of the development shown above, Stace (pl36-40), and Finlay (p60-9) 
both g i v e notable accounts of t h i s r e l a t i o n and the process surrounding 
I t , 
6. I t could be argued that t h i s does not take i n t o consideration h i s t o r y 
and t i m e - r e l a t e d development. Please see chapters eight and nine f o r 
discussion, 
7. Although, as has been discussed, Parmenldes' philosophy f a l t e r s because 
of h i s wish t o deny being's other any status, the v a l i d i t y of h i s 
philosophy i n t h i s comparative context i s I r r e l e v a n t , 
8. Al l e n , p45, 
9. S o l i , p l l 6 - 7 . 
10, Jaeschke, pl22. 
11. Taylor, p280. 
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12. Spinoza, 1. 
13. Spinoza, 2. 13. 
14. Spinoza, 1.29. 
15. Rosen, p243. 
16. Stace, p34. 
17. Ha r r i s , Hegel's Development, p391. 
18. Reardon, pl39. 
19. Stace, pl90. 
20. By 'existence' (.Existenz), Hegel means that which pertains t o the 
system as a determination of essence. Existenz, i t should be noted, 
r e f e r s p r e c i s e l y t o essential being, and Hegel's use of the term here 
h i g h l i g h t s i t s concreteness, 
21. I t may be noted that Hegel i s again presupposing the l o g i c a l 
development of existence t o a c t u a l i t y . Indeed, a c t u a l i t y (the 
o b j e c t i v e l y defined form of existence) may have been a more s u i t a b l e 
term t o employ i n t h i s passage, 
22. I repeat t h a t I am q u i t e u n s a t i s f i e d w i t h Hegel's assertion that pure 
being and nothing e f f e c t becoming (see chapter two). However, t h i s 
t h e s i s i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r a t h e r than an evaluation, and w h i l s t 
Stace's point may t h e r e f o r e be correct as a c r i t i c i s m , I contend i t i s 
at f a u l t as an understanding. 
5. The dlremptlve moment of appearance. 
When we discuss appearance, we may do so I n one of two contexts, namely 
e i t h e r as the appearance of f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y seemingly content w i t h i n 
i t s e l f (Scheln), or the appearance of the Absolute as being, le. i n a 
c o l l e c t i v e context and as the opposite t o the conceptual Idea of such 
(.Erscheinung). ^ The l a t t e r i n I t s e l f i s a moment, indeed could even be 
understood as the most c r i t i c a l moment, of the Absolute as a systematic 
p r o p o s i t i o n , f o r i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s moment tha t h i g h l i g h t s the apparent 
o p p o s i t i o n and i n s t i g a t e s the subsequent r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , the Absolute 
seeming t o be i n c o n f l i c t as +A over and against -A: 
" E s s e n c e must appear. I t s inward s h i n i n g i s the s u b l a t i n g of i t s e l f i n t o 
immediacy, which a s inward r e f l e c t i o n i s subsistence ( m a t t e r ) a s w e l l as for/s, 
r e f l e c t i o n - i n t o - a n o t h e r , s u b s i s t e n c e sublating itself, S h i n i n g i s the 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n , i n v i r t u e of which e s s e n c e i s not being, but e s s e n c e , and the 
d e v e l o p e d s h i n i n g i s [ s h i n i n g - f o r t h o r ] appearance, E s s e n c e t h e r e f o r e . i s not 
behind OT i s / i j f l i / a p p e a r a n c e , hut s i n c e t h e e s s e n c e i s what e x i s t s , e x i s t e n c e i s 
a p p e a r a n c e , " (Logic, §131) 
Here, Hegel i l l u m i n a t e s the meaning of the Absolute as essence, as neutral 
A, appearing i n order t o "shine," ie. t o express i t s e l f and lay I t s e l f open 
to o b j e c t i f i c a t l o n . I f the Absolute f a l l s t o do t h i s , then a l l that i s 
l e f t i s the purely subjective, u n o b j e c t l f l e d notion, which possesses no 
more s i g n i f i c a n t meaning than the notion of a god i n the sky who h u r l s 
thunderbolts has f o r us today. I n other words, the Absolute becomes 
manifest and dirempts i n t o nature i n order t o prove the notion; here I s the 
concept of God, here i s the being, and t h e r e f o r e God must ex i s t . Harris, 
d e l l b e r a t l e y a l i g n i n g God's appearance as phenomenal being with man's s e l f -
consciousness, eloquently w r i t e s " i n order t o posit myself as the ground of 
my own c o g n i t i o n I must p o s i t myself as a r a t i o n a l window on the world, "-^  
I n other words, the Absolute must be expressive i n order f o r I t t o create 
the ground f o r I t s own self-consciousness. The Absolute t h e r e f o r e p o s i t s 
I t s e l f e s s e n t i a l l y , through which' i t appears I n existence, and as essence 
i s i t s appearance. As Taylor remarks, "the r e a l i s not ' j u s t there', but 
i s posited, deployed i n f u l f i l m e n t of a r a t i o n a l formula,"^ Thus, when one 
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reads the almost mysterious sentence that "essence t h e r e f o r e i s not behind 
or beyond appearance, but since the essence I s what e x i s t s , existence i s 
appearance," I t i s clear t h a t appearance I s not i n t r u t h an independent 
other t o the Absolute, a d u a l i s t l c phenomenal world standing hard against a 
spe c u l a t i v e d e i t y , but e x i s t e n t as the Absolute I n the form of such being. 
Mure comments, "inasmuch as the e s s e n t i a l moment i s not hidden but 
apparent, s p i r i t here c l e a r l y determines I t s e l f as some sort of system or 
world. Thus, at t h i s point at least, a type of panentheisra may be seen 
as the phenomenal world i s given the status of being a determinate element 
of the Absolute. 
Of course, t h i s i s not t o say that the Absolute i s only the appearance -
t h i s i n I t s e l f would prompt questions d i r e c t e d against the e n t i r e meaning 
and purpose of appearance, Rather, appearance i s nothing more than the 
Absolute, as Indeed must be the case I f one argues Hegel's theology t o be 
monistic; f o r i f appearance were i n and f o r I t s e l f , then i t would not be 
appearance, but authentic, s e l f - c o n t a i n e d being which I s wholly 
independent. As Taylor w r i t e s , " i n appearance the p r i n c i p a l development i s 
of the idea of r e l a t i o n , The force of 'appearance' here i s that we see 
th i n g s as appearing, as posited, as coming t o manifestation through 
necessity, r a t h e r than as j u s t being there ' immediately' . To see things as . 
appearance i s t o see them not as j u s t reposing on themselves (auf slch 
selbst beruhend), but as moments of a larg e r whole , . , and hence t o see 
them as i n necessary r e l a t i o n t o others.'"^ Appearance, therefore, must be 
connected t o something other f o r i t t o maintain i t s a u t h e n t i c i t y . 
Thus, what we f i r s t a r r i v e at i s the p r o p o s i t i o n that appearance i s the 
shining, or expression, of the Absolute, the adoption by the Absolute of a 
kind of character through which i t may d i s t i n g u i s h i t s e l f . I t i s , i n t h i s 
sense, very much a determination, a determination t o o b j e c t i f y through an 
apparent d i v i s i o n w i t h i n the Idea, and again such i s r e f l e c t e d on the 
diagram i n chapter four, w i t h the Absolute i n t e r n a l l y d i v i d i n g and t u r n i n g 
away, so t o speak, from i t s a x i s on the c i r c u l a r t racks through the 
p o s i t i v e and negative c i r c l e s : 
" E x i s t e n c e , p o s i t e d i n i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i s appearance. The l a t t e r must not 
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be c o n f u s e d w i t h mere semblance, Semblance i s t h e p r o x i m a t e t r u t h of b e i n g 
or immediacy. The immediate i s not what we suppose i t t o be, not something 
i n d e p e n d e n t and s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g , but o n l y semblance, and a s su c h i t i s 
comprehended i n the s i m p l i c i t y of s e l f - c o n t a i n e d e s s e n c e , E s s e n c e i s 
i n i t i a l l y a t o t a l i t y of inward s h i n i n g , but i t does not remain i n t h i s 
i n w a r d n e s s ; i n s t e a d , a s ground, i t emerges i n t o e x i s t e n c e ; and e x i s t e n c e , 
s i n c e i t does not have i t s ground w i t h i n i t s e l f but i n an o t h e r , i s q u i t e 
s i m p l y appearance. When we speak of 'appearance' we a s s o c i a t e w i t h i t t h e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of an i n d e t e r m i n a t e m a n i f o l d of e x i s t i n g t h i n g s , whose b e i n g 
i s m e d i a t i o n , pure and s i m p l e , so t h a t they do not r e s t upon th e m s e l v e s , but 
a r e v a l i d o n l y a s moments," (Logic, §131A) 
The above o f f e r s us more important advice regarding Hegel's meaning here. 
Notably, he w r i t e s "existence, posited i n I t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i s 
appearance," and immediately, therefore, we learn that appearance i s very 
much involved w i t h opposition. That I s t o say th a t , by appearance, Hegel 
means tha t the Absolute appears as an other t o I t s e l f (although, as we have 
j u s t seen, appearance i s never independent), and he dis t i n g u i s h e s t h i s from 
semblance because semblance i s the immediate form of appearance iSchein'), 
r a t h e r than the developed appearance w i t h i n the whole. Hence, he contends 
that the semblance of being i s only p a r t i a l l y true; f o r Instance, a t a b l e 
i s never an e n t i r e l y independent t h i n g i n i t s own r i g h t , because such a 
view would argue a table, or any f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r , t o be t r u e i n and f o r 
I t s e l f , and thus Involve the misconception of i t possessing "self-contained 
essence" r a t h e r than belonging t o the system.'^ Rather, the diremptlon 
provides us w i t h a case of the Absolute appearing as other, but appearance 
here c r u c i a l l y d i f f e r s from semblance because appearance contains medlacy 
owing t o i t s opposition t o the concept, which i n t u r n makes i t 
simultaneously united w i t h i t . 
This s i t u a t i o n , i n i t s e l f an important element of Hegel's theology, may 
here be b r i e f l y summarised as follows. Appearance i s the expression of the 
Absolute, the Absolute I n the form of existent being. I t i s , as the 
i n i t i a l , Immediate Scheln, the Absolute as essence, thus making I t wholly 
the Absolute f o r - l t s e l f . However, as such, i t i s born from the Absolute 
Idea, and does not possess an independent existence I n i t s own r i g h t over 
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and against the Absolute but stands i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o the concept of the 
Idea. What t h i s means, therefore, i s that appearance i s not genuinely 
anything but the Absolute; I t i s a presentation of the Absolute i n a 
physic a l and c o n t r a d i c t o r y fashion, and once t h i s i s recognised, le, that 
the phenomenal i s not immediate as i t seems but the other of the noumenal, 
appearance can be termed as Erschelnung i n i t s forming of the t r i a d of the 
immediate, through the mediate and r e l a t i o n a l t o unity. The diremptlon, 
t h e r e f o r e , the phenomenal world of nature, appears f i r s t as immediate 
being-there CDaseln), before opposing i t s conceptual other to u n i f y i t as 
the Absolute, What we have then, I s r e a l l y not so much a representation, 
but r a t h e r a misrepresentation; we suppose nature, the phenomenal, t o be 
independent whereas i n fa c t i t i s t r u l y a d i s t o r t i o n of the whole. 
Within t h i s account, we have Hegel's understanding of the phenomenal world, 
and also i t s purpose; put simply, the world i s nothing more than the 
Absolute manifest, the appearance of the diremptlon. I n more Hegelian 
language, i t i s the Absolute f o r - i t s e l f , becoming an apparent other t o 
i l l u m i n a t e i t s hidden, inner s e l f . Hegel compares i t t o thunder and 
l i g h t n i n g , and he write s : 
"We t a k e n o te of thunder and l i g h t n i n g , We a r e a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h i s 
phenomenon and we o f t e n o b s e r v e i t . But man i s not s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h i s 
mere a c q u a i n t a n c e , w i t h t h e s i m p l e phenomenon; he wants to look b e h i n d i t ; 
he wants t o know what i t i s ; wants to comprehend i t , We th i n k about i t , 
t h e r e f o r e ; we want t o know the c a u s e a s something d i s t i n c t from the 
phenomenon a s such; we want t o know what i s inward a s d i s t i n c t from 
what i s m e r e l y outward, So we r e d u p l i c a t e the phenomenon; we break i t i n 
two, t h e inward and the outward, f o r c e and i t s u t t e r a n c e , c a u s e and 
e f f e c t . Here a g a i n , the i n n e r s i d e , or f o r c e , i s t h e u n i v e r s a l , t h a t 
which p e r s i s t s ; i t i s not t h i s or t h a t l i g h t n i n g , t h i s or t h a t p l a n t , but 
what r e m a i n s t h e same i n a l l . What i s s e n s i b l e i s something s i n g u l a r and 
t r a n s i t o r y ; i t i s by t h i n k i n g about i t t h a t we get t o know what p e r s i s t s 
i n i t . N a t u r e o f f e r s us an i n f i n i t e mass of s i n g u l a r s h a p e s and 
ap p e a r a n c e s , We f e e l t h e need t o b r i n g u n i t y i n t o t h i s m a n i f o l d ; 
t h e r e f o r e , we compare them and seek to [ r e ] c o g n i s e what i s u n i v e r s a l i n 
eac h of them," (Logic, §21 A) 
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Thus, Hegel proposes th a t what i s outer, or f o r - l t s e l f , i s more or less 
nothing but the s e l f - i d e n t i f y i n g aspect of something or, as I have termed 
I t , the t h i n g ' s expression; when one sees a f l a s h of l i g h t n i n g , one's 
senses are a l e r t e d t o the occurrence of an e l e c t r i c a l storm, but that i t i s 
an e l e c t r i c a l storm i s something t h a t i s only deduced from analysing the 
cause of the l i g h t n i n g . Notably, therefore, such analogy contains w i t h i n 
i t a h i n t of causal argument. 
So, w i t h the Absolute and phenomenal world, we begin by sensibly cognising 
the l a t t e r , questioning i t s meaning, and searching f o r a binding universal 
t h a t can l i n k a l l of i t s many pa r t s together, and here a strand of 
Platonlsm i s q u i t e e x p l i c i t as Hegel implies - or perhaps assumes? - that 
beneath the jumbled mass which we understand t o be the phenomenal, l i e s an 
ordered r e a l i t y , namely the Absolute i n - l t s e l f , t hat I s next t o be 
apprehended. I n many ways, t h i s I s a reversal of Hegel's normal deductive 
process, as instead of working o n t o l o g i c a l l y , and searching t o match being 
w i t h the I n i t i a l , conceptual thesis, he instead here suggests that, from 
f i n d i n g being, we then move on t o the noumenal side of the subject, hence 
the cosmological tendency. But t h i s i s very much the exception i n h i s 
w r i t i n g s , and Hegel continues h i s ex p o s i t i o n of appearance with the 
assertion; 
"When we s a y of something t h a t i t i s ' o n l y ' appearance, t h i s c a n be 
mis u n d e r s t o o d a s meaning t h a t ( i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h i s t h i n g t h a t o n l y 
a p p e a r s ) what is, or i s imediate, i s something h i g h e r . I n f a c t t h e 
s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c i s e l y t h e r e v e r s e ; a p p e a r a n c e i s h i g h e r than mere being. 
Appearance i s p r e c i s e l y t h e t r u t h of b e i n g and a r i c h e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n than 
t h e l a t t e r , b e c a u s e i t c o n t a i n s t h e moments of inward r e f l e x i o n and 
r e f l e x i o n - i n t o - a n o t h e r u n i t e d w i t h i n i t , whereas b e i n g or immediacy i s s t i l l 
what i s o n e - s i d e d l y w i t h o u t r e l a t i o n , and seems t o r e s t upon i t s e l f a l one. 
Of c o u r s e , t h e 'only' t h a t we a t t a c h to app e a r a n c e c e r t a i n l y does i n d i c a t e a 
d e f e c t , and t h i s c o n s i s t s i n t h e f a c t t h a t Appearance i s s t i l l t h i s i n w a r d l y 
broken [moment] t h a t does not have any s t a b i l i t y of i t s own. What i s h i g h e r 
than mere a p p e a r a n c e i s ,,, a c t u a l i t y , " (Logic, §131A)® 
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The message here I s i n fac t r e a l l y q u i t e p l a i n ; appearance, often mistaken 
as t h a t which i s i l l u s o r y , i s closer t o the Absolute than understanding a 
f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r t o be i n and f o r i t s e l f . What we have, more than 
anything, i s a question of d e f i n i t i o n , and Hegel i n s i s t s that i t i s more 
accurate t o say that the phenomenal i s appearance ( l e . an appearance of the 
Absolute I n physical m a n i f e s t a t i o n ) , than that i t i s Independent being, 
because t o assume the l a t t e r t o be t r u e I s e n t i r e l y t o divorce i t from the 
whole, a p r o p o s i t i o n t o t a l l y unacceptable t o Hegel, As Mure points out, 
" i t must not be f o r g o t t e n that each of these moments Cof being-there] i s 
i m p l i c i t l y the whole, or quasi—whole. World of Appearance,"® Thus, we read 
that "being or immediacy I s s t i l l what I s one-sidedly without r e l a t i o n , " 
and what I s undeniably r e j e c t e d i s the (presupposed) Independence of a 
p a r t i c u l a r , whereas "appearance i s higher, " 
What must be set against t h i s , however, i s Hegel's claim that the 
appearance i s s t i l l d efective; indeed he describes i t as "broken," Such a 
statement, though, derives from l o g i c a l necessity, because the diremption 
of the Absolute i s , from man's l o g i c a l perspective and as the preceding 
pages have attempted t o stress, merely one aspect of the Absolute, le, the 
Absolute f o i — I t s e l f but not I n - i t s e l f , I n other words, i t i s "inwardly 
broken" because appearance, at t h i s l o g i c a l point, lacks i t s conceptual 
other; c e r t a i n l y we cannot regard the Absolute as whole i f we view I t 
simply as appearance alone, although i t i s f a i r t o say that Erscheinung 
does I m p l i c i t l y acknowledge the whole owing t o i t s mediate nature. 
This issue i s developed f u r t h e r i n Hegel's Lectures, where we f i n d him 
arguing tha t : 
"The f i r s t [ a s p e c t ] i s the representation of Sod, Here we a r e c o n s i d e r i n g , 
not Sod i n g e n e r a l , but God i n h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , God app e a r s , then, but 
he does n o t m e r e l y appear i n g e n e r a l - he i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h i s , t o appear to 
h i m s e l f , F o r God i s s p i r i t i n p r i n c i p l e , [ s o ] the d i v i n e a p p earance i s a t 
th e same time r e f l e c t i o n i n t o s e l f , Hence Sod's a p p e a r i n g i s more 
p r e c i s e l y d e f i n e d thus; t h a t he a p p e a r s to h i m s e l f , t h a t h i s a p p e a r i n g i s 
an a p p e a r i n g t o h i m s e l f ; t h u s God i s an o b j e c t , indeed he i s an o b j e c t i n 
the s e n s e t h a t he i s an o b j e c t f o r h i m s e l f . The second p o i n t i s t h a t God 
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a p p e a r s to h i m s e l f i n the way i n which he i s i n and f o r h i m s e l f . These two 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s a r e i n t h i s r e s p e c t f undamental," (1/°/? 1,323-9) 
The key d i f f e r e n c e found i n t h i s passage, as against the quotations above 
from the Logic, i s that here Hegel i s p u t t i n g the diremptlve action of the 
Absolute from the Absolute's perspective; the account from the Logic, that 
i s , concerns i t s e l f w i t h man's c o g n i t i o n of the phenomenal and noumenal, 
the l o g i c a l t r i a d of the immediate, through the mediate and r e l a t i o n a l t o 
unity. Thus, instead of regarding appearance as the Absolute manifest for-
ltself, the Lectures Instead speak of the fac t " t h a t God appears t o himself 
i n the way i n which he i s In and f o r himself" (my i t a l i c s ) . 
This conspicuous d i f f e r e n c e occurs simply because the subject and object 
standpoints are both a p p l i c a b l e t o the Absolute; f o r man, t o view the 
appearance as the Absolute manifest i s merely for-the-Absolute ( i e . h i s 
understanding awaits the conceptual p a r t n e r ) , and man's perspective i s here 
purely s u b j e c t i v e ; we see the diremption as that which o b j e c t i f i e s the 
Idea, t h a t I s , and thus i t I s ' f o r ' . But, as f a r as the Absolute i s 
concerned, i t i s self-conscious throughout, and t h e r e f o r e the diremption i s 
r e f l e c t l o n - l n t o - s e l f owing to the wholeness of the Idea, f o r - l t s e l f because 
i t has posited i t s e l f as object, and also i n - l t s e l f because the object i s 
united w i t h the conceptual, or s p i r i t u a l , subject, i e , God, Again, t h i s i s 
s t r i c t l y an exercise I n t h e o l o g i c a l language, God being c o n t i n u a l l y aware 
of h i s t r u t h i n and f o r himself, whereas man has t o see f i r s t the thesis, 
then the a n t i t h e s i s , before being able t o comprehend at l a s t the synthetic 
u n i t y . I t i s thus a question of the .order of systematic deduction rather 
than two d i f f e r e n t accounts. As Taylor suggests, "what we are dealing with 
... i s a p a i r of a l t e r n a t i v e ways of conceiving t h i s relatedness as beyond 
or underlying external r e a l i t y , " ^ " both of which p e r t a i n to the same goal. 
Hegel stresses t h i s himself by continuing t o discuss the i n t e r n a l moments 
of man's c o g n i t i v e process, w r i t i n g ; 
"The f i r s t [moment] i s appearance in general, a b s t r a c t a p p e a r i n g g e n e r a l l y . 
T h i s i s t h e natural life, or n a t u r e i n g e n e r a l . A p p e a r i n g i s b e i n g f o r an 
ot h e r , an e x t e r n a l i t y , b e i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t e d one f o r an oth e r ; i n i t i a l l y , 
t h e r e f o r e , i t i s unmediated a p p e a r i n g f o r the o t h e r , not y e t r e f l e c t e d 
58 
be i n g f o r t h e o t h e r , " 1,329) 
Hegel continues along t h i s l i n e of argument, again i n s i s t i n g that the 
appearance must be f o r an other rather than i t s e l f . Appearance necessarily 
has a purpose of appearing f o r something, and i t s task of representing the 
Absolute i n m a t e r i a l form means t h a t the world as the u l t i m a t e appearance 
i s other than s t r i c t l y f o r i t s e l f . H a r r i s i s t h e r e f o r e q u i t e correct i n 
proposing that "the r a t i o n a l necessity of c o g n i t i o n can only be reconciled 
w i t h I t s freedom, i f the world we are aware of, the given content of our 
co g n i t i o n , I s the self as other for Itself. "^^ More c r u c i a l l y s t i l l , 
appearance must prove I t s e l f r e f l e c t i v e of i t s conceptual other, equivocal 
w i t h I t and eventually unlvocal; 
"Along w i t h r e f l e c t i o n t h e r e e n t e r s t h e need t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a c y [of 
a p p e a r a n c e ] s h o u l d have an e q u i v a l e n c e w i t h the Concept, though i n i t i a l l y i t 
i s no more t h a n an a b s t r a c t e q u a l i t y , R e f l e c t i o n has b e f o r e i t the Concept; 
t h e g e n e r a l need of the Concept, but o n l y w i t h i n i t s f r o n t i e r ; t h i s t h i n k i n g , 
a l t h o u g h i t h a s u n i v e r s a l i t y , t h e re a l m of the Concept, a s i t s p r i n c i p l e , 
makes t h e u n i v e r s a l i t s e l f i n t o a mere det e r m i n a c y , b e c a u s e i t g e t s s t u c k i n 
a b s t r a c t i o n . Or [ i t ] amounts to i d e n t i t y , u n i t y , " (Z/'z? 1,331) 
Thus, what we f i n d asserted i s that appearance must, i n a fashion again 
reminiscent of Spinoza's p a n t h e i s t i c doctrine, be matched equally by what 
i t appears f o r , namely the concept; again, therefore, +A must equal -A, f o r 
the appearance t o be compatible w i t h what i t represents. 
This, i t may be pointed out, i s not simply the r e s u l t of attempting t o 
e i t h e r q u a l i t a t i v e l y or q u a n t i t a t i v e l y equal one side w i t h the other, an 
attempt t o balance c o r r e c t l y one ' h a l f of the Idea w i t h the other. I t i s , 
rather, the d i r e c t r e s u l t of the opposition between t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s , 
the absolute c o n t r a d i c t i o n between +A and -A, I n other words, the 
appearance i s not merely equal t o the concept because, f o r example, the 
being of a hundred pounds should equal the concept of a hundred pounds. 
Rather, the concept i s i d e n t i c a l l y mirrored by the Absolute's appearance 
because I t i s equivocal owing t o I t s absolute otherness and thus sameness. 
59 Indeed, t o digress s l i g h t l y , t h i s point may be used t o defend Hegel from 
the Kantian c r i t i c i s m that being I s not an a t t r i b u t e of a concept, l e . 
th a t the appearance of the Absolute i s i n no way obliged t o mirror the 
concept of i t simply on the assumption that they p e r t a i n t o the same 
(presupposed) t h i n g . Hegel, r a t h e r than i n s i s t i n g that the notion must 
match the being of something, instead argues v i a h i s d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c that 
the p o s i t i v e must e s s e n t i a l l y equal the negative, +A = -A, pre c i s e l y 
because of t h e i r absolute opposition; +A must equal -A, tha t I s , because 
without the other n e i t h e r can be and, as we have seen, t h i s r e s u l t s i n each 
a c t u a l l y being i t s other. 
The above point i s alluded t o by Hegel himself i n the l a s t quotation from 
him. For he continues the passage by arguing t h a t , j u s t as appearance 
r e f l e c t s the concept, so does the concept, at t h i s l o g i c a l moment, r e f l e c t 
the appearance, thereby maintaining the absolute opposition of one against 
the other. This i s t o say that the concept m i r r o r s the appearance of i t s 
being, i e , i t s diremptlon, p r e c i s e l y because the appearance also possesses 
the concept as i t s other; the e q u a l i t y of the two r e s t s e i t h e r way on t h e i r 
interdependence and mutual grounding on each other: 
"We have a l r e a d y c a l l e d t h e f i r s t a s p e c t [ of God] representationt, but we 
have t o t a k e n o t e t h a t i t c a n be d e s i g n a t e d e q u a l l y e s s e n t i a l l y a s t h e 
a s p e c t of God i n h i s being. F o r God is, God i s t h e r e , i e , he i s s t r i c t l y 
r e l a t e d t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s , [ I f ] God i s determined, he i s not y e t the t r u e 
God; where he i s no lon g e r determined, no lon g e r l i m i t e d i n h i s e x i s t e n c e , 
or i n h i s appearance, he i s Spirit, b e c a u s e he a p p e a r s t o h i m s e l f a s he i s 
i n and f o r h i m s e l f , God's being, t h e r e f o r e , i n v o l v e s h i s b e i n g r e l a t e d to 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; o n l y a s an a b s t r a c t God does he have b e i n g f o r c o n s c i o u s n e s s 
a s s o m e t h i n g beyond, something o t h e r . S i n c e he now i s i n h i s appearance a s 
he i s , [ n a m e l y ] S p i r i t o r A b s o l u t e S p i r i t , and s i n c e he t h u s i s a s he i s , 
he i s i n and f o r h i m s e l f , H i s a p p e a r i n g i n c l u d e s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , e s s e n t i a l l y 
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , I n o t h e r words, we must not s e p a r a t e t h i s a t a l l ; God 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y c o n s c i o u s n e s s , e s s e n t i a l l y s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . The 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n g e n e r a l i s t h u s a l s o comprehended i n the 
f i r s t [ a s p e c t ] , and what we have c a l l e d 'the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of God' can j u s t 
a s w e l l be c a l l e d the 'being of Sod'," (Z/"/? 1,335-6) 
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And thus we may again see the completed t r i a d . God I s the u n i t y of h i s 
concept, and the other of t h i s , h i s dlremptlve appearance. Notably, we may 
again note that "we must not separate t h i s " because of God's eternal s e l f -
consciousness, but consider the development of the t r i a d as a development 
only i n terms of a l o g i c a l construction, 
A s i g n i f i c a n t problem, however, emerges i f we reconsider Taylor's comment 
that m a n i f e s t a t i o n i s a "necessity"; f o r w h i l s t i t i s necessary f o r 
appearance t o represent i t s higher master, we may detect a view whereby the 
Absolute is compelled to appear. Arguably, i t could be asserted that f o r 
something t o be, i t must appear, must become manifest i n order t o be 
concrete, but then i s i t c o r r e c t t o suggest that a thought or an emotion 
never genuinely i s simply because i t does not encompass a material 
appearance? Part of t h i s problem w i l l be addressed i n chapter eight, but 
here I f e e l i t i s Important t o question the purpose of the appearance from 
the Absolute's perspective, and the i m p l i c a t i o n of the phrase "coming t o 
ma n i f e s t a t i o n through necessity," namely the Absolute's dependency on i t s 
diremptlon. I f the Absolute I s dependent on i t s phenomenal manifestation, 
the dependency can be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y dealt w i t h by i t being a s e l f -
dependency; t h a t I s , the Absolute i s not externally dependent. But why 
should the Absolute maintain the diremption t o be of necessity f o r any 
reason other than that the noumenal Absolute must be contradicted by i t s 
opposite i n the contingent, phenomenal world? As Jaeschke points out, i t 
i s "not cle a r what law - other than the law of "absolute necessity," which 
i s Invoked on more than one occasion but not expounded - determines such a 
h i s t o r i c a l sequence, "^^ To be s t i l l more precise, what law other than that 
of absolute necessity determines there t o be any h i s t o r y at a l l ? 
Stace o f f e r s a half - h e a r t e d s o l u t i o n t o the problem based on the l o g i c of 
the d i a l e c t i c (which i s the only possible source f o r a s o l u t i o n ) , and 
w r i t e s "the Idea i s reason. Nature i s the opposite of the Idea, Nature, 
t h e r e f o r e , i s I r r a t i o n a l . And since r a t i o n a l i t y i s the same as necessity, 
nature must be governed by the opposite of necessity, v i z contingency. 
There i s no necessary l o g i c a l reason why anything i n nature should be as i t 
i s ; i t simply i s so."'^ This then, acknowledges th a t i f there i s 
61 
r a t i o n a l i t y and necessity, then i t must also be the case that there i s 
i r r a t i o n a l i t y and contingency, and Stace neatly matches the former with the 
noumenal and the l a t t e r w i t h the phenomenal, But s t i l l what i s evident 
i s t h a t , simply because the Absolute i s r a t i o n a l , i t f o l l o w s that i t must 
also Include i r r a t i o n a l i t y and b l i n d contingency, r e q u i r i n g i t f o r i t s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . This i n t u r n means that the Absolute i s r e l i a n t not j u s t on 
a logical other, but on a chaotic world of chance. And, i f the contingent 
i s genuinely the other of the r a t i o n a l , i e . i f i t i s wholly irrational, 
then the Absolute i s governed here by something that i s e n t i r e l y 
Incompatible with, and a l i e n to, i t s e l f as Reason. 
Findlay's response i s t o suggest that necessity i s two-fold, f i r s t as the 
other of contingency, and then as the synth e t i c harmony produced by the 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n : "Real Necessity, having a contingent foundation, i s 
t h e r e f o r e not r e a l l y Necessary at a l l " i s h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , 
Fackenheim proposes th a t "contingency enters into the necessity which i n 
t u r n c o n s i s t s of nothing but i t s conquest. " ^ B u t neither of these views 
are s a t i s f a c t o r y because they deviate from t r u e d i a l e c t i c by suggesting 
that the synthesis (necessity) i s i n f a c t the same as one of the theses 
(necessity as opposed t o contingency); necessity cannot encounter 
contingency merely t o evolve necessity again. Findlay continues by 
a s s e r t i n g t h a t " i t i s t h e r e f o r e Necessity i t s e l f which determines i t s e l f as 
Contingency, I n [ t h a t ! i t s very being repulses i t s e l f from i t s e l f , and i n 
t h i s repulse has only returned t o s e l f . " ' ^ I n other words, necessity 
e x h i b i t s i t s e l f as i t s other ( i e . contingency) before r e c o n c i l i n g as 
i t s e l f , thereby both p o s i t i n g i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n and then overcoming such; 
God, as noumenal concept, e x h i b i t s himself as the appearance of phenomenal 
being, w h i l s t remaining at one w i t h himself, supreme over h i s apparent 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 
Here then, we have an answer i n the contingent being genuinely governed by 
reason, the former being a representation t o o b j e c t i f y the l a t t e r . But 
s t i l l we f i n d no s o l u t i o n as t o the question of why the p o s i t i n g of the 
phenomenal, contingent world i s needed other than t o f u l f i l the law of 
o p p o s i t i o n , " * and Jaeschke's question i s t h e r e f o r e s t i l l unanswered, 
Furthermore, Taylor remarks w i t h notable chagrin that "the law i s 
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u n s a t i s f a c t o r y as a candidate f o r the underlying r e a l i t y behind the 
Appearance; f o r i t n e i t h e r r e a l l y underlies everything, nor does i t achieve 
the inner relatedness which i t i s supposed t o . , . [ t h e law] i s seen against 
t h i s background, as a way of conceiving the necessary relatedness 
u n d e r l y i n g the phenomena. As such i t f a i l s . "-^ ^ Thus, we have the second 
element of the problem surmised, namely that opposition does not 
a u t h e n t i c a l l y operate t o e f f e c t a synthetic harmony, because the r a t i o n a l 
necessity i s c o n t i n u a l l y supreme over i t s supposedly equal other of 
contingency. Opposition does not pervade necessity as i t does contingency, 
because necessity I s both t h e s i s and synthesis, and as such the purpose of 
the a n t i t h e s i s , the contingent world, i s l o s t . Although i t may be argued 
that the Absolute i s o b j e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l owing t o i t being not i t s 
appearance as the contingent i r r a t i o n a l , d i a l e c t i c demands that i t i s aiso 
the i r r a t i o n a l , something that i s here eventually denied. 
The problem, therefore, i n b r i e f I s that the Absolute dlrempts but f o r no 
s a t i s f a c t o r y reason. I t I s argued i n response that everything must have an 
other, and thus the noumenal Absolute must have a phenomenal other w i t h i n 
i t , but t h i s phenomenal other does not f o l l o w genuine d i a l e c t i c because i t 
simply disappears i n t o the notion of the noumenal, contingency swallowed 
whole by necessity. And, i f t h i s i s the case, not only i s a devi a t i o n from 
d i a l e c t i c evident, but also the purpose of the dlremption i s again l o s t ; I f 
i t i s t o be simply taken over by the r a t i o n a l r e a l i t y , rather than 
genuinely a f f e c t t h i s r e a l i t y , i t i s surely p o i n t l e s s . 
Notes 
1. There i s much debate regarding the s i g n i f i c a t i o n of Scheln and 
Ersche.inung intended by Hegel. Inwood provides a valuable comparison 
i n A Hegel Dictionary, and I have adopted h i s view i n considering 
Erschelnung to be " i n contrast t o Scheln, ... [an] independent and 
f l u c t u a t i n g whole or world. Erschelnung contrasts p r i m a r i l y not with 
'essence', but w i t h 'concept'." (p39) However, see note below on the 
H a r r i s and Geraets t r a n s l a t i o n . 
2. Although t h i s passage may be understood as being concerned with Scheln 
r a t h e r than Erscheinung, the t r a n s l a t o r s have argued i t t o be 
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discussing Erschelnung because Hegel i s here employing t h i s word w i t h 
regard t o the d i r e c t movement of Schein t o Erschelnung, the l a t t e r -
described by Harris and Gereats as the "higher development" of the 
former iLoglc, pXXV) - being the " ' t r u t h ' of Scheln i n a f u l l e r 
measure." (.Logic, pXXVl) I do not believe t h i s t o be q u i t e precise i n 
represe n t i n g Hegel's I n t e n t i o n here, but I concede i t i s correct t o 
understand Scheln i n i t s context w i t h (and, indeed, u l t i m a t e l y as) 
Erschelnung. 
3. Har r i s , Hegel's Development, p388. 
4. Taylor, p274. 
5. Mure, A Study of Hegel's Logic, p l l 7 . 
6. Taylor, p273. 
7. I t could be argued, of course, that any p a r t i c u l a r can be i n and f o r 
i t s e l f . Hegel, however, disputes t h i s , arguing emphatically that 
e verything must p e r t a i n t o the whole. 
8. By "mere being," Hegel i s c l e a r l y not r e f e r r i n g t o being i n the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l sense <ie. as substance), but being-there (Daseln). 
9. Mure, A Study of Hegel's Logic, p i 18. 
10. Taylor, p275. 
11. H a r r i s , Hegel's Development, p389. 
12. Kant, B631. 
13. Jaeschke, pl53, 
14. Stace, p309. 
15. Again we may detect a notably Platonic aura i n the chaotic world 
representing an ordered, higher r e a l i t y . 
16. Flndlay, p213. 
17. Fackenhelm, pl9. 
18. Flndaly, p213. 
19. I t should be noted t h a t although the above commentators r e f e r t o the 
law as the 'law of necessity', or the 'law of contingency', the law 
I t s e l f i s of opposition, as both necessity and contingency are obliged 
t o oppose each other according t o d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c . 
20. Taylor, p275-6. 
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6. Truth. 
From analysing the basic s t r u c t u r e of Hegel's t r i a d i c deity, i t i s 
Important now t o consider t r u t h . For Hegel, the Absolute i s equatable 
w i t h t r u t h , and so one needs t o understand the Absolute both i n i t s e l f , 
and w i t h regard t o un t r u t h and f a l s i t y . Broadly speaking, philosophy 
had (and perhaps s t i l l has) considered t r u t h t o be of e i t h e r 
correspondence or coherence, ^ With the former, a b r i e f d e f i n i t i o n could 
be that X i s t r u e i f i t i s compatible w i t h i t s relevant s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s ; a statement saying " t h i s i s ray dog," f o r example, i s true on 
t h i s c r i t e r i o n i f the object r e f e r r e d t o possesses the appropriate 
canine c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g i t f i r s t from a cat, and then a 
b i t c h . I n other words, correspondent t r u t h i s dependent upon external 
relation, the aptness of a p r o p o s i t i o n i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o external 
r e a l i t y , I t i s very much the t r u t h of empiricism and mathematics - that 
two plus two equals four i s regarded as t r u e i s an obvious example - and 
we may note also Kant's d e c l a r a t i o n that the "formal element of a l l 
t r u t h consists i n agreement w i t h the laws of the understanding, 
Importantly, i t may t h e r e f o r e be added that correspondent t r u t h i s 
app l i c a b l e d i r e c t l y t o p a r t i c u l a r i t y . 
For Hegel, however, t h i s i s an unacceptable c r i t e r i o n because every 
p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n necessarily involves f i n i t u d e - one being l i m i t e d by 
an other. As Inwood remarks, f o r Hegel "no f i n i t e e n t i t y f u l l y agrees 
w i t h i t s concept. I t i s entangled i n r e l a t i o n s t o other things which 
confer on i t features that are not determined by i t s concept."-^ Thus, 
Hegel says t r u t h i s not: 
"External things [which] correspond with my representations 
(representations of this kind are just correct representations held 
by /»<? as ^Ais [individual])." (.Logjc, §213) 
Coherent t r u t h (which i s usually associated w i t h idealism owing l a r g e l y 
t o i t s a priori nature) argues that t r u t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y system, the 
dynamics of which are motivated by, and d i r e c t e d to, i t s e l f as a s i n g l e 
system of thought. Truth, that i s , i s predicable only of the system as 
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a whole, and Mure w r i t e s that " t r u t h i s the genuineness possessed by any 
phase i n t h i s a c t i v e u n i t y of thought and being i n so f a r as I t i s a 
' r e s u l t ' approximating t o the full ' r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ' of the s e l f -
c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n the unity. "^ ' One consequence of t h i s i s that, 
aside from the system as a whole (which maintains an absolute t r u t h 
value), any d e r i v a t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n i s only partly t r u e or false. This 
i s t o say tha t a p r o p o s i t i o n as a subdiv i s i o n of the whole, maintains 
both facets; i t i s t r u e i n that i t i s reducible back t o the system, and 
untrue because i t d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f from the whole v i a i t s 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y nature. I n other words, coherent t r u t h cannot admit that 
some object or other I s wholly f a l s e because every object i s of the 
system and t h e r e f o r e contains an element of t r u t h by v i r t u e of i t s 
s t a t u s as such. As Mure q u i t e r i g h t l y points out then, "degrees of 
t r u t h are ... i n some sense also degrees of error, f o r t r u t h l i v e s only 
i n the conquest of error, and e r r o r i s not i l l u s i o n , but i t has no 
p o s i t i v e source of content except truth,"® 
( 1 ) Hegel's understanding of truth. 
I t i s the l a t t e r I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t r u t h that Hegel employs, and he f i n e 
tunes i t t o provide the d e f i n i t i o n "agreement of a content with I t s e l f . " 
(.Logic, §24A2) As the preceeding pages have Implied, t r u t h i s 
u l t i m a t e l y that which i s reconciled t o e x h i b i t a perfect, harmonious 
uni t y ; the s u b l a t l o n of d i v i s i o n and c o n t r a d i c t i o n produces the 
character of absolute t r u t h . Again, Mure summarises I t we l l , w r i t i n g 
" t r u t h i s genuineness, not the formal coincidence of the object, 
whatever i t s content, w i t h our Vorstellung I ie. representational 
thought], but i t s accordance w i t h itself."® Thus what emerges from t h i s 
c r i t e r i o n i s th a t a statement such as "my dog i s c a l l e d Mahler" contains 
no (coherent) t r u t h value whatsoever, f o r the statement i s q u i t e 
independent from that which q u a l i f i e s X t o be true, and the fa c t that my 
dog i s c a l l e d Mahler, and that I can mentally r e c o n c i l e t h i s w i t h my 
Vorstellung of my pet i s only an I n s i g n i f i c a n t and I r r e l e v a n t 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y . Hegel stresses t h i s point, proposing t h a t "we can form a 
correct representation of a bad object . . . but the content of t h i s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s something Inwardly untrue." (Logic, §24A2) 
The question t h i s poses i s what i s a 'bad' object and a 'good' one, and 
Hegel's response i s that "what i s bad and untrue consists always i n a 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the object's determination or concept and i t s 
existence. " (.Logic, §24A2) When I p i c t u r e my dog, no matter how precise 
the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n appears, a c o n t r a d i c t i o n continues t o e x i s t because 
both my p i c t u r e and my dog's existence are f i n i t e and thus i n c o n f l i c t . 
I n other words, any apparent u n i t y between my concept and Mahler's 
existence, w h i l s t producing a s i m i l a r e f f e c t , i s i n r e a l i t y other than 
genuine because i t i s formed on t h a t which i s e s s e n t i a l l y untrue ( i e . 
f i n i t e , a n t a g o n i s t i c f a c t o r s ) . As Hegel puts i t ; 
"In ordinary consciousness we see nothing wrong with the fi n i t e 
determinations of thought; they are held to be valid without further 
question, But a l l our illusions arise from thinking and acting 
according to fi n i t e determinations," {Logic, §24A2) 
What emerges, therefore, i s a f i n e d i f f e r e n c e between genuine t r u t h and 
merely co r r e c t representation. The crux of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e , that i s the 
d i s c r i m i n a t i n g aspect, i s the nature of the object; i f the object i s 
i n f i n i t e i n the f u l l sense of the term i t i s genuine t r u t h because i t i s 
abs o l u t e l y i t s e l f , And, as only the whole, the Absolute, i s i n f i n i t e , 
then consequently i t . a l o n e i s genuine t r u t h . P a r t i c u l a r i t y viewed 
e m p i r i c a l l y as independent substance can the r e f o r e not be true i f so 
perceived. Only when i t i s considered as of the whole, coherent w i t h i n 
the system, can i t s t r u t h be acknowledged: 
"Truth is understood f i r s t to mean that I /wfc something is. But this is 
truth only in relation to consciousness; i t is formal truth, mere 
correctness, In contrast with this, truth in the deeper sense means 
that objectivity is identical with the Concept." (.Logic, §2I3A) 
This e l u c i d a t e s the above example f u r t h e r s t i l l . I t i s me, as a f i n i t e 
i n d i v i d u a l , t h a t p i c t u r e s my dog. My dog i s a f i n i t e being who merely 
happens t o correspond t o the representation of i t i n my consciousness. 
Yet each contains the breath of the untrue by v i r t u e of t h e i r f i n i t e 
o r i g i n s , l e . t h e i r contextual states, which define the representations 
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through t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o other e x t e r n a l objects and representations, 
t h i s r e l a t i o n causing t h e i r f l n l t u d e . Thus, the content of the 
re p r e s e n t a t i o n i s f i n i t e and t h e r e f o r e d e f i c i e n t , and so I t i s 
u n q u a l i f i e d t o provide an authentic t r u t h . To analoglse, a person can 
b u i l d a house from b r i c k s and mortar, but i f n e i t h e r the bricks or the 
mortar are s y s t e m a t i c a l l y I n t e r r e l a t e d , the very basis of the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n i s removed, 
This i s something that i s very much evident also i n the l i n g u i s t i c 
philosophy of Ferdinand de Saussure, I n Saussurian thought, every 
a p p e l l a t i o n i s a r b i t r a r y , an algebraic t o o l of expression. I f one c a l l s 
an object a 'lemon', i t i s t o t a l l y independent of what the t h i n g 
r e f e r r e d t o a c t u a l l y i s . Thus, i f one points at a yellow-coloured 
c i t r u s f r u i t and c a l l s i t a 'hamster', only the a p p e l l a t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t 
from i f i t i s c a l l e d a 'lemon'; the f r u i t I t s e l f i s unchanged and 
remains unchanged whatever i t i s ca l l e d . 
This I s an example of a 'sound-pattern' or ' s l g n i f i e r ' , a l i n e a r 
a p p e l l a t i o n designed t o inform the r e c i p i e n t of what I s being spoken 
about. That the r e c i p i e n t understands that the s l g n i f l e r r e f e r s t o a 
yellow-coloured c i t r u s f r u i t i s , however, wholly dependent on the 
r e c i p i e n t ' s mental concept, l e . his/her Vorstellung. Because the 
r e c i p i e n t i s aware that L-E-M-O-N I n his/her language s i g n i f i e s a 
p a r t i c u l a r f r u i t (because the sound p a t t e r n causes and subsequently 
r e l a t e s t o a p i c t u r e of such I n his/her consciousness), the object 
becomes mutually shared between the communicator and r e c i p i e n t as a 
concept, or as a ' s i g n i f i e d ' . What emerges I s a kind of d i a l e c t i c : a 
s l g n i f l e r has introduced a conscious representation, and from t h i s a 
'sign' i s syntheslsed. L-E-M-O-N ( s l g n l f i e r ) + conscious representation 
of a yellow-coloured c i t r u s f r u i t ( s i g n i f i e d ) = the complete 
understanding of, and reference to, the object (sign). 
This process i s a part of Parole, i e . i t deals w i t h s i n g l e terms, and 
Saussure applies t h i s process t o part of a complete system, Langue,'^ f o r 
example a phrase. Dealing w i t h only Parole does not communicate any 
s u b s t a n t i a l information, and t h e r e f o r e a 'synchronic' study of language 
i s r e q u i r e d ( l e . how a language f u n c t i o n s as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t system) 
and, here, a 'syntagmatlc' examination of the phrase. I f , f o r example, 
one asks "who has eaten a lemon?", by acknowledging the sound patterns 
and consequential representations, the r e c i p i e n t understands the meaning 
of the i n d i v i d u a l words but not the phrase, f o r the words, rearranged, 
could read "a lemon has eaten who?". By being aware of the syntagmatic 
r e l a t i o n s between words, however, the linear pattern of the s l g n i f i e r s 
leads t o a determined and ordered concept and thus sign. Further, with 
'who has eaten a lemon?', i t i s noticeable that the f i r s t few terms 
('who', 'has', 'eaten') are only f u l l y understood once they are 
cont e x t u a l i s e d by the remainder of the phrase, i e . given a conceptual 
background which i s determined by relation.® 
What we t h e r e f o r e f i n d w i t h i n Saussure's system. I s a remarkable 
p a r a l l e l w i t h Hegel's no t i o n of coherent t r u t h . Single words are qu i t e 
nebulous by themselves, and thus r e q u i r e t h e i r place w i t h i n a phrase. , 
and the phrase must subsequently then f i n d I t s place w i t h i n the e n t i r e 
language system f o r i t to be e f f e c t i v e , Saussure's language system i s , 
l i k e Hegel's concept of God and t r u t h , a complete, s i n g l e system, and 
i t s I n t e r n a l elements are abso l u t e l y r e l i a n t on t h e i r respective places 
w i t h i n i t . 
The key point, then. I s that each of the elements f i t i n t o a whole. I f 
we consider t h i s i n r e l a t i o n t o a correspondence theory of t r u t h , we 
f i n d a dog i s f i n i t e because I t stands i n r e l a t i o n t o a b i t c h , a cat, a 
sponge pudding, and so on. The very notion of 'dog' i s the r e f o r e 
dependent, f i n i t e , and untrue. For Hegel, t h i s does not produce genuine 
t r u t h , l e . the Absolute Idea i n i t s i d e a l , reconciled state; rather, i t ' 
provides antagonism, that which the Absolute I s t o overcome. Because 
a l l phenomena are f i n i t e and merely representative of t h e i r concepts, 
coherence i s replaced by correspondence, and only when the f i n i t e 
phenomenal i s sublated t o 'leave', so t o speak, the essence i n freedom, 
does authentic t r u t h emerge: 
"God alone is the genuine agreement between Concept and reality; a l l 
fin i t e things, however, are affected with untruth; they have a concept 
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but their existence is not adequate to i t , For this reason they must 
go to ground, and this manifests the inadequacy between their concept 
and existence," {Logic, §24A2) 
What t h i s quotation thus proposes i s that the Absolute Idea i s uniquely 
i n f i n i t e , and uniquely true, because i t has overcome the realm of 
f i n l t u d e . Correspondingly, a l l that i s f i n i t e must be regarded as 
untrue. But, when Hegel says 'untrue', does he mean false? 
"'True' and 'false' belong among those determinate notions which are 
held to be inert and wholly separate essences, one here and one there, 
each standing fixed and isolated from the other, with which i t has 
nothing in common, Against this view i t must be maintained that truth 
is not a minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made, Nor 
IS there such a thing as the false," (PS, §39) 
( 1 1 ) Untruth and falsity. 
Patently then, the answer t o such a question must be an emphatic 'no'; 
to argue th a t t r u t h and f a l s i t y can co-exist as a t t r i b u t e s of any given 
p a r t i c u l a r i s the equivalent of saying that what i s , i s not! Yet, on 
the other hand, t h i s would seem t o suggest that Hegel must e i t h e r argue 
everything t o be fa l s e , or everything t o be true. This argument, 
a p p l i c a b l e against both Hegel personally and monism i n general, however, 
f a i l s t o appreciate the d i f f e r e n c e between u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y and the 
world of appearance; i t argues, t o borrow Kant's language, that 
philosophy i s confined purely t o the empirical and not t o the t h i n g - i n -
I t s e l f . 
Let us ov e r r i d e t h i s narrow approach and broaden the categories t o the 
't r u e ' , the ' f a l s e ' , and the 'untrue'. The t r u e i s s o l e l y the 
re c o n c i l e d Absolute, the sole realm of existence. The false, as the 
above qu o t a t i o n implies i s non-existence; false, as the opposite of 
true, t h a t i s , simply ' i s - n o f , 'not-being'.'^ I f one deals only w i t h • 
these two categories as such though, one must conclude that the f i n i t e 
simply ' i s - n o t ' , but then t h i s leads t o a complete denial of e x i s t e n t i a l 
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and Cartesian l o g i c ; f o r , i f something ' i s - n o t ' , how can i t appear and 
create the i l l u s i o n of i t s exlstence?^° 
I t i s at t h i s point t h a t we must apprehend the d i f f e r e n c e between 
f a l s i t y and that which i s 'untrue'. Ultimately, on the l e v e l of 
absolute i d e a l i t y , a l l t h a t i s n e i t h e r noumenal or i n f i n i t e (which i n 
t h i s context are synonomous terms anyway) must l o g i c a l l y be considered 
as f a l s e - they 'are-not'. But t h i s 'appearance', f i n i t u d e , i s f a l s e 
i n one sense only, l e. i t i s a d i s t o r t e d and incomplete e x h i b i t i o n of 
the Absolute, f o r f i n i t u d e i s derived from the Absolute and the 
dlremptive process: 
"Everything is actual is the Idea inasmuch as i t is something-true, 
and i t has it s truth only through the Idea and in virtue of i t , The 
singular being is some side or other of the Idea; that is why the other 
actualities were needed for i t - actualities which likewise appear to 
subsist distinctly on their own account, I t is only in a l l of them 
together and in their relation that the Concept is realised, By itself 
the singular does not correspond to it s concept; this restrictedness of 
its way of being constitutes i t s finiiude ind i t s f a l l , " (.Logic, §213) 
Thus, f i n i t u d e i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y and unavoidably associated with the 
Absolute so t h a t , on one hand, i t appears f i r s t t o be true, and then 
(when Hegelian analysis has confronted and redressed I t ) false, but i n 
r e a l i t y i t e x i s t s as the untrue, i e . that which i s t r u e only i n s o f a r as 
i t derives from the Absolute; X cannot become f a l s e - that i s absurd f o r 
i t must be grounded i n the absolute t r u t h - but I t can be untrue prima 
facie i f u l t i m a t e l y i t i s the other of what i t appears t o be. 
Hegel s t a t e s t h a t , although we can "know something f a l s e l y .., t o know 
something f a l s e l y means that there i s a d i s p a r i t y between knowledge and 
i t s substance, " (.PS, §39) I n other words, f a l s i t y i s an appropriate 
term only when aligned t o a wholly vacuous concept. Indeed, i t could 
even be asserted that f a l s i t y i s bound e n t i r e l y t o the abstract, f o r any 
h i n t of substance or a c t u a l i t y would at once r e l a t e the concept t o 
something that maintains a t r u t h value; at best the concept can only 
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untrue. F a l s i t y , therefore, i s a q u i t e nebulous notion, and Hegel 
commented "nor i s there suvh a t h i n g as the f a l s e . " (PS §39) Thus, with 
t h i s i n mind, one may say that the f a l s e i s not that which i s 
d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed t o the tru e , but that which maintains no definite 
or associative content. I t i s not a c o r r u p t i o n of the true, something 
which i s merely perceived erroneously, but- that which has no s u b s t a n t i a l 
being. This i s the basis f o r the d i f f e r e n c e between the f a l s e and the 
untrue, and the untrue i s not devoid of any connection with the true, 
but r a t h e r i s a d i s t o r t e d and incomplete representation of the true. As 
Hegel somewhat s t e r n l y notes: 
"The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth 
and falsity, the more i t tends to expect a given philosophical system to 
be either accepted or contradicted; and hence i t finds only acceptance or 
rejection, I t does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems 
as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in i t simple 
disagreements." (.PS, §2) 
To c l a r i f y t h i s , I would l i k e t o borrow from the Hindu monist, Sankara, 
and h i s analogy of a man on a dark night mistaking a rope f o r a snake. 
The man sees the object from a distance and believes i t t o be a snake; 
h i s eyes t e l l him i t i s so and h i s mind accepts h i s sensual conclusion. 
Only when he gets very close t o the object does the man r e a l i s e h i s 
erro r , and then he knows what he sees i s I n t r u t h a rope. Translated, 
the man sees the e m p i r i c a l , f i n i t e world as actual because h i s senses 
t e l l him i t i s so, and i n h i s Ignorance he p e r s i s t e n t l y argues the 
phenomenal i s actual i n and f o r i t s e l f . O b jectively, however, the man 
i s deceived and the f i n i t e world I s never a r e a l i t y per se, j u s t as the 
rope i s always most c e r t a i n l y a rope and never i n any way a snake. 
This, i t must be stressed, i s not t o say that phenomenality simply ' i s 
not', as the very concept of ' i s - n o t ' i s i n t h i s context absurd; 
whatever appears must possess some element of t r u t h i n order f o r both 
the appearance and subsequent c o g n i t i o n t o occur - one cannot cognise 
nothing! Rather, appearance must be that which in truth is something 
else; w i t h Sankara's analogy, the appearance of the snake i s not. Indeed 
cannot be no-thing - no-thing cannot deceive - i t must be rather 
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something else, i e . a rope, Here then, we may see tha t t r u t h and 
u n t r u t h i s not simply a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d case of r i g h t and wrong. The 
erroneous cannot be dismissed out of hand as i t s very being i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t i t maintains some t r u t h - v a l u e , even I f such i s not t o be found i n 
i t s immediate presentation. 
The s i m i l a r i t i e s between Sankara and Hegel are here q u i t e s t r i k i n g . 
Each regards the phenomenal as the appearance of t r u t h , but the 
phenomenal prima facie i s not the t r u t h . That i s , the t r u t h i s manifest 
as f i n i t u d e , but such manifestation as it is presented i s not the 
Absolute; rather, the Absolute i s the noumenal essence on which 
phenomenallty appears. Appearance i s thus rooted i n the Absolute, and 
as something e x i s t e n t i s the Absolute, but such i s sensually cognised 
wrongly as t r u e being. Being i s not, therefore, f i n i t e appearance, but 
the underlying essence, l e . the Absolute, 
What I s obviously important about Sankara's analogy i s that the sentient 
i s not a u t o m a t i c a l l y equatable w i t h genuine t r u t h and, moreover, that 
untruth plays a determinating role in the concept of reality. The 
r e a l i t y ( i n Sankara's analogy the rope) i s not only q u a l i f i e d by being 
' not-a-snake', but also the appearance o b j e c t i f i e s the r e a l i t y , and t h i s 
i l l u m i n a t e s the inner core of He r a c l l t u s ' l o g i c , that the a f f i r m a t i v e 
' I s ' e x i s t s by v i r t u e of the negative ' i s not', and t r u t h i s o b j e c t i f i e d 
by untruth. As Stace puts i t , "the appearance i s the essence; ie. i t i s 
not less e s s e n t i a l than the essence I t s e l f , This means that i t i s 
e s s e n t i a l f o r the essence t o appear ,,, essence and appearance are 
i d e n t i c a l i n s p i t e of t h e i r difference,"'-^ Quite simply, i f anything 
' i s ' , i t must u l t i m a t e l y be of the Absolute, regardless of however i t 
appears; the appearance and the essence i n t e r m i n g l e on the lower l e v e l , 
adopting a f i n i t e guise, but u l t i m a t e l y "the t r u t h of the f i n i t e i s 
ra t h e r i t s i d e a l i t y , " (Logic, §95) Therefore, the phenomenal i s actual, 
but not as ' f i n i t e X', and "the necessity of the world i s t o sublate i t s 
f i n i t u d e , " (LPR 1. 255) 
Notes 
1. I mention these two t h e o r i e s because Hegel adhered t o the coherent 
value of t r u t h , t o which correspondent t r u t h I s the most 
an t a g o n i s t i c . Other, established analyses of t r u t h , such as 
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correspondent t r u t h , Ramsey's 'redundancy', and James' 'pragmatic' 
t h e o r i e s of t r u t h are a l l post-Hegel and thus t o an extent 
i r r e l e v a n t t o t h i s discussion. 
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there i s also the broad Langage which i s the p o t e n t i a l of language. 
This l a t t e r category, however, i s not of relevance i n t h i s 
discussion. 
8. Saussure's l i n g u i s t i c theory i s the subject of h i s book Course in 
General Linguistics, I t should be noted that Saussure applies h i s 
theory only t o language, and most c e r t a i n l y not t o theology, but the 
p r i n c i p l e on which the theory operates i s not, I f e e l , i n any way 
incompatible w i t h t h i s part of the discussion. 
9. I use the terra 'opposite' here q u i t e loosely and i n i t s more common 
sense. As not-being, f a l s i t y cannot be other than a mere abstract 
other. 
10. Descartes, p53f, 96ff. 
11. Thlbaut G ( t r a n s ) , 1. 4. 6. 
12. Many c r i t i c s of Sankara (Stace, f o r example, p200) argue that the 
Hindu does i n fact propose that phenomenality i s a mere n u l l i t y . 
This i n part derives from confusion regarding the Sanskrit term 
Maya which i s of t e n loosely t r a n s l a t e d as ' i l l u s i o n ' . However, such 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n wrong; as Radhakrlshnan points out, f o r Sankara 
"the world i s not so much negated as r e i n t e r p r e t e d , " vol 2, p583. 
13. Stace, p200. 
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74 7. Finitude and infinitude. 
The previous chapter argued genuine t r u t h t o be s o l e l y the Absolute, and 
furthermore t h a t t r u t h i s compelled t o be i n f i n i t e . I n u l t i m a t e 
r e a l i t y , a l l that i s t r u e i s the Absolute Idea i n and f o r i t s e l f , free • 
from f i n i t u d e ; "the f i n i t e i s not actual being, i t i s not something 
su b s i s t e n t . " '(LPR 1.308) Thus, Hegel denies the t r u t h of a l l f i n i t e 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y , and keeps such p a r t i c u l a r i t y confined t o the realm of 
appearance, and what emerges i s tha t we enter a new realm of 
( s u p e r f i c i a l ) dualism, that of a higher and a lower t r u t h , the former 
being the i d e a l Absolute Idea, and the other the material, f i n i t e world 
t h a t appears t o oppose i n f i n i t y , Jenseits and Diesseits respectively. 
As we have seen, 'appearance' (Erscheinung) f o r Hegel does not r e f e r t o 
i l l u s i o n , f o r what appears does so s t r i c t l y as the noumenal Absolute 
appearing to be its other ( l e . the phenomenal), so that i t i s Incorrect 
t o say that i t i s i l l u s i o n of no authentic substance; i f t h i s should be 
the case, and f i n i t u d e i s th a t which I s wholly f a l s e , then i t would be 
genuinely independent from the Absolute, and not a manifestation of i t . 
The n o t i o n of the f i n i t e as i t appears, as a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y e x i s t i n g 
independently i n and f o r i t s e l f , I s t h e r e f o r e untrue, but as being-there 
(Daseln), i e . as some thing, i t i s derived from the Absolute. I n other 
words, appearance as I t pretends t o be i s untrue, and rather that the 
appearance i s i n f a c t the other of what i t seems t o be, i e . i t i s the 
i n f i n i t e : 
" E s s e n c e does not remain b e h i n d or beyond appearance; i n s t e a d , i t i s , 
s o t o speak, t h e i n f i n i t e goodness t h a t r e l e a s e s i t s semblance i n t o 
immediacy and g r a n t s i t t h e j o y of b e i n g ^ t h e r e , Uhen p o s i t e d i n t h i s 
way, a p p e a r a n c e does n o t s t a n d on i t s own f e e t , and does not have i t s 
b e i n g w i t h i n i t s e l f but w i t h i n an o t h e r , " (Logic, §131A) 
Appearance, then, i s the emergence of existence, the character which the 
Absolute assumes when becoming cognisant, but i t s t r u t h l i e s i n i t s 
l o g i c a l roots, i t s being as the i n f i n i t e Absolute despite its apparent 
otherness. Hence, we must understand at once Hegel's employment of the 
f i n i t e being-there, namely that i t i s s t r i c t l y a part of the Absolute's 
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s e l f - o b j e c t i f y i n g system, emerging from the Absolute as seeming 
otherness, but r e t a i n i n g i t s essential t r u t h as the Absolute, so that 
"'being-there' [ i s ] a determination which ... i s incapable of grasping 
what I s t r u e because I t i s i t s e l f untrue." (iLoglc, §28A)' 
( 1 ) Pantheism and dualism rejected. 
Ivan S o i l i s one commentator who f a i l s t o grasp t h i s point. He suggests 
t h a t , because Hegel proposes th a t " t o be f i n i t e i s t o be l i m i t e d by 
something else,"-- then from t h i s i t f o l l o w s that "'the whole world' or 
universe i s i n f i n i t e , f o r since i t Includes everything, there can be 
nothing eJse l e f t t o l i m i t i t . " I n t h i s way. S o i l argues, Hegel I s 
" f o l l o w i n g Spinoza."-^ But S o l i ' s commentary i n d i c a t e s an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y 
tendency on h i s behalf t o view Hegel as a pantheist i n the sense that 
e v e r y t h i n g i s crudely regarded t o be d i v i n e rather than assuming a place 
w i t h i n a l o g i c a l system and, as Findlay w r i t e s , " f o r an a l l - i n c l u s i v e 
S p l n o z i s t i c i n f i n i t e he [Hegel] has absolutely no place,"'* Although 
S o i l never makes t h i s charge of pantheism e x p l i c i t (he i s very much 
concerned w i t h Hegel the philosopher rather than Hegel the theologian), 
he i s b a s i c a l l y a s s e r t i n g t h a t , f o r Hegel, the Absolute i s merely the 
t o t a l i t y of a l l , the conglomeration of each and every p a r t i c u l a r , be the 
given p a r t i c u l a r abstract or m a t e r i a l , Therefore, h i s argument 
e f f e c t i v e l y i s that Hegel shares w i t h Spinoza the opinion that the d e i t y 
i s no more than the totality of a l l forms of being, i e . God i s that 
which ' I s ' . But such an argument i n the end only f o l l o w s Stace's point 
th a t everything must eventually be encompassed w i t h i n some indeterminate 
u n i v e r s a l , and that such provides a wholly impoverished philosophical 
basis. 
S o l i ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n stems from the simple l o g i c that i f every 
p a r t i c u l a r ' i s ' , then only no-thing can be i n opposition, or, put i n 
reverse, no-thing can oppose the Absolute, and so t h e r e f o r e one must 
regard a l l p a r t i c u l a r i t y as a part of the Absolute. I n I t s e l f , t h i s i s 
not I n c o r r e c t - of course a monistic Absolute i s a l l - but the Absolute 
i s not a l l i n the sense of i t being a mass of c o l l e c t i v e p a r t i c u l a r i t y , 
but r a t h e r as the whole which i s the underlying, t r u e essence and ground 
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upon which apparent p a r t i c u l a r i t y i s exhibited. S o l i f a l l s t o 
acknowledge t h i s important element of Hegel's system, arguing instead 
that a l l forms of being are c o l l e c t e d together, so t o speak, and stand 
as an apparent u n i t y against the presumed remaining no-thing; indeed, i t 
i s t h i s t h a t prompts S o l i t o contend that "the whole, and only the 
whole, i s i n f i n i t e . " ' " He thus argues that i t i s the t o t a l i t y alone 
which i s t r u l y i n f i n i t e ( t h i s p o s i t i o n i s probably derived from a 
m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the spurious i n f i n i t e , f o r which see below). S o l i 
does acknowledge that Hegelian theory maintains that "any 'being' that 
i s less than the whole of being, any 'content' that does not exhaust a l l 
content, 'necessarily stands i n r e l a t i o n ' t o what remains. And t o stand 
i n r e l a t i o n t o something else i s , i n Hegel's view, t o be l i m i t e d by i t 
and thus t o be f i n i t e , However, he m i s i n t e r p r e t s Hegel's meaning when 
he says t h a t every p a r t i c u l a r , because i t stands i n some r e l a t i o n , i s 
l o g i c a l l y f i n i t e ( i e . f i n i t e i n the sense that an opposition i s present) 
and instead understands t h i s t o mean that every p a r t i c u l a r must be 
simply reconsidered as a part of the 'whole' i n order f o r i t t o be 
unopposed, an argument that eventually leads t o a proposal that every 
part, as a distinct part, i s an element of the Absolute. Thus, the task 
of the f i n i t e i n S o i l ' s reading, l e . the removal of i t s opposition, 
becomes merely a process whereby the p a r t i c u l a r i s reclassified as 
belonging t o t h i s very indeterminate and obscure 'whole'. 
This i s s u r e l y not what Hegel Intended t o convey. The Absolute i s not 
the t o t a l being of every d i s t i n c t p a r t i c u l a r that possesses an 
a f f i r m a t i v e q u a l i t y , but the noumenal essence on which p a r t i c u l a r i t y i s 
grounded; th a t i s , the r e a l i t y i s the one Absolute p r e c i s e l y because the 
f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y of both the being and concept of X i s negated so 
that the q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s ( i e . the a n t i t h e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s ) that 
appear t o e x i s t are overcome. As Hegel c l e a r l y states; 
" A l t e r a t i o n iVerinderungI e x h i b i t s t h e i n n e r c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h which 
b e i n g - t h e r e i s burdened from t h e s t a r t , and which d r i v e s i t beyond 
i t s e l f , I n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , b e i n g - t h e r e a p p e a r s i n i t i a l l y to be s i m p l y 
p o s i t i v e and t o be q u i e t l y p e r s i s t i n g w i t h i n i t s l i m i t s a s w e l l ; but, 
of c o u r s e , we a l s o know t h a t e v e r y t h i n g f i n i t e (and b e i n g - t h e r e i s 
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f i n i t e ) i s s u b j e c t t o a l t e r a t i o n , B u t t h i s a l t e r a b i l i t y o f b e i n g - t h e r e 
a p p e a r s i n o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a s a rfjere p o s s i b i l i t y , w hose r e a l i s a t i o n 
i s i n v o l v e d i n t h e c o n c e p t o f b e i n g - t h e r e , a n d i s o n l y t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n 
o f w h a t b e i n g - t h e r e i s i n - i t s e l f , T h e l i v i n g d i e , a n d t h e y do s o 
b e c a u s e , i n s o f a r a s t h e y l i v e , t h e y b e a r t h e germ o f d e a t h w i t h i n 
t h e m s e l v e s , " (Logjc, § 9 2 A ) 
Again, t h e r e f o r e , Hegel r e t u r n s t o A r i s t o t l e ' s p r o p o s i t i o n that the 
t h i n g contains i t s end w i t h i n i t s e l f ientelechia, see chapter f o u r ) , and 
S o i l misses t h i s point w i t h alarming a l a c r i t y , neglecting t o apprehend 
the e n t i r e idea of the essential Absolute, the Absolute which i s pure 
being, the noumenal alpha and omega. Furthermore, such a 
m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hegel's dynamics means that S o i l i s unable t o 
engage w i t h the l o g i c a l system of the Absolute's emergence i n t o 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y and subsequent r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . By proposing that 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y i s e x i s t e n t i n and f o r i t s e l f , one may only achieve a 
r e s u l t of dualism (or an extremely f l i m s y n o t i o n of monism which i s 
q u a l i f i e d merely by everything being under the umbrella of an 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y and obscure whole, t h a t ' s p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r i n c l u s i o n are 
merely that something i s . The mechanics, as S o l i understands them, are 
that X, i n order t o be i n f i n i t e , encounters and encompasses Y, and so 
nothing may thus be said t o stand outside of t h i s unity. This 'unity', 
however, i s not the Absolute Hegel purports because i t has changed t o 
become X + Y, the Absolute plus i t s bounty of f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y or, 
as w i l l be noted i n chapters eight and nine, the misconception of 
syn t h e s i s i n g A w i t h B t o produce AB. 
Hegel argues the reverse of t h i s ; the Absolute, as we have seen, does 
not change or become i n t r i n s i c a l l y enhanced by i t s system, but rather i s 
enriched only i n terms of i t s apprehension. I t does not include 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y so much as i t appears itself as particularity, and the 
system i s t h e r e f o r e one t o i l l u m i n a t e , and not t o concretely a l t e r , the 
Idea. Hegel argues: " t h i s l a s t stage of the l o g i c a l process proves at 
the same time t o be what i s genuinely f i r s t . " (Logic, §215A) 
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Further t e x t u a l evidence t h a t may be c i t e d against understandings such 
as S o l i ' s i s found i n Hegel's Lectures, and t h i s provides also a 
possible clue as t o where such m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s stem from. For, while 
Hegel does indeed w r i t e t h a t the realm of: 
" F i n i t u d e i s a d i v e r s e m a n i f o l d o f e x t e r n a l [ p a r t i c u l a r s ] , a n d t h i s 
m a n i f o l d o f many [ p a r t i c u l a r s ] i s t h e bounded, o v e r a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e 
u n b o u n d e d d e f i n e s i t s e l f a s t h e ' a l l n e s s ' o f t h e many," (^W 1,291) 
he at once continues t o point out that: 
" T h i s f i n i t u d e e n d u r e s [ t e m p o r a l l y ] , a n d i t d o e s s o b e c a u s e i t 
c o n t a i n s s o m e t h i n g f a l s e ,,, S o m e t h i n g o f t h i s k i n d , h o w e v e r , i s n o t 
a t r u e [ r e a l i t y ] p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e o n e s i d e i s a m a n i f o l d , a 
m u l t i p l i c i t y , w h i l e t h e o t h e r i s a u n i t y , The m u l t i p l i c i t y w o u l d 
h a v e t o r e l i n q u i s h p a r t o f i t s c h a r a c t e r i n o r d e r t o be s u b s u m e d 
u n d e r u n i t y , " ( i W 1 , 2 9 2 ) 
Therefore, what Hegel o f f e r s i s an i m p l i c i t attack on Spinoza's 
pantheism, f o r such an 'Absolute of T o t a l i t y ' i s i n I t s e l f an opponent 
to what he regards as a t r u e u n i t y , thereby demoting i t t o a p o s i t i o n of 
i n s i g n i f i c a n c e on the lower l e v e l , Hegel does not, as S o l i seems t o 
thi n k , gather a l l the p a r t i c u l a r s together and provide the c o l l e c t i o n 
w i t h the heading 'God', or 'Absolute'; rather, he i d e n t i f i e s the 
i n t r i n s i c u n i t y of the essence of both X and Y that l i e s w i t h i n the 
a n t i t h e t i c a l r e l a t i o n , s t r i p p i n g away that which leads t o p a r t i c u l a r i t y , 
m u l t i p l i c i t y , etc, l e , he negates the f i n i t e and i t s associative 
r e l a t i o n s , and demands that phenomenal being u l t i m a t e l y r e l i n q u i s h e s i t s 
l i m i t e d character of f i n i t u d e , 
A s i m i l a r m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s found i n Grisez's c r i t i c a l summary of 
Hegel. Grisez wri t e s ; "the Absolute i s nothing but i t s parts taken as a 
un i t y . Truth i s the whole; the whole i s the Absolute. S t i l l , none of 
the p a r t s by i t s e l f i s true. But t h i s p o s i t i o n i s incoherent. I f the 
Absolute i s nothing but i t s p a r t s taken as a un i t y , then a l l of the 
co n d i t i o n s f o r the Absolute are given by i t s parts. I f none of the 
parts i s true, then the Absolute I s not t r u t h . On the other hand, i f 
the Absolute i s t r u t h , each of i t s parts also must be true. '"^  I n other 
words, Grisez i s arguing t h a t Hegel i s at f a u l t by proposing that the 
Absolute I s t r u t h because i t maintains a supreme property as the 
t o t a l i t y of p a r t i c u l a r i t y , and yet p a r t i c u l a r i t y i t s e l f i s d e f i c i e n t 
because i t i s s u b j e c t i v e and i n r e l a t i o n t o other p a r t i c u l a r i t y . This, 
to Grisez, i s unacceptable because the property of being the sum of 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y must necessarily derive from a formation of the parts, and 
i f the parts are not t r u e then no such formation, and consequential 
supreme property, can e x i s t . I f one considers a c h a r i o t , for example, 
' c h a r i o t ' i t s e l f I s merely an a p p e l l a t i o n given t o a series of 
components that are arranged i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner. But t o argue that 
the components are unreal renders the ch a r i o t as no more than a vacuous 
name which r e f e r s t o nothing. The chariot only i s because i t i s 
determined by i t s actual parts, without which the c h a r i o t i t s e l f could 
not p o s s i b l y be. 
Grisez, however, makes the same e r r o r that S o l i does, i n that he 
understands the 'whole' t o be the u n i t y of parts which stand unopposed 
because beyond the whole i s only no-thing. Furthermore, although Grisez 
acknowledges Hegel's own denial of pantheism, he continues to maintain 
th a t f o r Hegel "the p a r t i c u l a r i t y , the becoming, and the otherness of 
f i n i t e and contingent t h i n g s are not l o s t i n God, but are gathered up 
and maintained i n the u n i t y , "-^  I m p l i c i t l y , t h i s reasserts the charge 
against Hegel of pantheism, i f one may consider 'pantheism' t o r e f e r t o 
God as the sura of p a r t i c u l a r i t y , but i t also suggests that Hegel 
advocates a mechanism whereby p a r t i c u l a r i t y i s encompassed w i t h i n the 
Absolute as i t appears prima facie, That i s , f o r Grisez (and S o i l ) , 
Hegel's God encompasses f i n i t u d e , possessing t h i s as the whole, dragging 
i t , so t o speak, i n t o the i n f i n i t e category because i t i s presumed, by 
v i r t u e of I t having the property of being, t o be w i t h i n that which i s 
presumed t o be.unopposed. E f f e c t i v e l y , Grisez's v i s i o n i s , l i k e Soil's, 
t h a t Hegel merely r e c l a s s i f i e s f i n i t u d e rather than negates i t , 
encompassing i t i n an obscure Absolute, which f o r Grisez includes any 
p a r t i c u l a r that possesses the property of being, thereby supposedly 
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denying i t s f l n i t u d e because i t i s w i t h i n the whole against which there 
i s no-thing. 
But Hegel does not propose such a weak 'whole' as S o i l and Grisez 
purport. The n o t i o n t h a t h i s theology must accept the prima facie 
appearance of p a r t i c u l a r i t y i n order f o r the Absolute t o be genuinely 
staggers f a r from what I believe t o be the r e a l Hegel, where the 
negation of f i n i t u d e i s taken seriously, Thus, i f we reconsider the 
ch a r i o t analogy, Hegel would not argue that the parts are unreal but the 
composition i s r e a l , f o r t h i s i s pa t e n t l y I l l o g i c a l as Grisez i s so keen 
to stress. Rather, what i s o f f e r e d by Hegel i s th a t the f i n i t e 
appearance, of both the parts and the chariot ( i e . the e n t i r e phenomenal 
realm) i s fundamentally untenable as i t appears. The t r u t h of the 
ch a r i o t and i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s l i e s i n the common, underlying, and 
supreme essence, because "the f i n i t e i s not actual being, i t i s not 
something subsistent ... [ b u t ] the f i n i t e i s a moment of the i n f i n i t e , " 
(LPR 1.308-9) and both the c h a r i o t and i t s p a r t s are merely forms of 
f i n i t u d e : 
" A l t h o u g h b e i n g c e r t a i n l y d o e s p e r t a i n t o t h e [ p h e n o m e n a l ] w o r l d , i t 
i s o n l y s e m b l a n c e ISchsinl, n o t g e n u i n e b e i n g , n o t a b s o l u t e t r u t h ; 
f o r , on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e t r u t h i s b e y o n d t h a t a p p e a r a n c e , i n God 
a l o n e , a n d o n l y God i s g e n u i n e b e i n g , " (Logic, §50) 
The f i n i t e occurs, therefore, not as a part or element of the Absolute 
per se, as a wheel i s a necessary part of a ch a r i o t , but as a moment 
when it is apparently distinct from the Absolute owing to its seeming 
limitation. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Absolute and i t s f i n i t e 
appearance i s t h e r e f o r e confined t o the moment of t h i s appearance, a 
moment which derives from the Absolute, and which i s , indeed, u l t i m a t e l y 
the Absolute i t s e l f , because the t r u t h of f i n i t u d e l i e s i n i t s other, 
the i n f i n i t e Absolute Idea, Of course (as w i l l be discussed s h o r t l y ) , 
the e n t i r e i n f i n i t e / f i n i t e r e l a t i o n t h a t Grisez presumes q u i t e wrongly 
to be d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o the whole (the Absolute) and the parts 
( f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y ) i s a f a l l a c y , f o r were such the case, then the 
i n f i n i t e would i t s e l f be l i m i t e d by i t s other of f i n i t u d e , and thus i t 
I s an absurd p r o p o s i t i o n . Rather, what occurs i n the moment of 
appearance i s p r e c i s e l y what the name suggests, an apparent moment of 
opp o s i t i o n between the f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e : 
"The d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e l a t t e r [ t h e f i n i t e ] i s p r e c i s e l y t o be n o t t r u e 
i n i t s e l f , I f God h a s t h e f i n i t e o n l y o v e r a g a i n s t h i m s e l f , t h e n he 
h i m s e l f i s f i n i t e a n d l i m i t e d , F i n i t u d e m u s t b e p o s i t e d i n God 
h i m s e l f , " ( Z W 3 , 2 6 4 ) 
Again, t h i s I l l u s t r a t e s the two l e v e l s of r e a l i t y , namely an apparent 
r e a l i t y and the t r u e r e a l i t y , but importantly, and despite the f i n i t e 
being-there's s t a t u s as merely appearance, f i n i t u d e must be as 
appearance immediate t o the Absolute (from which i t necessarily 
derives). I f there i s 'appearance', i t , as a l l else, must be of the 
whole, e s s e n t i a l l y I d e n t i c a l t o the whole regardless of i t s guise, 
A f u r t h e r , u n s a t i s f a c t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hegel's perception of regard 
the i n f i n i t e comes from Emlle Fackenhelra, His account, I contend i s 
untenable owing t o the dualism which emerges from i t as a l o g i c a l 
consequence, Fackenheim argues that "Nature [ i e . the phenomenal], 
though contingent, i s not sheer contingency. I t i s a Totality, made so 
by a structure."''' By ' s t r u c t u r e ' , Fackenheim i s presumably r e f e r r i n g 
to the l o g i c a l c onstructions t h a t derive from Hegel's d i a l e c t i c a l 
process; that i s , the very act of diremptlon produces opposing 
s t r u c t u r e s , but these s t r u c t u r e s , i f they are t o be considered as 
genuine a n t i t h e t i c a l counterparts, must themselves be able to sustain 
the mechanics that are e x i s t e n t w i t h i n them, despite t h e i r status as of 
the Absolute. Thus, the phenomenal world, aside from i t s p o s i t i o n i n 
the whole, can be seen as a d i s t i n c t and autonomous system, a 
" t o t a l i t y , " which maintains a r e a l i t y i n i t s e l f . 
The r e a l i t y i s present because, Fackenheim argues, the l o g i c of Hegel's 
system determines that the phenomenal i s both "other-than-self" and 
" p r e - s e l f " , s e l f here r e f e r r i n g t o the Idea, This i s t o say that the 
phenomenal i s ot h e r - t h a n - s e l f because i t I s that which opposes the 
noumenal, and p r e - s e l f because the Idea "reenacts the s t r u c t u r e by which 
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Nature i s maintalned, "' i e . the phenomenal must already be f o r the Idea 
to subsequently subsume i t . Pre-self, that i s , r e f e r s not t o the 
Absolute's self-consciousness of i t s e l f p r i o r t o the diremption ( i e . the 
Absolute aware of an obscure, forthcoming diremption whose being has 
already been conceptually determined), but that the Absolute i s a c t u a l l y 
challenged by the phenomenal s t r u c t u r e . The Absolute i s obliged t o 
confront nature, t o encompass I t at a point which enables i t t o gain a 
f u l l e r i d e n t i t y and enhanced self-consciousness, and thus an actual, 
mechanical advance i s advocated whereby the Absolute encounters a 
h i t h e r t o a l i e n s t r u c t u r e . 
This l a t t e r concept then, operates on the theory t h a t , f o r A t o be 
subsumed, i t must be actual as pre - s e l f , and i t i s t h i s element of 
Fackenheim's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which forces him i n t o absolute dualism. 
Although he admits "the Absolute Idea i s not one category besides 
others, such as those manifest i n the actual world; i t has so a l t e r e d 
others as t o incorporate them," he continues " t h i s i s t r u e i n a sense 
only . . . l o g i c a l thought i s forced t o recognise Nature as other-than-
s e l f i n the very act which d i s p l a y s i t as pr e - s e l f ; i n doing so i t 
recognises, as w e l l , the r e a l i t y of f i n i t e selfhood, which takes Nature 
as o t h e r - t h a n - s e l f . Consequently, i f the absolute l o g i c a l Self 
supersedes e x i s t i n g f i n i t e selfhood, i t i s only at the p r i c e of an 
a b s t r a c t i o n which leaves f i n i t e selfhood a p e r s i s t i n g r e a l i t y : a 
r e a l i t y , moreover, of which l o g i c a l thought I t s e l f stands i n p e r s i s t i n g 
need. "' 
I n other words, Fackenheim i s proposing that there i s p r i m a r i l y ' the 
f i n i t e being of A, A i s conceptually subsumed i n t o idea-of-B, but the 
f i n i t e being-there of A p e r s i s t s on i t s own account i n opposition t o 
idea-of-B. Thus A e x i s t s as the p r e - s e l f of i t s absolute t r u t h , that 
which i s before i t s subsumption i n t o idea-of-B, and continues i t s 
autonomous existence i n s p i t e of B. This, Fackenheim contends, i s 
necessary, f o r unless A as f i n i t e being-there i s c o n t i n u a l l y actual, i t 
cannot be subsumed. 
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But t h i s generates a c r u c i a l Inaccuracy regarding Hegel's theory, as I t 
postulates an absolute r e a l i t y of f i n i t e A as necessary both f o r the 
concept of i t , and the subsequent subsumption. This i n t u r n r e s u l t s i n 
an absolute (r a t h e r than s u p e r f i c i a l ) dualism as the opposition r e l i e s 
on an independent and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t f i n i t e t o c o n f l i c t w ith the 
i n f i n i t e ; the c o n f l i c t cannot be resolved as each q u a l i t y i s absolute 
over against the other. •^^  
Indeed, Hegel argues against t h i s point w i t h considerable vigour. The 
existence of being-there i s never so i n i t s own r i g h t - "the f i n i t e i s 
not actual being" (.LPR 1. 308) - but e x i s t s merely as a produced moment 
of the system, a moment when being i s s e l f - r e f l e c t e d by i t s a n t i t h e s i s 
of nothing (and these then prove t o be the same). The moment at which 
t h i s s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n occurs, therefore, i s what i s termed as appearance, 
but because the a c t u a l i t y of I t s s t a t u s i s derived wholly from the 
system, and r e t u r n s back t o i t i n unity. I t i s p a t e n t l y i n c o r r e c t t o 
suggest th a t being-there possesses the pre-self t h a t Fackenheim 
suggests: 
"Bejngd.r\6 sxistsnce pr&senied t h e m s e l v e s e a r l i e r a s f o r m s o f t h e 
i m m e d i a t e ; being i s q u i t e g e n e r a l l y u n r e f l e c t e d i m m e d i a c y a n d 
passing-ovsr i n t o a n o t h e r , Existence i s i m m e d i a t e u n i t y o f b e i n g a n d 
r e f l e c t i o n , a n d h e n c e appearance', it comes f r o a t h e g r o u n d a n d g o e s t o 
t h e g r o u n d . The a c t u a l i s t h e positedness oi t h a t u n i t y , t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t h a s become i d e n t i c a l w i t h i t s e l f ; h e n c e , i t i s 
e x e m p t e d f r o m passing-over, a n d ' i t s exiernaJiiy i s i t s e n e r g y ; i n t h a t 
e x t e r n a l i t y i s i n w a r d l y r e f l e c t e d , i t s b e i n g - t h e r e i s o n l y t h e 
Manifestation of itself, n o t o f a n o t h e r , " {Logic, § U 2 ) 
Therefore, we must rather acknowledge the un t r u t h of the f i n i t u d e of 
being-there, an acknowledgement th a t Fackenheim refuses t o accept, 
w r i t i n g "absolute idealism must recognise the r e a l i t y of the f i n i t e . " '-^  
Untruth, as we have j u s t considered, opposes t r u t h , and thus Hegel's 
system i s , i n r e a l i t y , that from B the being-there of A emerges, A 
e x i s t s t r u t h f u l l y only as thought-of-B, the f i n i t e character of A i s 
rendered as untrue - only thought-of-B ( l e , the Idea) i s r e a l i t y . To 
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suggest, t h e r e f o r e , that A i s the pr e - s e l f of t r u t h i s misleading, as i t 
must, i f i t i s a genuine p r e - s e l f thing, contain t r u t h w i t h i n i t , 
something which i s q u i t e absurd i f "the f i n i t e has f o r i t no t r u t h . " 
CLPR 1.421) Rather, A i s merely the appearance of B, which contains no 
a u t h e n t i c i t y i n i t s e l f ( l e , as f i n i t e A) whatsoever, but rather f i l l s an 
o b j e c t i f y i n g r o l e i n order t o q u a l i f y the thing, maintaining I t s 
essential, fundamental truth as B; or, e x p l a i n i n g i t rather d i f f e r e n t l y , 
" t r u t h i s beyond that appearance, i n God alone," (Logic, §50) 
Cll ) The spurious infinite. 
We may now consider Hegel's concept of the 'spurious i n f i n i t e ' . What 
has been established thus f a r i s tha t God i s absolutely i n f i n i t e , and as 
such q u a l i f i e d only by i t s a n t i t h e s i s , f i n i t u d e . But t h i s seems t o have' 
problematic i m p l i c a t i o n s , f o r i f i n f i n i t y stands i n opposition, I t must 
l o g i c a l l y I t s e l f be l i m i t e d , so th a t "the f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e stand 
opposed only i n such a way that the f i n i t e i s duplicated," (LPR 1,307) 
This i s t o say th a t , as the f i n i t e i s l i m i t e d , i t must necessarily be 
l i m i t e d by an other, i e . n o t - f i n l t u d e ( i n f i n i t u d e ) and vice-versa, hence 
the ' d u p l i c a t i o n ' . I n Findlay's words, "the very f a c t that the I n f i n i t e 
i s thought of as l y i n g beyond the F i n i t e , and as being exclusive of i t , 
makes the I n f i n i t e f i n i t e , bounded by what i t excludes. " ^ 
I f we reconsider the S t r i f e of Opposites, the problem becomes more 
l u c i d . Light i s not only o b j e c t i f i e d by dark, but also has i t s q u a l i t y 
negated by i t . Thus, dark not only o b j e c t i f i e s l i g h t by i t s opposition 
t o i t , but also - by v i r t u e of being the a n t i t h e s i s - diminishes l i g h t ' s 
q u a l i t y . The p l a t f o r m on which these e x i s t demands an Interchange, an 
a l t e r a t i o n , so that l i g h t and dark can contrast and thereby e x i s t . 
A b s t r a c t l y then, l i g h t and dark are i d e n t i c a l by t h e i r immediacy t o each 
other, t h e i r mutual nature of c o n f i n i n g the other r e s u l t i n g i n a 
p e c u l i a r k i n d of b a t t l e , each vying f o r the other's space, and yet 
remaining simultaneously dependent on the other f o r q u a l i f i c a t i o n ; i t i s 
a war tha t n e i t h e r can win. S i m i l a r l y , f i n i t u d e , i f I t i s t o be f i n i t e , 
must be l i m i t e d by i n f i n i t u d e , but so too must the i n f i n i t e be 
correspondingly l i m i t e d by the f i n i t e , a c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o s i t i o n . 
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The problem th a t emerges i s q u i t e s e l f - e v i d e n t ; as X i s X because I t I s 
not-Y, so i n f i n i t y i s i n f i n i t y because i t i s n o t - f i n i t e . But t h i s 
reduces the i n f i n i t e t o a dependent s i t u a t i o n , g i v i n g i t a negative 
q u a l i t y ( i e . i t i s only because i t i s not i t s a n t i t h e s i s ) . I t i s a 
'spurious' i n f i n i t e because i t s d e f i n i t i o n l i e s only i n i t s opposition 
t o i t s other, and t h e r e f o r e i t becomes a p a r t i c u l a r I t s e l f , l i m i t e d by 
i t s very d e f i n i t i o n and character of being n o t - f i n i t e . 
This awkward s i t u a t i o n i n the system i s the same as was encountered i n 
chapter three; a deeper u n i t y , one that frees the i n f i n i t e from i t s 
over-agalnst p o s i t i o n , needs t o be located, and Hegel seeks t h i s I n the 
t r a n s i t o r y nature of the f i n i t e : 
"The w o r l d i s r e l i n q u i s h e d a s g e n u i n e b e i n g ; i t i s n o t r e g a r d e d a s 
s o m e t h i n g p e r m a n e n t ,,, The s o l e i m p o r t o f t h i s p r o c e d u r e i s t h a t ths 
infinite alonii ig, t h e f i n i t e h a s no g e n u i n e b e i n g , w h e r e a s God h a s 
o n l y g e n u i n e b e i n g , " (iy°/?l,424) 
This then, provides the answer, Hegel arguing that u l t i m a t e l y the f i n i t e 
has no genuine value, thus l e a v i n g the i n f i n i t e unopposed; to consider 
the f i n i t e as t r u e and authentic I s t o confine the argument t o the lower 
l e v e l of appearance. The f i n i t e m i r r o r s the Absolute, q u a l i f y i n g the 
Absolute through i t s r e f l e c t i o n , but t h i s does not thereby mean that the 
r e f l e c t i o n i s t r u t h (which p a t e n t l y i t i s no t ) , merely that the 
Absolute, and the Absolute alone, i s . I n e f f e c t , i t I s again l i k e a man 
f a c i n g a mirror, o b j e c t i f y i n g himself (so t o speak) by his r e f l e c t i o n . 
Yet the r e f l e c t i o n , though r e a l as an appearance, i s never a c t u a l l y the 
man duplicated, simply a v i s u a l manifestation of him, and thus i t i s 
untrue as a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y , w i t h i t s only facet of u l t i m a t e t r u t h being 
i t s r e l a t i o n t o i t s owner. The r e f l e c t i o n i s r e a l as an appearance of 
the man, i t q u a l i f i e s the man, but i t i s f a l s e as a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y ; t o 
assume i t i s otherwise i s presumptuous and unfounded. 
Stace n e a t l y surmises the overcoming of the problem of the l i m i t that 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s f i n i t u d e by w r i t i n g that "the f i n i t e i s c o n s t i t u t e d by i t s 
own Inherent p o s i t i v e character, by i t s q u a l i t y , and not by anything 
merely e x t e r n a l t o i t . The meadow i s l i m i t e d by i t s own being, by the ®^ 
very f a c t t h a t i t I s a meadow. But l i m i t i s negation. Therefore 
negation, not-being, are of the essence of f i n i t e things. Their very 
being, i e . p o s i t i v e character or q u a l i t y , i s not-being. They contain 
w i t h i n themselves the germs of t h e i r death and dissolution."^'^ I n other 
words, i t i s t h i s q u a l i t y of not-being that l i e s at the heart of 
f i n i t u d e . The spurious i n f i n i t e i s the r e f o r e such only on a s u p e r f i c i a l 
l e v e l , i n correspondence w i t h the appearance of f i n i t u d e , but as t h i s 
appearance i s u l t i m a t e l y untrue, the genuine i n f i n i t e i s the abstract 
u n i t y of these lower, abstract antagonists, so that "the t r u t h i s the 
u n i t y of the i n f i n i t e i n which the f i n i t e i s contained." iLPR 1.309) 
Fin i t u d e , t h e r e f o r e , p e r s i s t s not as an actual , concrete feature, but as 
a misconception, the untrue against the true, the 'Is-not' against the 
' i s ' , and the spurious i n f i n i t e must u l t i m a t e l y be placed on the same, 
lower l e v e l . To argue that being-there i s thus u l t i m a t e l y opposed t o 
the Idea i s i n i t s e l f wrong; I t i s the f i n i t e character assumed by 
being-there t h a t i s untrue: 
"The f i n i t e h a s f o r i t no t r u t h b u t i s s o m e t h i n g c o n t i n g e n t ; i t i s a 
b e i n g , t o be s u r e , b u t one t h a t i n f a c t i s o n l y a n o n - b e i n g . T h i s 
n o n - b e i n g o f t h e f i n i t e i n p o s i t i v e f o r m i s i n w a r d l y a f f i r m a t i v e ; 
t h i s a f f i r m a t i v e n o n - f i n i t e i s t h e i n f i n i t e , i t i s a b s o l u t e b e i n g , " 
{LPR\M\-2) 
The question t h a t needs t o be considered, however, i s j u s t how Hegel 
denies f i n i t u d e i t s a u t h e n t i c i t y . Again, the problem i s that, on one 
hand, Hegel attempts t o prove i n f i n i t y v i a i t s a n t i t h e s i s of f i n i t u d e , 
but, on the other, he also seeks t o argue that the a n t i t h e s i s , t h i s 
e s s e n t i a l Ingredient f o r the o b j e c t i f I c a t l o n , i s i n fac t not such at a l l 
and has n e i t h e r any t r u t h nor genuine being. 
The d e f i n i t i o n of f i n i t u d e i s that which stands i n r e l a t i o n , and what i t 
stands i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o I s i n f i n i t u d e , so "the genuine other of the 
finite is the infinite." (LPR 1.423) From t h i s , however, one may argue 
that the f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e are I n fac t i d e n t i c a l because each i s 
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grounded i n the other and thus also i s i t s other; hence, there i s no 
d i f f e r e n c e between the f i n i t e and (spurious) i n f i n i t e , and they collapse 
i n t o u n i t y : 
"The t r u e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e f i n i t e i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o t h e i n f i n i t e i s t h e 
i m m e d i a t e u n i t y o f b o t h ,,, T h e f i n i t e i s g r a s p e d a s a f f i r m a t i o n . T h i s 
a b s o l u t e n e g a t i v i t y , t h e u n i t y , t h i s a f f i r m a t i o n , i s an a b s t r a c t , f r e e power, 
w h i c h , h o w e v e r , i s a m e d i a t i o n i n i t s e l f , T h i s u n i t y o f t h e i n f i n i t e i s i n 
i t s e l f no t r u t h ; on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e i n f i n i t e s e e k s s e l f - d i r e m p t i o n i n 
o r d e r t o be o n l y t h e a f f i r m a t i v e a s n e g a t i o n o f n e g a t i o n , " UPR],307) 
What Hegel argues, therefore, i s t h a t w i t h i n t r u e i n f i n i t y l i e s both the 
spurious i n f i n i t e and the f i n i t e . The t r u e i n f i n i t e (God, the Absolute) 
i s that which appears t o p o s i t the moment of both f i n i t u d e and spurious 
i n f i n i t u d e , which prove themselves to be i d e n t i c a l and empty i n t h e i r 
negation of each other, and thus the r e s u l t i s that t r u e I n f i n i t y i s 
a f f i r m e d by v i r t u e of i t s abstract 'opposition' t o that which i s not. 
As Mure w r i t e s , "Hegel c a l l s ' i n f i n i t e ' not the endlessness which 
characterises the world of f i n i t e t h ings (that i s the 'spurious 
i n f i n i t e ' ) , but the nature of what contains i t s own determining negation 
w i t h i n I t s e l f and i s t h e r e f o r e i n d i v i d u a l by 'double' negation and not 
by mere exclusion."^'-' I n other words, Hegel q u a l i f i e s h i s i n f i n i t e by 
d r i v i n g the a n t i t h e s i s i n t o a wholly negative p o s i t i o n , deeming i t t o be 
untruth, against which stands the tr u e , and t h i s renders the antagonism 
as no more than abstract. Hence, one may surmise that Hegel again 
o b j e c t i f i e s the one t r u t h by the appearance of the untrue, so that the 
synthesis i s never an actual d e r i v a t i v e but the beginning and r e s u l t of 
a l o g i c a l process that manipulates through I t s e l f i t s own i d e n t i t y . 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Hegel's concept of f i n i t u d e that were offered by 
Grisez and S o l i are here worth reconsidering. F i r s t , we noted that a 
( q u a n t i t a t i v e ) number of f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r s does not produce the 
Hegelian I n f i n i t e ; q u a n t i t a t i v e i n f i n i t y stands i n r e l a t i o n and i s 
t h e r e f o r e l i m i t e d and unacceptable i n Hegelian l o g i c - an unending 
se r i e s of p a r t s i s not considered as I n f i n i t e . Indeed, Hegel expounds 
t h i s point t o a notable degree, arguing; 
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" T h e r e i s a s p u r i o u s a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t c o n s i s t s i n t h e r e p e t i t i o n o f 
t h e f i n i t e , i n t h e f a c t t h a t i t o n l y b r i n g s f o r t h a g a i n t h e f i n i t e 
t h a t w a s t h e r e b e f o r e , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t one f i n i t e t h i n g p o s i t s 
a n o t h e r , a n d s o on u n t o t h e s p u r i o u s i n f i n i t e ,,, I n t h i s way t h e 
o t h e r c o i n c i d e s i t s e l f w i t h i t s e l f ; i t comes t o i t s e l f a n d t h e 
n e g a t i o n i s s u p e r s e d e d , T h e p a s s i n g o v e r i n t o a n o t h e r , o r t h i s 
s p u r i o u s a f f i r m a t i o n , i s t h e s p u r i o u s p r o g r e s s o f t h e f i n i t e ; i t i s 
s i m p l y t h e t e d i o u s r e p e t i t i o n o f one d e t e r m i n a t i o n , " (Z/'/P 1, 4 2 3 ) 
From t h i s i t i s clear that Grisez and S o i l are q u i t e i n c o r r e c t t o assert 
th a t Hegel's Absolute i s the sum of X number of f i n i t e parts. Such a 
sum i s not of an i n f i n i t e nature, i t i s merely a f i n i t e process of 
"tedious r e p e t i t i o n ; " the Absolute, that i s , i s i n t h i s 
<mis)understanding l i m i t e d by the f i n i t e nature of i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n 
which i s compelled t o stand i n r e l a t i o n . Findlay i s q u i t e correct t o 
note t h a t "there i s no last member t o a series of enlarging f l n i t e s , and 
the i n f i n i t e cannot be reached by pursuing such a se r i e s t o i t s end"^° 
A second element of c r i t i c i s m f o l l o w s on from t h i s . I f the Absolute i s 
the sum of I t s parts beyond which there i s nothing else, l e , i f i t i s 
only t h i s obscure 'whole' that encompasses a v a r i e t y of f i n i t e 
p a r t i c u l a r s , then the Absolute I t s e l f must be f i n i t e because I t e x i s t s 
merely as the ' f i n i s h e d a r t i c l e ' . I f we reconsider the chariot analogy, 
the f i n i t e p a r t s determine a f i n i t e c h a r i o t because of the p a r t i c u l a r 
formation of them; ' c h a r i o t ' , therefore, i s here nothing more than a 
nominal. I f the parts were rearranged t o produce a bicycle, then again 
i t i s the formation of the f i n i t e parts that determine the completed 
object, and once more 'b i c y c l e ' would simply be the nominal appellation, 
of no value i n i t s e l f . I n other words, i f the Absolute i s the sum of 
i t s f i n i t e parts, i t must i t s e l f be determined as f i n i t e ; i f f i n i t e 
p a r t i c u l a r s are considered actual prima facie, then their quality of 
finitude must extend to their collective status. Furthermore, t h i s i s 
i n i t s e l f q u i t e i l l o g i c a l f o r Hegel as he contends that "the nature of 
the f i n i t e i t s e l f [ i s ] t o pass beyond i t s e l f , " because as soon as one 
comprehends f i n i t u d e ( i e . something l i m i t e d by something else), then one 
immediately sees also beyond i t owing t o the i m p l i c i t otherness. As 
Flndlay puts i t , " i n the no t i o n of a f i n i t e t h i n g ... i s contained the 
no t i o n of an I n d e f i n i t e world of other things, otherwise q u a l i f i e d , 
l y i n g beyond i t s b a r r i e r s . One cannot Indeed conceive of a b a r r i e r as a 
b a r r i e r without i n thought passing beyond i t . " ^ ' ' Thus, we may 
appreciate that the q u a n t i t a t i v e I n f i n i t y awarded t o the Absolute by 
S o l i and Grisez i s q u i t e useless anyway, spurious both i n i t s nature and 
l o g i c a l status. 
This, t h e r e f o r e , i l l u s t r a t e s the I l l o g i c a l nature of the c r i t i c i s m s made 
by S o i l and Grisez, each of whom m i s i n t e r p r e t s Hegel's concept of both 
i n f i n i t y and f i n i t u d e . Both commentators make the presumption that the 
process of c o l l e c t i v i t y , i e . the r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , n a t u r a l l y produces a 
r e s u l t of I n f i n i t y , simply because they assume "there i s nothing l e f t . " 
Both t h e r e f o r e f a l l t o cognise that by not negating the f i n i t e character 
of p a r t i c u l a r i t y , by al l o w i n g i t t o continue as a c o l l e c t i o n of l i m i t e d 
and r e l a t l n g - t o - o t h e r things, such character must p e r s i s t t o pervade the 
e n t i r e t y , the Absolute. The Absolute thus becomes d i s t i n c t not by i t s 
i n f i n i t y but by the opposite, i t s p e r s i s t e n t , "tedious" nature of 
f i n i t u d e . 
Notes 
1. Hegel i s a c t u a l l y using t h i s phrase w i t h regard t o s i m p l i c i t y , but 
he makes cle a r i n the passage that such i s the same wi t h being-
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2. S o i l i s here a c t u a l l y quoting from Spinoza's Ethics (1.8), and 
assumes Hegel t o be i n absolute (and, moreover, continual, on-going 
agreement. This I s somewhat misleading as i t Implies that Hegel 
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of f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y . The f o l l o w i n g paragraphs w i l l t h e r e f o r e 
t r y and i l l u m i n a t e the poor c o n t e x t u a l i s a t i o n o f f e r e d by S o i l . 
3. S o l i , p l l 6 - 7 . 
4. Flndlay, pl64. 
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8. A produced Absolute? 
We have already considered the manner i n which the Absolute contains 
d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n i t s e l f , but we may remind ourselves of Hegel's 
i n s i s t e n c e upon a form of d i v e r s i t y i n order t o o b j e c t i f y the Absolute. 
With t h i s i n mind, the question now i s th e r e f o r e whether d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n 
u n i t y creates or produces the Absolute, or whether such d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
merely what one might r a t h e r l o o s e l y term as f u n c t i o n i n g elements of an 
atemporal, incorporeal Absolute as, f o r example, the mind, body, nervous 
system, and so f o r t h compose a person, 
( 1 ) Arguments for an evolving Absolute. 
I t i s dubious whether anywhere w i t h i n the mass of commentary on Hegel can 
opinion be found t o d i f f e r so sharply. Peter Singer, f o r example, i s j u s t 
one commentator who adopts the former view and.attempts t o expose a 
dependency on the Absolute's behalf on the phenomenal. Singer's argument, 
b r i e f l y , f o l l o w s the l i n e that the Absolute i s at f i r s t essence which 
r e q u i r e s m a n ifestation so t h a t the task i s f o r the Absolute " t o perfect the 
world i n order t o perfect i t s e l f , " ' Or, put another way, that the 
Absolute's s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and o b j e c t i f I c a t i o n i s contingent on a 
physical manifestation, the diremption. 
This i s an argument which must be judged as deeply u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because 
i t appears t o assert t h a t the Absolute i s Imperfect, requiring i t s 
phenomenal other, depending on the physical manifestation. I n fac t , i t i s 
q u i t e u n f a i r t o forward t h i s c r i t i c i s m , f o r as Singer himself stresses, the 
phenomenal i s the manifestation of the Absolute i t s e l f , =^  and thus the 
Absolute i s dependent only on i t s e l f , l e , i t I s s e l f - (and the r e f o r e i n - ) 
dependent. However, a more serious i m p l i c a t i o n i n Singer's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
i s that the Absolute changes, or evolves, becoming something d i f f e r e n t i n 
substance through the diremptlon, and i t i s t h i s which i n t u r n implies the 
Absolute t o be i n i t i a l l y imperfect, and continuously unstable. I n other 
words, i t i s only after the Absolute has expressed i t s e l f v i a the 
diremption that i t i s complete. 
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Of course, Singer i s not wrong t o suggest that the Absolute i s a dynamic 
system, t h a t i t changes and a l t e r s w i t h i n i t s e l f , and ne i t h e r does he imply 
that such change and dynamicism i s i n r e l a t i o n t o an other, w r i t i n g " f o r 
Hegel the Absolute i s everything."® The Absolute undeniably does possess 
change w i t h i n i t , indeed must possess change, i n order f o r a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
between being and concept, f i n i t u d e and i n f i n i t u d e , and so f o r t h t o be 
pl a u s i b l e . Rather, the problem l i e s i n what Singer perceives t o be the 
effect of such c-hange. He wri t e s , f o r example, that the Absolute "seeks t o 
comprehend i t s e l f " ^ and, i f t h i s I s the case, does t h i s mean - as i t 
undoubtedly implies - that the Absolute i s not always and f u l l y omniscient? 
I f the Absolute must seek comprehension of I t s e l f , i t must the r e f o r e be, i n 
part at l e a s t , d e f i c i e n t because i t i s not I n t e r n a l l y content with i t s e l f . 
This precise point i s also found w i t h i n Findlay's reading of Hegel, and he 
o f f e r s us the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t " S p i r i t i s i n f i n i t e , but i t must pretend 
to be f i n i t e i n order t o overcome t h i s pretence, t o d i s t i n g u i s h i t from 
eve r y t h i n g f i n i t e , to become aware of i t s own i n f i n i t y . S p i r i t i s the only 
r e a l i t y , but i t must confront i t s e l f w i t h something seemingly a l i e n , i n 
order t o see through I t s own self-deception, t o become aware that i t i s the 
only r e a l i t y . And the c r e a t i o n and s e t t i n g aside of t h i s strange deception 
i s moreover necessary t o S p i r i t , which could have no being without i t . " ^ 
But, between the two understandings, a f i n e and yet v i t a l d i f f e r e n c e may be 
located; whereas Singer argues the Absolute must "perfect the world i n 
order t o perfect i t s e l f , " and that i t "seeks t o comprehend i t s e l f , " Flndlay 
uses phraseology such as the Absolute "must pretend t o be f i n i t e " (my 
i t a l i c s ) , t h a t " i t must confront i t s e l f w i t h something seemingly a l i e n " 
(again, my i t a l i c s ) . 
Thus, what we discover i n the l a t t e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i s that the Absolute 
is aware of i t s a c t i v i t y , that i t posits on purpose the pretence of 
otherness. Singer, however, proposes almost the opposite of t h i s , arguing 
t h a t the Absolute begins a process whereby i t seeks i t s e l f t o become 
per f e c t , not so much proving by a form of self - d e c e p t i o n that i t i s a l l , 
but d i s c o v e r i n g almost perchance i t s t r u e status, Furthermore, the 
discovery t r i p that Singer advocates does not r e s u l t i n a scenario whereby 
the Absolute f i n d s I t s e l f as what i n f a c t i t has been a l l the time ( i e . the 
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p e r f e c t , united r e a l i t y ) , but Instead Includes also a s i t u a t i o n whereby the 
Absolute has changed i n essence, Rather than p o s i t i n g otherness, as 
Findlay argues, pretending t o maintain opposition, Singer contends that 
only on encountering such opposition does the Absolute become perfect, and 
that before such an encounter i t i s d e f i c i e n t . The change that Singer says 
occurs then, i s not part of the Absolute deliberately and purposlvely 
o b j e c t i f y i n g I t s e l f , i n the sense that a man might prove h i s existence by 
making himself known t o another who had previously doubted such, but a 
process which the Absolute requires t o actually perfect i t s e l f , t o " 
e s s e n t i a l l y enrich and a l t e r i t . This i s the key difference: Singer argues 
that the Absolute a c t u a l l y changes to reach a h i t h e r t o unencountered 
p e r f e c t i o n ; Findlay, more properly, says the Absolute chooses t o seew 
incomplete, and that i t s p e r f e c t i o n i s never doubted but I l l u m i n a t e d by i t s 
system. 
The same problem can seemingly be found w i t h Mure's reading of Hegel. Mure 
proposes i n discussing the Absolute's process t h a t "absolute s p i r i t , 
immediate and p r i o r t o s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n , i s p o s i t i v e thesis; s p i r i t 
'othered' and ali e n a t e d i s a n t i t h e s i s ; s p i r i t r e t u r n i n g on i t s e l f and 
'reconciled' i s synthesis. But these are not three separable thoughts; f o r 
the i n i t i a l p o s i t i v e i s p o s i t i v e only by v i r t u e of the negation l o g i c a l l y 
t o come [my i t a l i c s ] . I t I s only the determinable, only t o be named 
p r o l e p t i c a l l y . Thesis and a n t i t h e s i s are inseparable 'moments' of a single 
thought; the a n t i t h e s i s i s the negated thesis. But the si n g l e thought i s 
still logically Incomplete [again, my i t a l i c s ] , because the a n t i t h e s i s i s 
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n . Thought must pass through negative mediation t o r e -
immediation i n synthesis. '"^  Once more, then, we see the Absolute described 
as i m p l i c i t l y being a product that i s merely derived from d i a l e c t i c a l 
l o g i c ; as Grisez, i n t h i s context, q u i t e r i g h t l y c r i t i c i s e s , " i f Hegel's 
d i a l e c t i c were open-ended l i k e Plato's, no u l t i m a t e claims about r e a l i t y 
would be made. But Hegel's d i a l e c t i c terminates I n Absolute S p i r i t . " ' ^ 
But the f a c t o r that i n s t i g a t e s Grisez's own dismissal of Hegel (he w r i t e s 
"only i f Hegel's final standpoint i s Incoherent i s h i s e n t i r e metaphysical 
p r o j e c t a failure"®) r e s t s on the theory that the emergence of the Absolute 
Idea, i n and f o r i t s e l f . I s the end of the process, or, put a l g e b r a i c a l l y , 
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that A and B synthesise t o produce the wholly new being of AB. Clearly, 
t h i s must be seen as a contentious point. I f we say that the Absolute Idea 
i s only the r e s u l t , the f i n a l development of the process, then the Absolute 
as e v e r y t h i n g else, be t h i s Concept, phenomenal p a r t i c u l a r i t y , or whatever, 
i s imperfect and anything but absolute. Furthermore, i f we regard the 
Absolute simply as an evolving process, such introduces an o v e r - r i d i n g 
element of inconstancy and i n s t a b i l i t y , f o r at no point i n the a c t i v e 
process can we p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f y the supreme Absolute S p i r i t , the Idea i n 
and f o r i t s e l f . What we are provided w i t h i s nothing more than something 
c o n t i n u a l l y becoming, s t r i v i n g t o reach i t s complete state, and t h i s can 
only be viewed as a wholly u n s a t i s f a c t o r y proposition. 
< i l ) Critique of the 'evolving' theory. 
But does Hegel himself forward t h i s as Singer, Mure, and Grisez seem to 
suggest. The evidence of h i s w r i t i n g s , I contend, argues otherwise. To 
begin w i t h , we may consider Hegel's comments i n Phenomenology of Spirit 
regarding the Absolute as reason, and how reason contains i t s end w i t h i n 
i t s e l f : 
" I f we s t a r t f r o m w h a t i s f i r s t , t h e n t h i s i n i t s End, o r i n t h e o utcome of i t s 
a c t i o n , r e t u r n s o n l y t o i t s e l f ; a n d t h r o u g h t h i s v e r y f a c t i t d e m o n s t r a t e s i t s e l f 
t o b e s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a s i t s own s e l f f o r i t s End, a n d t h u s , a s a prJus, h a s 
a l r e a d y r e t u r n e d t o i t s e l f o r i s Jn and for itself. T h e r e f o r e , w h a t i t a r r i v e s 
a t t h r o u g h t h e p r o c e s s o f i t s a c t i o n i s itssJf, and i n a r r i v i n g o n l y a t i t s e l f , 
i t o b t a i n s i t s f e e l i n g o f s e l f , " iPS, § 2 5 7 ) 
This passage, then, h i g h l i g h t s the nature of the 'End', the moment which 
Singer, Grisea, and ( t o a lesser extent) Mure argue i s the culmination of 
the Absolute's development, but which i n f a c t i s merely a point of s e l f -
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . I t i s not, t h a t i s t o say, the end i n the sense of any 
sor t of f i n a l piece being i n s e r t e d i n t o a kind of metaphysical jigsaw, but 
a point i n the Absolute's apprehension when i t i s o b j e c t i v e l y , as well as 
s u b j e c t i v e l y , affirmed. What must be made clear at t h i s ' p o i n t i s that the 
a f f i r m a t i o n spoken of i s not a conclusion t o the Absolute, but the end of 
i t s i l l u m i n a t i o n ; i t i s the picture of the Absolute that i s completed, not 
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the Absolute i t s e l f . I n other words, Hegel does not advocate that the 
Absolute i s a s y n t h e t i c r e s u l t , but rath e r that the synthesis applies 
s t r i c t l y t o the manner i n which the Absolute i s comprehended. Hegel 
w r i t e s : 
"The same d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h i n k i n g t h a t i s p r e s e n t e d i n t h e h i s t o r y o f 
p h i l o s o p h y i s p r e s e n t e d i n p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f , b u t f r e e d f r o m t h a t h i s t o r i c a l 
o u t w a r d n e s s , i e , p u r e l y i n t h e e l e m e n t o f t h i n k i n g , F r e e a n d g e n u i n e 
t h o u g h t i s i n w a r d l y concrete'i h e n c e i t i s Idea, a n d i n a l l i t s u n i v e r s a l i t y 
i t i s ihe I d e a o r i/te Absolute, The s c i e n c e o f i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a system, 
s i n c e w h a t i s concretely true i s s o o n l y i n i t s i n w a r d s e l f - u n f o l d i n g a n d i n 
t a k i n g a n d h o l d i n g i t s e l f t o g e t h e r i n u n i t y , i e , a s totality O n l y t h r o u g h 
t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g , a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f i t s d i s t i n c t i o n s , c a n w h a t i s 
c o n c r e t e l y t r u e be t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s and t h e f r e e d o m o f 
t h e w h o l e , " Uogic, § 1 4 ) 
What we discover, therefore, i s that the Absolute remains e t e r n a l l y whole 
and complete when viewed " i n a l l i t s u n i v e r s a l i t y , " but we must not simply 
assume such u n i v e r s a l i t y t o be an end r e s u l t as such. On t h i s point Hegel 
i s q u i t e clear, arguing f o r example that: 
" P h i l o s o p h y ( a s s c i e n c e ) i s a d e v e l o p m e n t o f u n t r a m m e l l e d t h i n k i n g , o r 
r a t h e r i t i s t h e e n t i r e t y o f t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t , a c i r c l e t u r n i n g back i n t o 
i t s e l f , r e m a i n i n g w h o l l y a t home w i t h i t s e l f , b e i n g e n t i r e l y i t s e l f , a n d 
w a n t i n g o n l y t o r e v e r t t o i t s e l f . " ULHP, p 8 7 ) 
Thus, we see a p l a i n advocacy of the Absolute r e f e r r i n g only t o i t s e l f as 
"the e n t i r e t y of t h i s development." Clearly, therefore, what we have i s an 
Absolute which i n i t s e l f i s complete as t o t a l i t y , a system which i s f u l l y -
f u n c t i o n i n g (so t o speak) as i t s e l f , and wholly content. The 'development' 
of such, however, e x i s t s purely i n the sense of anai/sing- the system's 
s t r u c t u r e , seeking to discover how the elements combine and synthesise i n 
u n i t y , r a t h e r than assembling the elements t o produce a brand new 
con s t r u c t i o n . Again: 
" J u s t a s a p r o v i s i o n a l , o r g e n e r a l , n o t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y c a n n o t be g i v e n , 
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b e c a u s e o n l y t h e ( c / j c / s o f t h e S c i e n c e i s t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e I d e a , s o 
t h e divsion of i t , t o o , c a n be c o m p r e h e n d e d o n l y f r o m t h e w h o l e 
p r e s e n t a t i o n ; t h e d i v i s i o n i s o n l y s o m e t h i n g a n t i c i p a t e d , l i k e t h e 
p r e s e n t a t i o n f r o m w h i c h i t i s t a k e n , B u t t h e I d e a s h o w s i t s e l f a s t h e 
t h i n k i n g t h a t i s s t r i c t l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h i t s e l f , a n d t h i s a t o n c e s h o w s 
i t s e l f t o be t h e a c t i v i t y o f p o s i t i n g i t s e l f o v e r a g a i n s t i t s e l f , i n o r d e r 
t o be i t s e l f , a n d t o be, i n t h i s o t h e r , o n l y a t home w i t h i t s e l f , " 
Uogic, § 1 8 ) 
Undeniably, what i s asserted then i s that " d i v i s i o n i s something only 
a n t i c i p a t e d , " because d i v i s i o n i s never present w i t h i n the Absolute i n 
i t s e l f , only i n an analysis of the Absolute ( f o r i t s e l f ) , i e, the 
examination of the Absolute's composition and systematic s t r u c t u r e , borne 
out by Hegel's words t h a t the Absolute proves t o be " i d e n t i c a l " and "only 
at home w i t h i t s e l f , " 
There i s , I suggest, no v a l i d excuse f o r understanding Hegel's Absolute i n 
any other fashion, and the reasons f o r t h i s are easy t o pinpoint. I n the 
f i r s t place, as was j u s t noted, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which p o s i t s A > B > AB 
has no op t i o n but t o concede th a t the Absolute i s d e f i c i e n t and imperfect 
u n t i l i t reaches i t s terminus. Secondly, we may note that, as an equally 
n a t u r a l consequence of such an understanding, u n s a t i s f a c t o r y assumptions 
concerning the Absolute i n i t s beginning are also made. For example, i f 
one considers the Absolute Idea as an evolved e n t i t y , a r e s u l t that i s 
derived from the synthesis of various independent elements, then how can 
one honestly consider the mo t i v a t i o n of such elements t o be governed 
towards e f f e c t i n g such a r e s u l t ? I n other words, i f the Absolute Idea i n 
and f o r i t s e l f i s found only on the completion of what i s e f f e c t i v e l y a 
l i n e a r process, how can the elements which construct i t r e a l i s e t o what end 
t h e i r purpose is? And the answer t o such a question i s that they cannot. 
Unless there e x i s t s a pre-defined goal f o r the process, i t can only be 
described as b l i n d and w i t h no d e f i n i t i v e purpose, f o r there i s no master 
i n c o n t r o l who can e i t h e r guide or beckon i t . 
( i i i ) A third option. 
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Furthermore, i t i s not cogent t o counter-argue that, rather than d e r i v i n g 
AB from a synthesis of A and B, the Absolute Idea begins p e r f e c t l y , and 
then dirempts t o o b j e c t i f y i t s e l f , before r e t u r n i n g as the perfect, but now 
o b j e c t i f i e d . Idea. Grisez i s j u s t one commentator who b o l d l y proposes "the 
Absolute goes outside i t s e l f and I n doing so becomes other than i t s e l f , 
assuming the form of a m a t e r i a l world, i n order that i t can become - that 
i s , come t o be actual, and t h i s commonly propounded view, which e x i s t s by 
v i r t u e of m i s - i n t e r p r e t i n g Hegel's phrase "re t u r n s i n t o i t s e l f , " i s 
d e f i c i e n t i n two ways, the f i r s t of which i s l o g i c a l l y , and the second 
(which i s a n a t u r a l consequence of the f i r s t ) i s purposively. 
(a) With the former, i f one proposes th a t the perfect Idea dirempts before 
r e c o n c i l i n g as the perfect Idea once more (A > B > A), then at some point 
i n the process ( l e . B), the perfect Idea becomes something other than 
perfect. To suggest t h a t the otherness caused by the diremptlon i s merely 
the o b j e c t i v e (as against the Concept) i s not s a t i s f a c t o r y , because to be 
genuinely d i f f e r e n t from point A - i e . t o a u t h e n t i c a l l y "go outside i t s e l f " 
- point B must be concretely different and not merely an a l t e r n a t i v e 
perspective of A. I n other words, i f i t i s argued that the process i s 
actual as a c o n s t r u c t i v e process, actual d i f f e r e n c e must be found w i t h i n 
i t . Further, i f t h i s case i s argued, and the Absolute Idea r e t u r n s from 
i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n t o resume i t s status as the perfect, but now o b j e c t i f i e d 
Idea, then i m p l i c i t i s the f a c t that the Absolute could not have been 
i n i t i a l l y p e r f e c t when t o be o b j e c t i f i e d I s even more perfect. This i s t o 
say t h a t , i f the Absolute seeks i t s o b j e c t i f i c a t l o n , then i t f o l l o w s that 
i t was d e f i c i e n t I n i t i a l l y , and t h e r e f o r e less than perfect. Thus, on one 
hand, the argument i s t h a t from the s t a r t the Absolute i s perfect, but, on 
the other, that i t becomes 'perf e c t - e r ' a f t e r the diremption, an absurd 
p r o p o s i t i o n . 
With the a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n , A > B > AB, exactly the same err o r can be 
i d e n t i f i e d because AB i s held t o be the complete, syn t h e t i c Absolute, and 
i f AB i s perfect, the two, d i s t i n c t elements of A and B cannot also be so. 
Again, the f a u l t l i e s i n the d i f f e r e n c e between the Absolute Idea, content 
i n and f o r i t s e l f , and the Absolute as i t i s i n i t i a l l y s u b j e c t i v e l y 
apprehended, and Hegel makes i t q u i t e patent that any Imperfection ' 
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a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the Absolute l i e s s o l e l y i n such su b j e c t i v e apprehension: 
"What i s i t t h e n t o be p e r f e c t ? F o r i t t o be s o m e t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t e , t h e 
p e r f e c t m u s t be d e f i n e d , T h e d e f i n i t i o n o f what i s ' p e r f e c t ' we c a n s e e 
i m m e d i a t e l y i n what i s c o u n t e r p o s e d t o t h e r e f e r e n t o f t h i s n o t i o n , F o r what 
i s i m p e r f e c t i s j u s t t h e mere t h o u g h t o f God, a n d h e n c e t h e p e r f e c t i s t h e 
u n i t y o f t h o u g h t ( o r t h e c o n c e p t ) w i t h C p h e n o m e n a l ] r e a l i t y ,,, The p e r f e c t , 
t h e r e f o r e i s n o t mere s u b j e c t i v e b e i n g b u t o b j e c t i v i t y , " ( £ W 3 , 1 8 1 ) 
Thus i t i s made e x p l i c i t that the only imperfection of the Absolute i s not 
in fact within the Absolute itself but in viewing It merely subjectively, 
only as concept, only as being, etc, or as i s the case here, viewing i t as 
two, d i s t i n c t and independent elements that e i t h e r combine (A > B > AB), or 
one element th a t maintains a concrete r e l a t i o n w i t h an obscure and absurd 
other (A > B > A). 
(b) The second problem t o emerge i s again of why the Absolute Idea, i f i t 
i s i n i t i a l l y perfect, should want t o manifest i t s e l f i n phenomenality. ^° 
A f t e r a l l , i f the Absolute i s genuinely absolute i n and f o r i t s e l f , what 
prompts i t t o become manifest i n f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y , and motivates i t s 
' d r i v e ' through i t s process; i f i t i s perfect, that i s , why should i t have 
the need f o r such purpose? 
I f we r e t u r n t o the f i r s t r e j e c t e d suggestion, that the Absolute i s 
imperfect u n t i l i t has manifested and then reconciled as AB, or that the 
Absolute i s r e l i a n t on f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y , then we are provided with one, 
p l a u s i b l e answer t o t h i s problem. However, the cost of such an answer i s 
expensive, f o r i t r e s u l t s i n a wholly u n s a t i s f a c t o r y p r o p o s i t i o n that the 
Absolute depends on the phenomenal world f o r i t s being, needing and 
r e q u i r i n g such f o r i t t o gain p e r f e c t i o n . This option must be 
c a t e g o r i c a l l y r e j e c t e d , f o r i t i s simply nonsensical t o suggest that a 
supreme, pe r f e c t , i n f i n i t e d e i t y depends on anything. Furthermore, such a 
p r o p o s i t i o n leads t o a second problem, f o r i f the Absolute needs the 
phenomenal world, requires i t f o r i t s purpose, then the phenomenal world 
must be considered as a genuine other t o the Absolute. 
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This second point i t s e l f depends on having the A > B > AB assertion as i t s 
base; i t cannot be argued t o apply to Hegel's t h e s i s / a n t i t h e s i s r e l a t i o n 
because these two elements i n fact prove t o be each other. With A > B > 
AB, however, genuine otherness i s present because the Absolute begins in an 
imperfect state. That i s t o say, i t s t a r t s i t s absurd process merely as A 
and r e q u i r e s B f o r i t t o synthesise with, but B enters the r e l a t i o n as a 
wholly new and Independent element. C e r t a i n l y i t i s argued by those such 
as Singer that A and B c o n t r i v e t o produce AB, but AB i s I n t r u t h nothing 
but a c o n s t r u c t i o n of two, independent elements which have been united at a 
l a t e stage of the process. A and B, therefore, despite being married 
eventually, begin as genuine, a l i e n others. What must therefore be 
immediately recognised i s that the phenomenal world i s eternally part of 
the d i v i n e being, however vague t h i s may, at t h i s stage, seem. This point 
i s r a i s e d w i t h t y p i c a l eloquence by Reardon, who comments "the universe i s 
the 'thought' of God as the e t e r n a l Idea, the 'Word', by which he i s 
e x t e r n a l l y expressed and manifested, I t thus must be conceived as e x i s t i n g 
in God, whether as mater i a l being, the n a t u r a l order, or as the f i n i t e 
i n t e l l i g e n c e of i n d i v i d u a l subjects, " '' 
The phenomenal i s thus an i n t r i n s i c part of the Absolute's being, not a 
ma t e r i a l element that comes i n t o contact w i t h a conceptual d e i t y but an 
e s s e n t i a l part of the Absolute's s e l f . Or, i n other words, we are not 
dealing w i t h two independent parts that happen t o come together i n some 
obscure way, but rath e r elements which are as es s e n t i a l t o the Absolute as 
the body and l i f e - f o r c e are t o a human being: 
"The members a n d o r g a n s o f a l i v i n g body s h o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d m e r e l y a s 
p a r t s o f i t , f o r t h e y a r e w h a t t h e y a r e o n l y i n t h e i r u n i t y a n d a r e n o t 
i n d i f f e r e r e n t t o t h a t u n i t y a t a l l , T h e members a n d o r g a n s become mere 
' p a r t s ' o n l y u n d e r t h e h a n d s o f t h e a n a t o m i s t , " ( L o g i c , § 13SA) 
I n conclusion, then, we cannot p e r s i s t with the notion of e i t h e r A > B > 
AB, nor A > B > A. The analogical phrase "they are what they are only i n 
t h e i r u n i t y , " employed by Hegel, makes t h i s q u i t e e x p l i c i t , at least i n 
terms of i n t e r p r e t i n g h i s theology, i f not c r i t i c a l l y evaluating i t s 
p l a u s i b i l i t y . 
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9. The 'wholly present' Idea versus h i s t o r i c a l evolution. 
Thus f a r , we have considered an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y set of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
concerning the process of the Absolute, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which argue f o r 
e i t h e r an evolved Absolute (A > B > AB), or an Absolute which i s 
i l l o g l c a l l y t o become more perfect than perfect (A > B > A). These 
p r o p o s i t i o n s I have attempted t o expose as being l o g i c a l l y d e f i c i e n t both 
i n t h e i r understanding of the 'end', ie. the Absolute Idea i n and f o r 
I t s e l f , and i n t h e i r presuppositions and bogus notions regarding pr e c i s e l y 
how t h i s end i s derived. I n short, we have deduced that the Absolute 
cannot simply be c o n t r i v e d from a system which maintains no Idea as the 
possessor of process, nor can the Absolute be enhanced by v i r t u e of 
engag'lng i t s e l f w i t h i n the l o g i c a l process because t h i s immediately implies 
an i n i t i a l deficiency. 
So, what can be said about the Absolute Idea i n terms of the d i a l e c t i c a l 
progression, a progression which Hegel undeniably does advocate? To begin 
with, we may consider Hegel's point that "we usually suppose that the 
Absolute must l i e f a r beyond; but i t i s p r e c i s e l y what i s wholly present." 
(Logic, §24A2) Here, we may at once note that Hegel does not suggest a 
c o n t r i v e d Absolute, a r e s u l t which i s constructed and becomes complete at 
the end of a l i n e a r development, but n e i t h e r does t h i s promote the second 
r e j e c t e d p r o p o s i t i o n , that the Absolute "goes outside I t s e l f " before 
r e t u r n i n g ; i f A > B > A i s the case, then the Absolute s t i l l cannot be 
"wholly present, " unJess B Is In truth A. 
Now, t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n may, I suggest, be viewed i n two ways. The f i r s t 
way, i l l u s t r a t e d i n the chapter above, i s not p l a u s i b l e because t h i s s t i l l 
i m p l i e s a requirement on the Absolute's behalf t o become e s s e n t i a l l y 
enhanced. As was noted, Grisez w r i t e s "the Absolute goes outside i t s e l f 
and i n doing so becomes other than I t s e l f ... i n order that i t can become -
t h a t i s , come t o be a c t u a l , " ^ and so again we f i n d e i t h e r an i n i t i a l l y 
imperfect Absolute, or t h i s (mis)understanding of A > B > A and the 
r i d i c u l o u s idea of the perfect becoming more perfect. And, i f we say that 
the Absolute i s perfect, becomes imperfect by going "outside I t s e l f , " and 
then r e t u r n s t o i t s p e r f e c t i o n , we cannot r e c o n c i l e t h i s w i t h Hegel's 
mm 
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i n s i s t e n c e that the Absolute i s wholly present, never mind f i n d any sort of 
reason f o r such a jaunt. I n other words, we are faced with a s i t u a t i o n 
whereby the Absolute cannot, i f i t i s wholly present, move from perfection, 
t o imperfection, and then back to p e r f e c t i o n , nor can i t be i n i t i a l l y 
Imperfect and then r i s e t o p e r f e c t i o n because of the i m p l i c a t i o n s already 
l i s t e d , and because i t would s t i l l not be wholly present. 
But, i f we examine the second understanding of A > B > A, with B u l t i m a t e l y 
being A and only appearing as i t s other, then the Absolute i n and for 
i t s e l f , as the Idea, can be wholly present and, moreover, e t e r n a l l y perfect 
and thus genuinely absolute. That i s t o say, the Absolute does not s h i f t 
or progress through a linear process as such, A > B > A, because B i s i n 
f a c t A and so there i s no authentic, l i n e a r progression; i t i s instead 
e s s e n t i a l l y A > A or, as Hegel puts i t i n more d e t a i l (and w i l l be 
discussed s h o r t l y ) , +A = -A, This leads, of course, t o placing a question 
mark over the r o l e of apparent otherness; what i s i t there f o r , and how 
p r e c i s e l y does i t play any s u b s t a n t i a l part i n the Absolute? One cannot 
deny i t s existence, any more than one can deny the phenomenal world's being 
over against the concept of God; i t i s there, i t seems t o be d i f f e r e n t , and 
yet i t proves i t s e l f t o be the same - why? 
The answer l i e s i n the self-consciousness of the Absolute, i t s deployment 
of what we have here termed as B t o create seeming otherness. Once more, 
the inluence of H e r a c l i t u s i s evident; the path up i s the same as the path 
down because both up and down are contingent on t h e i r shared s t a t u s of 
being t h e i r opposite's other. I f we apply t h i s t o A > B > A, or the 
i n v e r s i o n of t h i s , B > A > B (which i s p r e c i s e l y the same as A and B are 
merely, nominal a p p e l l a t i o n s ) , then we can see a tension i n the r e l a t i o n , as 
t o say 'up' implies the existence of 'down', but the emergence of 'down' 
immediately and i n t u r n i m p l i e s the existence of 'up'. Hence we f i n d the 
paradoxical conclusion that +A = -A, because each contains the other w i t h i n 
i t owing t o the mutual r e l i a n c e and opposition. A simpler analogy e x i s t s 
i n the human person; we e x i s t both p h y s i c a l l y and s p i r i t u a l l y , as body and 
soul i n a s t a t e of mutual Interdependence. I n order t o be conscious of 
one's s e l f , one must have a body, something cognisant and tangible, 
something th a t i s concretely i d e n t i f i a b l e as an object, Equally essential, 
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however, i s the soul (or mind), which i s able t o sustain the consciousness 
of existence and prevents the body being merely a Jumble of material 
elements; --
"The p u r p o s e s e i z e s upon t h e o b j e c t i n i m m e d i a t e f a s h i o n , b e c a u s e i t i s t h e 
power o v e r t h e o b j e c t ; p a r t i c u l a r i t y i s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n i t , a n d w i t h i n t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y o b j e c t i v i t y i s c o n t a i n e d a s w e l l , The l i v i n g b e i n g h a s a body; 
t h e s o u l t a k e s h o l d o f t h e body and, i n d o i n g s o , i t h a s o b j e c t i f i e d i t s e l f 
i m m e d i a t e l y . T he human s o u l h a s much t o do i n m a k i n g i t s c o r p o r e a l n a t u r e 
i n t o a means, Man mu s t f i r s t t a k e p o s s e s s i o n o f h i s body, a s i t were, i n 
o r d e r f o r i t t o be t h e i n s t r u m e n t o f h i s s o u l , " (.Logic, § 2 0 8 A ) 
What Hegel o f f e r s here, then, i s a reason f o r the Absolute t o posit i t s e l f 
as otherness, i e . t o o b j e c t i f y i t s e l f , t o become self-conscious and aware 
of i t s own being. I t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t , that i s , f o r the Absolute t o be 
merely content i n - i t s e l f , i t must also be content through i t s s e l f -
o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n which i s f o r - l t s e l f . Thus, once more we see d i a l e c t i c , 
only here Hegel i s a c t u a l l y applying I t t o God himself. Not only, 
t h e r e f o r e , does he apply the l o g i c of the d i a l e c t i c to h i s t h e o l o g i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e , c o n f r o n t i n g every t h e s i s w i t h an o b j e c t i f y i n g a n t i t h e s i s , but he 
p e r s i s t s f u r t h e r i n demanding that the Absolute i t s e l f , at i t s most 
fundamental, be subject t o such l o g i c as w e l l . 
I n many ways, t h i s i s j u s t i f i a b l e ; could we s e r i o u s l y consider a theology 
which p e r t a i n s t o the whole when the whole i t s e l f stands exempt from the 
l o g i c t h a t deduces i t ? Perhaps not. But t h i s i n t u r n takes us back to our 
r e c u r r i n g problem that i f the Absolute has t o posit apparent otherness i n 
order t o o b j e c t i f y and become self-conscious of i t s e l f , does t h i s not imply 
th a t the Absolute i s I n i t i a l l y unconscious of i t s own being? Hegel i s 
q u i t e c l e a r of what he means by consciousness (.Bewusstsein), and one may 
read f o r example; 
" C o n s c i o u s n e s s knows something, t h i s o b j e c t i s t h e e s s e n c e o r t h e in-
itself, b u t i t i s a l s o f o r c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e i n - i t s e l f , T h i s i s w h e r e t h e 
a m b i g u i t y o f t h i s t r u t h e n t e r s . We s e e t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s now h a s two 
o b j e c t s ; o n e i s t h e f i r s t in-itself, t h e s e c o n d i s t h e being-for-
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consciousness of t/)is in-itseJf, T h e l a t t e r a p p e a r s a t f i r s t s i g h t t o be 
m e r e l y t h e r e f l e c t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t o i t s e l f , i e , w h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s 
h a s i n m i n d i s n o t a n o b j e c t , b u t o n l y i t s k n o w l e d g e of t h a t f i r s t o b j e c t , 
B u t , a s was shown p r e v i o u s l y , t h e f i r s t o b j e c t , i n b e i n g known, i s a l t e r e d 
f o r c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; i t c e a s e s t o be t h e i n - i t s e l f , a n d becomes s o m e t h i n g t h a t 
i s t h e in-itseJf mly for consciousness. And t h i s t h e n i s t h e T r u e , " 
{PS, §86) 
Hence i t i s clear that the true, the Absolute, must be self-conscious, what 
we are commonly terming as the Idea i n and f o r i t s e l f . But does such 
consciousness a r i s e f o r the Absolute? I f i t does, then Singer and Grisez 
have a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e i r assertions, but at a price, as we have already 
observed, of the Absolute not being wholly present. Further, we may again 
say t h a t i f the Absolute's self-consciousness i s not eter n a l , on what 
grounds does the Absolute know i t must a t t a i n o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n ; a f t e r a l l , 
i f i t i s i n i t i a l l y unconscious of i t s t r u t h , i t surely cannot know to 
venture f o r t h . I n f a c t , Hegel does not provide us wi t h a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d 
s o l u t i o n , but rat h e r he o f f e r s three perspectives under which the Absolute 
mat be viewed as outside time and the world, as the world i t s e l f , and as 
the church: 
"The f i r s t d i v i n e h i s t o r y i s outside t/ie loorld, i t i s n o t i n s p a c e , b u t 
o u t s i d e f i n i t u d e a s s u c h - God a s he i s i n a n d f o r h i m s e l f , The s e c o n d 
l o c a l e i s t h e morld, t h e d i v i n e h i s t o r y a s r e a l , God h a v i n g t o h i s 
d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g i n tt-ie w o r l d , T h i r d l y t h e r e i s t h e inner place, t h e 
com m u n i t y , f i r s t o f a l l i n t h e w o r l d , b u t a l s o t h e c o m m u n i t y i n s o f a r a s i t 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r a i s e s i t s e l f t o h e a v e n , o r a l r e a d y h a s h e a v e n w i t h i n i t s e l f 
on e a r t h - t h e c o m m u n i t y w h i c h , a s t h e c h u r c h , i s f u l l o f g r a c e , a n d i n 
w h i c h God i s a c t i v e a n d p r e s e n t , " (LPRZ.W) 
The f i r s t h i s t o r y , or category, i s the most important t o t h i s thesis, and I 
s h a l l r e t u r n t o i t s h o r t l y i n order t o r e i n f o r c e my attack upon the notion 
of a- produced Absolute. I n i t i a l l y , however, I would.like t o examine the 
second and t h i r d categories which might appear t o lend p a r t i a l support to 
the e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e o r i e s I am disputing, but more apparent than r e a l 
because i t i s q u i t e useless t o view them except i n context of t h e i r 
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r e l a t i o n t o the f i r s t and major category, that of God outside f i n i t u d e . As 
Findlay r i g h t l y says, " i t i s p l a i n , i n f a c t , t h a t Hegel's metaphysical aim 
i s not t o do the work of h i s t o r y or science, nor t o add t o t h e i r r e s u l t s , 
but t o frame concepts i n terms of which these r e s u l t s can be 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y grasped, can be a l l o t e d a place i n the th e o l o g i c a l frame of 
notions and phases of being i n terms of which Hegel sees the world. 
Thus, we must at once comprehend that Hegel i s not simply a l i g n i n g h i s 
Absolute t o the development of the world and the church and, moreover, 
.making i t contingent on such (the argument that Singer propounds), but i s 
rathe r f a c i n g the r e a l i t y of the phenomenal world and t r y i n g t o encompass 
i t w i t h i n h i s t h e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e . We cannot deny the physical world, 
nor r e f u t e i t s chronological development, but i f we argue that f o r Hegel 
ev e r y t h i n g i s of the whole, that he i s a genuine exponent of monism, then 
we must agree w i t h Fackenheim's asse r t i o n that "Hegel i s forced t o confront 
h i s t o r y , but i n a way tha t keeps i t u l t i m a t e l y subordinate t o h i s 
dominant t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n . 
Hegel himself note the tension between perspectives drawn from the f i r s t and 
second categories; 
"We can say that the Absolute Idea - the way i t is determined as an object, 
subsisting in and for itself - is complete, On its subjective side, however, 
this is not so; i t is neither complete in itself - [for] i t is not Cyet] 
concrete - nor is i t complete as consciousness with respect to what i t has as 
it s object." (i^/? 3,198-9) 
I n other words, the h i s t o r i c a l aspect of the Absolute i s not complete and, 
should we consider t h i s aspect i n i s o l a t i o n , we f i n d only a crumbling 
n o t i o n of Hegel's de i t y . As Fackenheim c r i t i c a l l y comments, i t remains 
"wholly mysterious how any one time i n human h i s t o r y could ever become r i p e 
f o r Hegelian 'science', much more how human h i s t o r y could move necessarily 
i n that d i r e c t i o n . '"^  
The n o t i o n of an e n t i r e l y h i s t o r i c a l l y - r o o t e d Absolute i s the r e f o r e not 
p l a u s i b l e , but there remains the problem of how h i s t o r y can be 
I n t r i n s i c a l l y associated w i t h Hegel's all-encompassing system. For, as 
106 Findlay puts i t , "the Philosophy of His t o r y i s no independent part of the 
system, which can be studied i n i s o l a t i o n . I t i s part and parcel of the 
t e l e o l o g i c a l movement of the system as a whole, and the answer l i e s i n 
our r e t u r n t o the f i r s t category of God beyond the sensible, the f i n i t e , 
and time. I f we r e t u r n t o the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, we 
observe the three categories developed as follows: 
"We c a n t h e n d e f i n e t h e s e t h r e e e l e m e n t s d i f f e r e n t l y i n r e g a r d t o tiae. T h u s 
t h e f i r s t e l e m e n t i s God o u t s i d e o f t i m e , God a s t h e e t e r n a l I d e a i n t h e e l e m e n t 
of t h e p u r e t h o u g h t o f eternity, b u t e t e r n i t y o n l y i n t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h i t i s 
s e t a g a i n s t t i m e , T h i s t i m e t h a t i s i n a n d f o r i t s e l f e x p l i c a t e s i t s e l f by 
u n f o l d i n g i n t o p a s t , p r e s e n t , a n d f u t u r e . The s e c o n d e l e m e n t i s t h e d i v i n e 
h i s t o r y a s a p p e a r a n c e , b u t a s a past t i m e ; i t i s [ t h e r e ] , f o r a p p e a r a n c e means 
s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s , t h a t h a s b e i n g , b u t i t h a s a mode of b e i n g t h a t h a s b e e n 
r e d u c e d t o mere show, As a p p e a r a n c e i t i s an i m m e d i a t e l y d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g , 
w h i c h i s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y n e g a t e d ; t h i s i s t h e p a s t - e x a c t l y w h a t i s c a l l e d 
h i s t o r y , w h i c h p r o v e s i t s e l f t o be mere a p p e a r a n c e by t h e v e r y f a c t t h a t i t i s 
onJy hisio'ry. The t h i r d e l e m e n t i s t h e present, b u t o n l y t h e l i m i t e d p r e s e n t , 
n o t t h e e t e r n a l p r e s e n t a s s u c h b u t t h e p r e s e n t t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s p a s t and 
a n d f u t u r e f r o m i t s e l f , T h i s i s t h e e l e m e n t o f h e a r t and mind, of i m m e d i a t e 
s u b j e c t i v i t y - t h e s p i r i t u a l 'now' a s i t i s i n t h i s [ s i n g l e ] i n d i v i d u a l . B u t 
t h i s p r e s e n t h a s a l s o t o be t h e t h i r d e l e m e n t ; t h e c o m m u n i t y r a i s e s i t s e l f t o 
h e a v e n a s w e l l , So i t i s a p r e s e n t t h a t r a i s e s i t s e l f , i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
r e c o n c i l e d , b r o u g h t t o c o n s u m m a t i o n t h r o u g h t t h e n e g a t i o n o f i t s i m m e d i a c y , 
c o n s u m m a t e d i n u n i v e r s a l i t y , b u t i n a c o n s u m m a t i o n t h a t i s n o t y e t a c h i e v e d , 
a n d w h i c h m u s t t h e r e f o r e b e g r a s p e d a s future -• a now o f t h e p r e s e n t t h a t h a s 
c o n s u m m a t i o n b e f o r e i t s e y e s ; b u t b e c a u s e t h e c o m m u n i t y i s p o s i t e d now i n t h e 
o r d e r o f t i m e , t h e c o n s u m m a t i o n i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h i s 'now' a n d i s p o s i t e d 
a s f u t u r e , T h e s e a r e t h e t h r e e u n i v e r s a l i d e a s i n w h i c h we h a v e t o c o n s i d e r t h e 
d i v i n e h i s t o r y , " UPP\,W-B) 
Here, then, we see God being v i t a l l y portrayed as beyond time, but i n such 
a way t h a t he maintains c o n t r o l over h i s t o r y , both past and t o come, v i a 
the second and t h i r d categories which c o n t r i b u t e i n d i f f e r i n g ways t o the 
phenomenal aspect of the Absolute. What emerges from t h i s i s that the 
second and t h i r d categories are th e r e f o r e subservient t o the f i r s t , because 
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the f i r s t category of the Absolute beyond time determines the progress of 
h i s t o r y : 
"The s o l e t h o u g h t w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y b r i n g s t o t h e t r e a t m e n t of h i s t o r y i s t h e 
s i m p l e c o n c e p t o f Reason, t h a t R e a s o n i s t h e l a w o f t h e w o r l d a n d t h a t , 
t h e r e f o r e , i n w o r l d h i s t o r y , t h i n g s h a v e come a b o u t r a t i o n a l l y , " {RH, p l l ) 
The Absolute as Reason t h e r e f o r e d i c t a t e s the world and h i s t o r y , and from 
t h i s i t must be concluded that the Absolute does not evolve other than i n 
i t s self-determined and providential appearance. I t does not become 
perfected or complete as Singer propounds, but commands outside of f i n i t u d e 
i t s changing nature w i t h i n i t . Stace summarises t h i s as l u c i d l y as anyone, 
o f f e r i n g the view that " i n h i s t o r y the Idea unfolds i t s various phases i n 
time and the dominant phase at any epoch i s embodied i n a dominant. The 
succession of these phases c o n s t i t u t e s world-history, and t h i s h i s t o r y i s 
not governed by chance or b l i n d f a t e but by the et e r n a l reason, the Idea 
i t s e l f . Hence h i s t o r y i s no b l i n d medley of contingencies, but i s a 
r a t i o n a l development. The Idea, when thus embodied i n the h i s t o r y of the 
world i s the w o r l d - s p i r i t . I t i s s p i r i t , because s p i r i t means simply the 
concrete embodiement of the Idea. 
The notable i m p l i c a t i o n of Hegel's theory i s that the phenomenal, 
h i s t o r i c a l world i s t h e r e f o r e not only the manifestation of the Absolute, 
but subject t o d i v i n e r u l e . What we have i s a do c t r i n e of d i v i n e 
providence, and Hegel pursues t h i s throughout the second and t h i r d 
categories, w r i t i n g ( f o r example) f o r the former that: 
" P h i l o s o p h y i s t h e e x h i b i t i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h o u g h t a s i t i s i n a n d 
f o r i t s e l f , w i t h o u t a n y a d d i t i o n ; t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y i s t h i s 
d e v e l o p m e n t i n t i m e , C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y i s i d e n t i c a l 
w i t h t h e s y s t e m o f p h i l o s o p h y , " (ILRP, p 8 7 - 8 ) 
The above quotation shows that h i s t o r y i s employed as an " e x h i b i t i o n " of 
the Idea's movement, r e f l e c t i n g the Absolute's I n t e r n a l l o g i c . I t does not 
enjoy any r e a l autonomy but matches the abstract development of the Idea, 
thus h i g h l i g h t i n g i t as a phenomenal representation of God. 
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Here we perhaps f i n d the closest s i m i l a r i t y between Hegel and Spinoza's 
pantheism, w i t h Hegel edging p e r i l o u s l y near t o Spinoza's concept of 
thought and extension, the two modes of the substance of God. ^  Yet Hegel 
maintains h i s distance from Spinoza, because he stresses that the sublation 
of a t h i n g ' s character provides a more apprehensible unity. That i s t o 
say, when the t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s are reconciled i n unity, the synthesis 
i s not a pure negation, a r e s u l t of one c a n c e l l i n g out i t s other, but a 
s u b j e c t i v e t h e s i s being o b j e c t i f i e d by i t s a n t i t h e t i c a l other. I f we 
reconsider the l i g h t and dark analogy, neither of these two i d e n t i c a l 
elements lose t h e i r character, but rather they can be f u l l y understood only 
by t h e i r o pposition t o each other and t h e i r place w i t h i n the higher, 
enriched ( i n terms of c o g n i t i o n ) unity. Hegel attacks Spinoza for e n t i r e l y 
negating the elements, w r i t i n g : 
"However, i n S p i n o z i s r a t h i s w o r l d o r t h i s ' a l l ' s i m p l y ;5 not list gar nicfifi. 
C e r t a i n l y t h e ' a l l ' a p p e a r s , one s p e a k s o f i t s d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g ISasein], and 
o u r l i f e i s a b e i n g w i t h i n t h i s e x i s t e n c e LExistenz], I n t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
s e n s e , h o w e v e r , t h e w o r l d h a s i n t h i s v i e w no a c t u a l i t y a t a l l ; i t s i m p l y is 
not ,,, I f one e m p l o y s t h e e x p r e s s i o n ' a l l i s one' a n d [ c l a i m s ] t h e r e f o r e t h a t 
u n i t y i s t h e t r u t h o f m u l t i p l i c i t y , t h e n t h e ' a l l ' s i m p l y i s no longer,'° 
( Z W 1 , 3 7 7 - 8 ) 
I n other words, although Hegel may agree w i t h H e r a c l i t u s that "the path up 
i s the same as the path down," he recognises also the u n i t y ' s dependency on 
the l o g i c that gives the u n i t y i t s precise character. I n a p p l i c a t i o n t o 
the p r o v i d e n t i a l , h i s t o r i c a l world, therefore, w h i l s t the world acts as an 
image of the dynamic Idea, i t never leaves i t s status as 'an other' i n the 
same way as my body does not r e l i n q u i s h i t s character and d i s t i n c t i o n from 
my soul, despite the f a c t that each serves t o i l l u m i n a t e the higher u n i t y 
of ' me'. 
The issue of how Hegel's Absolute maintains both p u r i t y and d i s t i n c t i o n has 
already been discussed. But i t i s important again t o stress how t h i s can 
be the case, so th a t when we argue Hegel t o be monistic, we do not b l i n d l y 
assume an absolute, i n d i f f e r e n t , s t a t i c d e i t y , but a d e i t y who possesses 
the phenomenal world w i t h i n i t s being, as we l l as a d e i t y defined as 
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concept. I possess a body and a s o u l , d i r e c t i o n possesses up and down, and 
so f o r t h ; w h i l s t t h e elements c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e u n i t y o f t h e whole upon 
which t h e y a re dependent - t h e 'possessor' - t h e y r e t a i n an element of 
d i f f e r e n c e as ' o t h e r s ' , 
Most s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h i s p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n , however, I s t h e f a c t t h a t 
one e n t i t y does not meet I t s o t h e r t o produce t h e u n i t y , A > B > AB, but 
t h a t , as opposltes, they arise in exact opposition to each other. +A = -A, 
and I t I s w h o l l y r e l i a n t on -A f o r I t s s t a t u s because I t I s grounded I n -A; 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y I t s e l f , t h a t I s , because o f I t s a b s o l u t e o t h e r , and t h e 
u n i t y o f t h e A b s o l u t e <A) i s based e n t i r e l y on t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f +A = -A = 
A. 
Hence we may say t h a t t h e most I m p o r t a n t c a t e g o r y i s t h e f i r s t , t h a t o f God 
o u t s i d e o f space, t i m e , and f i n l t u d e . I t i s so because o n l y from t h i s 
c a t e g o r y can God be omnipresent, o m n i s c i e n t , and a l l - p o w e r f u l , T h i s does 
mean t h a t Hegel i s compelled t o adopt a s t r i c t d o c t r i n e of d i v i n e 
p r o v i d e n c e , but I suggest t h a t a m o n i s t i c t h e o l o g y can encompass no v i a b l e 
a l t e r n a t i v e . I f t h e r e i s f r e e w i l l , and man and h i s t o r y can determine 
themselves, t h e n a c o n f l i c t o f v o l i t i o n becomes e v i d e n t , t h e A b s o l u t e ' s 
w i l l v e r s u s a g e n u i n e l y a l i e n o t h e r ' s , I n s t e a d , Hegel i s compelled t o 
argue f o r d i v i n e p r o v i d e n c e , so t h a t t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f God, t h e seeming 
o t h e r which o b j e c t i f i e s t h e I d e a i n - i t s e l f , i s i n d i s p u t a b l y c o n t r o l l e d by 
t h e i n c o r p o r e a l A b s o l u t e S p i r i t , The s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e A b s o l u t e i s 
t h u s e x h i b i t e d o n l y i n t h e s u b s e r v i e n t second and t h i r d c a t e g o r i e s , i n t h e 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n , y e t u l t i m a t e l y t h i s e x h i b i t i o n t o o has i t s source beyond 
such t r a n s i e n t f i e l d s ; I n t e a d of t h e A b s o l u t e s e e k i n g I t s e l f , t h e r e f o r e , i t 
i s e t e r n a l l y s e l f - c o n s c i o u s and p o s i t s i t s e l f as o t h e r n e s s merely t o 
e x h i b i t i t s wholesome u n i t y r a t h e r t h a n t o s t r i v e t o reach I t , Thus Hegel 
a s s e r t s : 
"When we s p e a k o f t h e I d e a , i t m u s t n o t be t a k e n t o mean s o m e t h i n g f a r away 
a n d b e y o n d , I n s t e a d , t h e I d e a i s w h a t i s p e r f e c t l y p r e s e n t , a n d i t i s l i k e w i s e 
t o be f o u n d i n a n y c o n s c i o u s n e s s t o o , h o w e v e r c o n f u s e d a n d i m p a i r e d i t may be, 
We i m a g i n e t h e w o r l d a s a g r e a t w h o l e w h i c h h a s b e e n c r e a t e d by God - i n s u c h a 
way t h a t God h a s m a n i f e s t e d h i m s e l f t o u s i n i t . I n t h e l i k e manner, we r e g a r d 
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t h e w o r l d a s g o v e r n e d by d i v i n e P r o v i d e n c e , a n d t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t t h e w o r l d , i n 
i t s m u t u a l e x t e r n a l i t y , i s e t e r n a l l y l e d b a c k t o t h e u n i t y f r o m w h i c h i t came 
f o r t h , a n d i s p r e s e r v e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h a t u n i t y , " (Logic, § 2 ) 3 A ) 
Thus, t h e A b s o l u t e e x i s t s i n e t e r n a l p e r f e c t i o n w i t h apparent o t h e r n e s s 
which p r o v e s I n t r u t h t o be i t s v e r y s e l f . Of course, t h i s i s an enormous 
amount o f p h i l o s o p h y crammed i n t o t h e s e few paragraphs, but f u r t h e r 
i l l u s t r a t i o n i s a f f o r d e d by Hegel v i a an I m p o r t a n t passage i n t h e Logic: 
" W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e beginning [ t h i s ] p h i l o s o p h y h a s t o make, i t seems, 
l i k e t h e o t h e r s c i e n c e s , t o s t a r t i n g e n e r a l w i t h a s u b j e c t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , 
i e , t o h a v e t o make a p a r t i c u l a r o b - j e c t , i n t h i s c a s e thinking, i n t o t h e 
o b - j e c t o f t h i n k i n g , j u s t l i k e s p a c e , number, e t c , B u t w h a t we h a v e h e r e i s 
t h e f r e e a c t of t h i n k i n g p u t t i n g i t s e l f a t t h e s t a n d p o i n t w h e r e i t i s f o r i t s 
own s e l f , producing its oun ob-ject for itseJf thereby, a n d giving it to 
itself. W i t h i n t h e S c i e n c e C i e , H e g e l ' s s y s t e m ] t h i s s t a n d p o i n t , w h i c h i n 
t h i s f i r s t a c t a p p e a r s a s imediate, must make i t s e l f i n t o t h e result, a n d 
( w h a t i s m o r e ) i n t o i t s l a s t r e s u l t , i n w h i c h i t r e a c h e s i t s b e g i n n i n g a g a i n 
a n d r e t u r n s i n t o i t s e l f , I n t h i s way, [ t h i s ] p h i l o s o p h y shows i t s e l f a s a 
c i r c l e t h a t g o e s b a c k i n t o i t s e l f ; i t d o e s n o t h a v e a b e g i n n i n g i n t h e same 
s e n s e a s t h e o t h e r s c i e n c e s , s o t h a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o n l y h a s a r e l a t i o n t o t h e 
s u b j e c t who t a k e s t h e d e c i s i o n t o p h i l o s o p h i s e , b u t n o t t o t h e s c i e n c e a s 
s u c h ,,, T h i s i s e v e n i t s C i e , t h e A b s o l u t e I d e a ' s ] u n i q u e p u r p o s e , deed, a n d 
g o a l ; t o a r r i v e a t t h e C o n c e p t o f i t s c o n c e p t a n d s o t o a r r i v e a t i t s r e t u r n 
[ i n t o i t s e l f ] a n d c o n t e n t m e n t , " {Logic, § 1 7 ) 
T h i s paragraph a g a i n e n f o r c e s s u p p o r t f o r t h e A b s o l u t e b e i n g beyond t i m e 
and space, yet p o s i t i n g i t s e l f as an o b j e c t w i t h i n t h e r e a l m o f t i m e and 
space. I n assuming t h e c l a i m i s o n t o l o g i c a l , m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e A b s o l u t e 
e x p resses i t s consciousness by making such t h e o b j e c t over and a g a i n s t 
i t s e l f as s u b j e c t i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e such consciousness w i t h d e f i n i t i o n . 
Thus under s t o o d , we can p i c t u r e q u i t e s i m p l y t h e act of e x p r e s s i o n or 
u t t e r i n g ; i n e f f e c t , t h e concept amounts merely t o a d e c l a r a t i o n o f being. 
Again, i t i s c r u c i a l t o n o t e t h a t such an e x p r e s s i o n does not i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
a l t e r t h e A b s o l u t e , but o n l y I l l u m i n a t e s i t , making o b j e c t i v e what would 
o t h e r w i s e be j u s t a presupposed, s u b j e c t i v e being. The s u b j e c t i v e b e i n g i s 
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not changed by becoming a l s o t h e o b j e c t ; I n s t e a d i t s i m p l y l o g i c a l l y 
proves, as i t were, i t s being. 
There a r e a number o f o t h e r v i t a l p o i n t s r a i s e d w i t h i n t h i s q u o t a t i o n . 
F i r s t , t h e r e i s t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e process i s 
i d e n t i c a l , indeed a c t u a l l y i s , t h e r e s u l t ; t h e i n i t i a l s t a n d p o i n t , t h a t I s , 
must a l s o be t h e end, and so, r a t h e r t h a n A and B c o n t r i v i n g t o s y n t h e s l s e 
AB, we a g a i n r e t u r n t o t h e A > B (as an appearance o f A) > A p r o p o s i t i o n , 
w i t h A ( t h e A b s o l u t e I d e a ) " r e t u r n i n g i n t o I t s e l f . " Second, we may no t e 
t h a t Hegel i s s a y i n g t h a t h i s system i s c i r c u l a r r a t h e r t han l i n e a r or, put 
a n o t h e r way, t h a t r a t h e r t h a n p r o g r e s s i n g from A > B > AB ( w i t h B being t h e 
I n g r e d i e n t which enhances A), there is an authentic return to A, and 
t h e r e f o r e no actual departure from it. 
What p r e c i s e l y does t h i s mean? I f we c o n s i d e r , as S i n g e r and G r l s e z 
suggest, t h a t A becomes 'more p e r f e c t ' owing t o i t s d l r e m p t l o n v i a B, then 
t h e i n i t i a l A b s o l u t e cannot be t h e same as t h e progressed A b s o l u t e because, 
as b o t h S i n g e r and G r i s e z r e a d i l y admit, t h e A b s o l u t e has been enhanced, 
has "become" and been made " a c t u a l , " i n G r l s e z ' s words. Thus, t h e r e i s no 
genuine r e t u r n o f t h e A b s o l u t e i n t o I t s e l f , nor a s i t u a t i o n whereby t h e 
A b s o l u t e i s w h o l l y p r e s e n t ; t h e r e i s an immense d i f f e r e n c e between t h e 
enhanced A b s o l u t e (AB) and t h e A b s o l u t e i n i t i a l l y engaged (A). But, when 
Hegel says we have a " c i r c l e , " and a " r e t u r n i n t o i t s e l f , " t h i s must s u r e l y 
mean a p u r e l y A > A p r o p o s i t i o n , w i t h no enhancement or e s s e n t i a l change i n 
t h e A b s o l u t e ' s p e r f e c t s t a t u s . 
I n o t h e r words, we are co m p e l l e d t o r e c o n s i d e r p r e c i s e l y what we mean by 
' process'• or, t o be more a c c u r a t e 'system'. A p r e f e r e n c e f o r t h i s l a t t e r 
t e r m i s i m m e d i a t e l y of a s s i s t a n c e , f o r l o s t i s t h e l i n e a r i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
t h e f o rmer. Hegel proposes I n h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e Logic t h a t "a 
p h i l o s o p h i s i n g without system cannot be s c i e n t i f i c at a l l , " (Logic, §14) 
but t h i s need not, indeed s h o u l d not, be u n d e r s t o o d s i m p l y as a r g u i n g AB 
p r o c e e d i n g f r o m A + B i n t h e e v o l u t i o n a r y manner which I have a l r e a d y 
c r i t i c i s e d . I n s t e a d , we must view t h e g e n e r a l n o t i o n o f system as t h a t 
which i s a whole, or t o t a l i t y , but a l s o t h a t f r o m which p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t s 
can be c o g n i s e d and examined s e p a r a t e l y , '' Here we can r e f e r t o Hegel's 
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comments r e g a r d i n g c o g n i t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r elements, and t h e importance o f 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g them as not b e i n g a c t u a l i n and f o r themselves, but as p a r t s 
of t h e A b s o l u t e ; 
" I n n a t u r e , i t i s n o t s o m e t h i n g - o t h e r t h a n t h e I d e a t h a t i s [ r e l c o g n i s e d , 
b u t t h e I d e a i n t h e f o r m o f [ i t s ] u t t e r i n g lEntiuBerungl, j u s t a s i n t h e 
s p i r i t we h a v e t h e same I d e a ss being for-itself, a n d coining to be in and 
for itself, A d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h i s k i n d , i n w h i c h t h e I d e a a p p e a r s , i s a t 
t h e same t i m e a moment tftat flows, h e n c e , t h e s i n g l e s c i e n c e i s j u s t a s much 
t h e c o g n i t i o n o f i t s c o n t e n t a s an o b - j e c t that is, a s i t i s t h e i m m e d i a t e 
c o g n i t i o n i n t h a t c o n t e n t o f i t s p a s s a g e i n t o i t s h i g h e r c i r c l e . T he 
representation oi division i s t h e r e f o r e i n c o r r e c t i n a s m u c h a s i t p u t s t h e 
p a r t i c u l a r p a r t s o r s c i e n c e s side by side, a s i f t h e y w e r e o n l y i m m o b i l e 
p a r t s a n d s u b s t a n t i a l i n t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n , t h e way t h a t species ive," 
{Logic, §18) 
What we must a p p r e c i a t e , t h e r e f o r e , i s t h a t when we c o n s i d e r any g i v e n 
aspect o f t h e A b s o l u t e , we s h o u l d n o t c o n s i d e r i t as something a c t u a l i n 
and f o r i t s e l f , nor s i m p l y as an i n g r e d i e n t which c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e 
c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e Idea, but r a t h e r t h e A b s o l u t e Idea from a c e r t a i n 
p e r s p e c t i v e ; we have b e f o r e us not a component as such, but t h e v e r y Idea 
I t s e l f o n l y i n a f i n i t e , i n c o m p l e t e g u i s e because of our apprehension of 
i t . I n o t h e r words, it is our viewpoint that is untrue and incomplete at 
t h i s p o i n t i n t h e c o g n i t i v e process, and not t h e A b s o l u t e Idea which i s 
w h o l l y p r e s e n t . T h i s , then, i s t h e f i r s t c r u c i a l t h i n g t o understand when 
a n a l y s i n g Hegel's system, t h a t one must d i s c r i m i n a t e between t h e supreme 
I d e a and how i t might appear t o us prima facie; t h e Idea i s e t e r n a l l y 
c o m p l e t e i n and f o r I t s e l f r e g a r d l e s s of i t s apparent showing: 
" E a c h o f t h e p a r t s o f p h i l o s o p h y i s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l w h o l e , a c i r c l e t h a t 
c l o s e s upon i t s e l f ; b u t i n e a c h o f them t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l I d e a i s i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r d e t e r m i n a c y o r e l e m e n t . E v e r y s i n g l e c i r c l e a l s o b r e a k s t h r o u g h 
t h e r e s t r i c t i o n of i t s e l e m e n t a s w e l l , p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e i t i s i n w a r d l y 
[ t h e ] t o t a l i t y , a n d i t g r o u n d s a f u r t h e r s p h e r e . T he w h o l e p r e s e n t s i t s e l f 
t h e r e f o r e a s a c i r c l e o f c i r c l e s , e a c h o f w h i c h i s a n e c e s s a r y moment, s o 
t h a t t h e s y s t e m of i t s p a r t i c u l a r e l e m e n t s c o n s t i t u t e s t h e w h o l e I d e a -
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w h i c h e q u a l l y a p p e a r s i n e a c h s i n g l e one o f them," (Logic, i l S ) 
Of p a r t i c u l a r r e l e v a n c e i s Hegel's c l a i m not o n l y t h a t " t h e representation 
o f division i s . , , i n c o r r e c t Inasmuch as i t p u t s t h e p a r t i c u l a r p a r t s or 
s c i e n c e s side by side," but t h a t each element i s " I n w a r d l y [ t h e ] t o t a l i t y . " 
What t h i s means i s t h a t t h e system i s not a c o l l e c t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r s which 
c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e o v e r a l l whole o f t h e Idea, but r a t h e r t h a t each 
p a r t i c u l a r i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y t h e whole because i t "breaks t h r o u g h t h e 
r e s t r i c t i o n o f i t s element." I n s h o r t , t h e A b s o l u t e Idea i s c o n t i n u a l l y 
w h o l l y p r e s e n t . 
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1. G r i s e z , pl85. 
2. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t body and s o u l a re n o t t r u e o p p o s i t e s and t h a t 
t h i s a n a l o g y t h e r e f o r e c o n t a i n s an element o f inaccuracy. However, I 
s h a l l c o n t i n u e t o employ i t , as Indeed does Hegel, as t h e i m p o r t a n t 
aspect o f i t - two d i f f e r e n t elements p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e whole - remains 
r e l e v a n t 
3. F l n d l a y , p24. 
4. Fackenheim, p231, 
5. Fackenheim, p57. 
6. F l n d l a y , p328, 
7. Stace, p438. 
8. Given t h e p e r s i s t e n t p o p u l a r i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y I n Germany, o f d i v i n e 
p r o v i d e n c e t h r o u g h o u t Hegel's time, t h i s i s not of course s u r p r i s i n g . 
D i c k ey o f f e r s one o f t h e most l u c i d and t h o r o u g h accounts o f t h i s 
c l i m a t e . 
9. Spinoza, 1; see a l s o c h a p t e r t h r e e . 
10. A l t h o u g h Hegel i s h e r e c r i t i c i s i n g Spinoza because o f t h e w h o l l y 
s u b j e c t i v e s t a t u s awarded t o t h e a l l ( i e . i t has no a u t h e n t i c 
o t h e r n e s s ) , i t i s perhaps w o r t h remembering Hegel's own u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
of pure b e i n g ' s s t a t u s as u n l v o c a l w i t h n o t h i n g . I t i s a r g u a b l e t h a t 
t h e s e do not m a i n t a i n any g r e a t e r sense o f a u t h e n t i c o t h e r n e s s than 
Spinoza's a t t r i b u t e s which a re d i f f e r e n t as a s p e c t s o f substance. 
11, Hegel a c t u a l l y says t h a t t h i s i s something which i s i m p o s s i b l e 
114 because something can o n l y be known a g a i n s t t h e background o f t h e 
t o t a l i t y . When I employ t h i s phrase, t h e r e f o r e , i t must be understood 
as meaning c o g n i s i n g and examining i t a g a i n s t such. 
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10. Hegel's p n t o l o g i c a l argument. 
The I n t e n t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s has been t o t r y and i l l u s t r a t e Hegel's 
A b s o l u t e as a m o n i s t i c d e i t y . My a t t e m p t s t o a c h i e v e t h i s have been 
based on an e x p o s i t i o n o f Hegel's t r i a d i c s t r u c t u r e , t h e A b s o l u t e ' s 
e q u i v o c a l n e s s w i t h t r u t h and I n f i n i t u d e , and i t s b e i n g and s t a t u s v i s - c i -
v i s t h e phenomenal, h i s t o r i c a l w o r l d . But t o c o n f i n e t h e t h e s i s 
e n t i r e l y t o t h i s would omit one, e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e of Hegel's A b s o l u t e 
t h a t i s p e r t i n e n t t o t h e argument, namely h i s e f f o r t s t o prove t h e 
e x i s t e n c e o f t h e d e i t y . I have t h e r e f o r e d e c i d e d t o conclude my work 
w i t h a b r i e f a n a l y s i s o f Hegel's o n t o l o g i c a l argument, i n o r d e r t o 
h i g h l i g h t b o t h how he adopts t h e argument t o a f f i r m h i s Absolute, and 
how t h r o u g h i t t h e A b s o l u t e may be c o n s i d e r e d f u r t h e r as m o n i s t i c . 
I n d i s c u s s i n g C h r i s t i a n i t y , t h e 'consummate' r e l i g i o n , Hegel opens h i s 
1831 l e c t u r e s on t h e o n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f by o f f e r i n g t h r e e fundamental 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . CLPR 3.351) The f i r s t of t h ese i s t h e " A b s t r a c t concept 
of God", t h e f r e e , s u b j e c t i v e concept o f t h e d e i t y . The second i s t h e 
" d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g " o f God, God's m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n f i n i t u d e , or, more 
p r e c i s e l y , t h e f a s h i o n i n g o f t h i s m a n i f e s t a t i o n , f i n i t e s p i r i t , and i t s 
s t a t u s as b e i n g c o n c r e t e w i t h f i n i t e consciousness. The t h i r d 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h e u n i t y of concept and b e i n g w i t h i n God. Indeed, so 
h i g h l y does Hegel v a l u e such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , he c l a i m s : 
o 
"The m a i n p o i n t i n r e g a r d t o t h i s [ C h r i s t i a n ] r e l i g i o n i s t o c o g n i s e 
t h i s p r o c e s s , t h a t God m a n i f e s t s h i m s e l f i n f i n i t e s p i r i t a n d i s 
i d e n t i c a l w i t h h i m s e l f i n i t , " ( / : W 3 , 3 S 1 ) 
li i s perhaps t h e r e f o r e not s u r p r i s i n g t o n o t e a l s o t h a t he c l a i m s t h e 
o n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f t o be " t h e o n l y genuine one, " (.LPR 3. 352) and w h i l s t 
Jaeschke w r i t e s " i t i s not i m m e d i a t e l y c l e a r what q u a l i f i e s i t t o 
c o n s t i t u t e t h e f o r m a l e x p l c a t l o n o f t h e concept o f t h e "Consummate 
R e l i g i o n , " ^ c l e a r l y t h e argument's att e m p t t o r e c o n c i l e t h e b e i n g w i t h 
t h e concept o f God i s a t t r a c t i v e t o Hegel's d i a l e c t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s . 
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Hegel's argument i s based upon Anselm's a s s e r t i o n t h a t "God i s t h a t t h a n 
which n o t h i n g g r e a t e r can be conceived, "-^^ i e , 'God' as t h e most p e r f e c t 
concept, which cannot be d e n i e d as i t would a u t o m a t i c a l l y be r e p l a c e d by 
a new most p e r f e c t concept which would i n t u r n assume t h e s t a t u s o f 
'God', i n c l u d i n g a c t u a l i t y t o r e t a i n t h e s t a t u s o f b e i n g ' a b s o l u t e l y 
p e r f e c t ' , - ' C e r t a i n l y Hegel agrees w i t h Anselra's t h e o r y , c a l l i n g I t 
" q u i t e c o r r e c t , " (LPR 3,70) but he a l s o sees a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l f a u l t i n 
Anselm's concept, i n t h a t ' t h a t t h a n which n o t h i n g g r e a t e r can be 
con c e i v e d ' remains a subjective, o r p o s s i b l e , concept which i s f a u l t y by 
v i r t u e o f i t s s u b j e c t i v e stance, i t s f a i l u r e t o be i l l u m i n a t e d by 
something i n o p p o s i t i o n t o i t , l e , d e t e r m i n a t e being. He w r i t e s : 
"The d e f e c t i n A n s e l m ' s a r g u m e n t , h o w e v e r ,,, i s t h a t t h i s u n i t y Cof 
t h e c o n c e p t a n d b e i n g o f G o d ] , w h i c h i s p r o c l a i m e d a s w h a t i s most 
p e r f e c t ( o r s u b j e c t i v e l y a s t h e t r u e k n o w i n g ) , i s prssuppossd, i e , i t 
i s a s s u m e d a s in-itself (.Logic, §193) 
The i s s u e , t h e r e f o r e , i s how such argument can be developed so as t o 
show God t o be not merely a s u b j e c t i v e n o t i o n , how t h e argument can be 
c o n c r e t e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f being: 
"We h a v e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f God, B u t God i s no mere r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 
f o r God ;'s, How t h e n a r e we t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s p a s s a g e , how a r e we t o 
g a i n t h e i n s i g h t t h a t God i s n o t m e r e l y s o m e t h i n g s u b j e c t i v e w i t h i n u s ? 
Or, how i s t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f b e i n g t o b e m e d i a t e d w i t h God? F o r 
b e i n g a n d God a r e [ s e e m i n g l y ] two d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , " ( Z W 1, 4 3 3 ) 
Hegel's concern i s w i t h t h e need f o r what i s at f i r s t g l a n c e a merely 
s u b j e c t i v e n o t i o n of God t o be c o n c r e t e l y o b j e c t i f i e d . The o n t o l o g l c a l 
p r o o f f o r God, t h a t i s , must be o b j e c t i f i e d by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e 
co n c e p t ' s u n i t y w i t h being. To a c h i e v e t h a t end, Hegel a g a i n employs 
H e r a c l l t u s ' l o g i c o f t h e ' S t r i f e o f Opposltes', X and Y c o n f l i c t i n g t o 
p o r t r a y t h e i r u n d e r l y i n g , e s s e n t i a l u n i t y : 
"The o n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f h a s t h e c o n c e p t a s i t s s t a r t i n g p o i n t , T h e c o n c e p t 
i s r e g a r d e d a s s o m e t h i n g s u b j e c t i v e a n d c h a r a c t e r i s e d a s o p p o s e d t o t h e o b j e c t 
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a n d t h e r e a l i t y . H e r e t h e c o n c e p t i s t h e b e g i n n i n g , a n d what m a t t e r s i s t o 
show t h a t b e i n g a l s o p e r t a i n s t o t h i s c o n c e p t . I n more d e t a i l t h e a r g u m e n t 
r u n s a s f o l l o w s ; T h e c o n c e p t o f God i s s e t up, a n d i s shown t h a t i t c a n n o t be 
g r a s p e d e x c e p t a s i n c l u d i n g b e i n g - w i t h i n i t s e l f ; t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t b e i n g i s 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e c o n c e p t , t h e c o n c e p t e x i s t s o n l y s u b j e c t i v e l y , i n o u r 
t h i n k i n g . As t h u s s u b j e c t i v e , i t i s w h a t i s i m p e r f e c t , w h a t f a l l s o n l y 
w i t h i n f i n i t e s p i r i t . T h a t i t i s n o t j u s t tw c o n c e p t b u t a l s o is, 
i r r e s p e c t i v e o f o u r t h i n k i n g h a s t o be d e m o n s t r a t e d , " (LFf!2,3S2) 
I n o t h e r words, i f God i s merely an a b s t r a c t , s u b j e c t i v e concept, i t i s 
vacuous as i t l a c k s a c o n c r e t e , d e f i n i t i v e s t a t u s . The concept of God 
as concept i s u n q u a l i f i e d because absent i s apparent r e l a t i o n , t h a t 
w hich can c o n c r e t e l y u n i f y t h e concept and b e i n g i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g 
essence o f t h e A b s o l u t e . For God f u l l y t o be means t h a t he must, as we 
have seen, appear t o encompass an element o f d i f f e r e n c e so as t o become 
a l s o t h e d e t e r m i n a t e o b j e c t - be t h i s d i f f e r e n c e e x t e r n a l (as a 
t r a n s c e n d e n t t h e o l o g y might argue) or i n t e r n a l , as Hegel proposes. 
The problem, then, becomes c l e a r ; God as concept must be shown t o be 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h a t which i s being. Anselm's argument 
f a l t e r s i n i t s assumption t h a t , as God i s t h e p e r f e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i t 
must t h e r e f o r e be a c t u a l , as a n y t h i n g l e s s t h a n a c t u a l i s not a b s o l u t e l y 
p e r f e c t . - ^ Such an assumption was, o f course, r u t h l e s s l y a t t a c k e d by 
Kant on t h e grounds t h a t b e i n g i s not a p r e d i c a t e of a concept but i n 
f a c t something e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t which need not add a n y t h i n g whatsoever 
t o t h e o t h e r ; G a u n l l o c r i t i c i s e d t h e argument i n Anselm's own t i m e more 
s i m p l y by p o i n t i n g out t h a t a concept o f an i s l a n d need never be an 
a c t u a l I s l a n d , 
G a u n l l o ' s c r i t i c i s m we may d i s c a r d , as by 'concept' Hegel (and Anselm) 
does not mean i m a g i n a t i o n or a mental p i c t u r e (see LPR 1.436), but 
r a t h e r t h a t "God i s ' n o t a concept but t/je concept. " (LP^ 3. 71) God, 
t h a t i s t o say, i s not one concept amongst many; he i s not concept i n 
t h e sense o f n o t i o n , nor merely t h e r e s u l t o f a b s t r a c t t h o u g h t , but i s 
the concept, God has a noumenal f o r m beyond t h e immediate, phenomenal 
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w o r l d (however u n d e f i n e d t h i s f o r m might at t h i s p o i n t be), t h e o t h e r t o 
phenomenal b e i n g and not merely a mental c o n c o c t i o n . 
The o t h e r c r i t i c i s m , made by Kant, might seemingly h o l d more a u t h o r i t y , 
yet Hegel i s r e m a r k a b l y s c a t h i n g when he comments t h a t Kant; 
" T r e a t e d i t [ t h e o n t o l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t ] a t f i r s t a s i f i t w e r e empty 
m u s i n g , n o t h i n g b u t a n u n n a t u r a l s c h o l a s t i c t r i c k f o r c o n j o u r i n g r e a l i t y 
o u t o f c o n c e p t s , " (FK, p 6 7 ) 
C l e a r l y Kant i s r i g h t i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t b e i n g does not m a i n t a i n any 
n e c e s s a r y q u a l i t y w i t h i n a g i v e n concept, but o n l y when c o n s i d e r e d f r o m 
an e m p i r i c a l s t a n d p o i n t such as h i s own. His view c o n s i d e r s b e i n g t o be 
r e a l i t y but o n l y i n I t s e l f , d i s t i n c t from any a b s t r a c t n o t i o n , and q u i t e 
removed f r o m any s o r t o f u n i v e r s a l . However, w h i l e h i s o b j e c t i o n s may 
succeed a g a i n s t a transcendent God such as Anselm envisaged, t h e 
p o s i t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o Hegel i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . Hegel i s a t t e m p t i n g 
t o p rove an immanent d e i t y , a d e i t y who i s not ( a t t h i s s t a g e at l e a s t ) 
a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e a b s o l u t e t o t a l i t y of r e a l i t y . Indeed, as Hegel 
argues "we are not supposed t o be a d d i n g a n y t h i n g t o t h e concept. 
Rather we a r e removing f r o m i t t h e s h o r t c o m i n g t h a t i t i s o n l y something 
s u b j e c t i v e ; " (LP/? 3. 354) " t h e main i s s u e i s whether b e i n g l i e s w i t h i n 
t h e concept and may be deduced f r o m i t . " (LPR 1.436) 
T h i s i s q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t t r a c k , as t h e t a s k becomes not t o c o n s i d e r 
whether or not b e i n g and concept add a n y t h i n g t o each o t h e r , but whether 
u l t i m a t e l y b e i n g I s w i t h i n t h e concept. I n consequence, t h e d i f f e r e n c e 
between what Kant and Hegel r e s p e c t i v e l y c o n s i d e r 'concept' t o mean 
becomes c l e a r e r ; f o r t h e f o r m e r i n t h i s c o n t e x t i t i s t h o u g h t p e r t a i n i n g 
t o X, whereas f o r t h e l a t t e r i t i s : 
"God i n h i s u n i v e r s a l i t y , t h i s u n i v e r s a l i n w h i c h t h e r e i s no 
l i m i t a t i o n , f i n i t u d e , o r p a r t i c u l a r i t y , i s t h e a b s o l u t e s u b s i s t e n c e a n d 
i s s o a l o n e . W h a t e v e r s u b s i s t s h a s i t s r o o t a n d s u b s i s t e n c e o n l y i n 
t h i s One, I f we g r a s p t h i s i n i t i a l c o n t e n t i n t h i s way, we c a n e x p r e s s 
i t t h u s : "God i s t h e a b s o l u t e s u b s t a n c e , t h e o n l y t r u e a c t u a l i t y , " A l l 
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e l s e t h a t i s a c t u a l i s n o t a c t u a l on i t s own a c c o u n t ; t h e u n i q u e l y 
a b s o l u t e a c t u a l i t y i s God a l o n e , " (LP/!],3S3) 
What Hegel argues, t h e r e f o r e , i s t h a t , as t h e A b s o l u t e i s m o n i s t i c , t h e 
u l t i m a t e l y s o l e a c t u a l i t y , t h e n t h e concept o f God must c o n t a i n t h e 
b e i n g of God because t h e r e i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h i s One t o possess i t . 
At t h i s p o i n t , then, one may say t h a t Hegel sees t h e concept of God as 
b e i n g t h e ground on which b e i n g i s dependent - concept becomes l i k e a 
P l a t o n i c f o r m which possesses b e i n g as a d e t e r m i n a t e aspect o f I t s e l f . 
Thus, r a t h e r t h a n s i d i n g w i t h Kant i n a s s e r t i n g an e s s e n t i a l and t o t a l 
d i f f e r e n c e between b e i n g and concept, Hegel a s s e r t s a system i n which 
b e i n g i s w i t h i n a c o n c e p t u a l framework. The concept o f God i s t h e r e f o r e 
not aJso bein g , but encompasses being. 
(1 ) 7736 first premise for the concept of God encompassing being. 
T h i s Hegel i l l u s t r a t e s i n two ways. F i r s t , t h e concept d i v i d e s and 
p a r t i c u l a r i s e s i t s e l f , p o s i t i n g f i n i t u d e and t h e n " n e g a t i n g t h i s i t s own 
f i n i t u d e and b e i n g i d e n t i c a l w i t h i t s e l f . " CLPR 1.436) Here, then, we 
ar e shown t h e c l a s s i c , d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c o f Hegel, +A m a n i f e s t i n g , 
p o s i t i n g I t s e l f as -A, so t h a t each, +A and -A, l i e i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e 
o t h e r . But +A and -A remain e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l , as indeed they must 
as b o t h a r e grounded i n each o t h e r and t h e Absolute. To say t o t h e 
c o n t r a r y , t h a t b e i n g i s w h o l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e concept, i s t h e r e f o r e 
t o argue t h a t one or t h e o t h e r i s not grounded i n t h e A b s o l u t e but 
r a t h e r d e r i v e s f r o m a c o m p l e t e l y a l i e n source, and t h i s I s not 
a c c e p t a b l e t o Hegel; i f u l t i m a t e l y t h e r e i s t h e whole, t h e s o l e 
substance, t h e n i t i s n o n s e n s i c a l t o suggest t h a t b e i n g and concept a re 
not i n t r i n s i c a l l y and u l t i m a t e l y u n i v o c a l . Thus, i n t h e process o f God 
p a r t i c u l a r i s i n g , d e s p i t e t h e seemingly enormous g u l f between t h e concept 
and b e i n g , t h e two are u l t i m a t e l y i d e n t i c a l and, o f course, 
r e c o n c i l a b l e : 
"God i s t h i s s e l f - p a r t i c u l a r i s i n g , God c r e a t e s t h e w o r l d a n d p r o d u c e s 
h i s Son, p o s i t s an o t h e r a n d i n t h i s o t h e r h a s h i m s e l f , i s i d e n t i c a l 
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w i t h h i m s e l f , T h i s i s t h e c a s e i n t h e c o n c e p t a s s u c h ,,, t h r o u g h t h e 
n e g a t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r i s i n g ( f o r w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r i s i n g t h e c o n c e p t 
i t s e l f i s e q u a l l y t h e p o s i t i n g a c t i v i t y ) t h e c o n c e p t [ c o m e s ] t o be 
i d e n t i c a l w i t h i t s e l f , " ( Z W 1,437) 
I n t h e above q u o t a t i o n , o f course, t h e l o g i c p a r a l l e l s t h e d o c t r i n e of 
t h e T r i n i t y , God becoming m a n i f e s t i n t h e Son, r e v e a J i / j g - h i s b e i n g 
t h r o u g h t h i s process, b e f o r e r e c o n c i l i n g i n u n i t y : 
"God i s t h u s g r a s p e d a s w h a t he i s f o r h i m s e l f w i t h i n h i m s e l f ; God 
[ t h e F a t h e r ] makes h i m s e l f a n o b j e c t f o r h i m s e l f [ t h e S o n ] ; t h e n , i n 
t h i s o b j e c t , God r e m a i n s t h e u n d i v i d e d e s s e n c e w i t h i n t h i s 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f h i m s e l f w i t h i n h i m s e l f , a n d i n t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
o f h i m s e l f l o v e s h i m s e l f , i e , r e m a i n s i d e n t i c a l w i t h h i m s e l f , " 
( Z W 1,126) 
I n p a r t i c u l a r i t y , t h e r e f o r e , God i s a b s o l u t e l y and n e c e s s a r i l y h i m s e l f , 
m a n i f e s t but Immediate t o h i m s e l f , as must be t h e case, f o r "God remains 
t h e u n d i v i d e d essence, " d e s p i t e a p p e a r i n g t o be o t h e r w i s e . F i n i t e b eing 
as such i s t h e r e b y a r e v e l a t o r y t o o l , t h e p l a t f o r m , so t o speak, upon 
which God's i d e n t i t y i s d i s p l a y e d . Thus, I n I t s f o r m ( l e . as f i n i t u d e ) , 
b e i n g i s , i n Stace's words, " t h e r e f l e c t l o n - l n t o - s e l f of t h e t h i n g , ' " ^ 
l e . I t i s t h a t which God employs as an apparent medium f o r s e l f -
I d e n t i f i c a t l o n , a l t h o u g h u l t i m a t e l y : 
" B e i n g i s n o t h i n g more t h a n t h e i n e x p r e s s i b l e o r t h e c o n c e p t l e s s ; i t i s 
n o t t h e c o n c r e t e , w h i c h t h e c o n c e p t i s , b u t i s w h o l l y a n d o n l y t h e 
a b s t r a c t i o n o f r e l a t i o n t o s e l f , " (Z/VP 1,437) 
Put a n o t h e r way, a c t u a l i t y i s w i t h i n t h e concept, or Idea, r a t h e r than 
f i n i t u d e ; t h e l a t t e r i s p o s i t e d by t h e Absolute, and a t t a c h e d t o t h a t 
which we c a l l ' b eing', i n o r d e r f o r t h e A b s o l u t e t o i d e n t i f y and r e l a t e 
t o I t s e l f . Reardon comments w i t h a d m i r a b l e s i m p l i c i t y t h a t "God, t h e 
A b s o l u t e , as t h e u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y cannot be o t h e r than thought,"'^ and 
t h i s p o i n t i s enhanced by G r i s e z who w r i t e s : " [ t h e A b s o l u t e ' s ] 
c o n d i t i o n s a r e e v e r y t h i n g e l s e , f o r a l l e l s e - even as eJse, as o t h e r -
reduces t o t h e Absolute.'"^ God, then, i s s e l f - c o n d i t i o n i n g , u s i n g 
f i n i t u d e (which i s r o o t e d i n him) t o express h i m s e l f , but w i t h o u t 
s t e p p i n g o u t s i d e h i s i n f i n i t e n a t u r e , because a l l b e i n g d e r i v e s f r o m 
him. F u r t h e r ; 
" W h a t e v e r i s , i s ; i t r e l a t e s i t s e l f t o i t s e l f ,,, i t i s i m m e d i a c y . 
B e i n g i s i m m e d i a t e a s s u c h , a n d c o n v e r s e l y , t h e i m m e d i a t e i s b e i n g a n d 
i s i n r e l a t i o n t o s e l f , w h i c h means t h a t m e d i a t i o n i s n e g a t e d , T h i s 
d e f i n i t i o n of ' r e l a t i o n t o s e l f o r ' i m m e d i a c y ' i s now d i r e c t l y e x p l i c i t 
i n t h e c o n c e p t i n g e n e r a l , a n d i n t h e a b s o l u t e c o n c e p t o r i n t h e c o n c e p t 
of God," 1 , 4 3 7 ) 
T h i s i s t o say t h a t b e i n g i s an immediate, or immanent, c o n c e p t u a l t o o l 
which d e t e r m i n e s t h e concept t o r e a l i s e i t s e l f ; i t i s i n a b s o l u t e u n i t y 
w i t h t h e concept, grounded i n t h e essence, t h e ' i s ' , o f t h e A b s o l u t e 
and, as Hegel makes q u i t e c l e a r , " ' b e i n g ' cannot be deduced f r o m t h e 
concept o r a n a l y s e d out o f i t . " (Logic, §51) Being i s , t h e r e f o r e , in 
the superficial sense alone, not" a b s o l u t e l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h e concept, 
but i t i s q u i t e i n c o r r e c t a l s o t o presume t h a t t h e y a re w h o l l y d i s t i n c t , 
e a s i l y shown by t h e s i m p l e l o g i c which r e n d e r s e i t h e r as vacuous w i t h o u t 
t h e o t h e r . I n t h i s sense, G a u n i l o i s i n harmony w i t h Hegel i n a s s e r t i n g 
t h a t a concept must have b e i n g , but so t o o must b e i n g have concept i f i t 
i s not t o become merely "evanescent e x t e r n a l i t y and appearance. " (LPR 
3. 70) 
(11) The second premise for the concept of God encompassing being. 
The second way of showing b e i n g t o be w i t h i n t h e concept l i e s i n t h e 
t h e o r y t h a t , a l t h o u g h i t i s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n , " b e i n g i s a l s o d i f f e r e n t 
f r o m t h e concept because t h e concept i s t h e t o t a l i t y , " (LPR 1.438) but 
t h i s begs t h e q u e s t i o n o f how b e i n g can be t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of t h e 
concept w h i l s t r e m a i n i n g i d e n t i c a l and immediate t o t h e concept; a f t e r 
a l l , s u r e l y when one examines Hegel's f r e q u e n t use of t h e phrase ' b e i n g -
t h e r e ' as r e g a r d s t h i s , i m p l i c i t i s change. B e f o r e a d d r e s s i n g t h i s 
p r o b l e m d i r e c t l y , i t i s w o r t h n o t i n g Hegel's c r i t i c i s m made a g a i n s t 
Spinoza's arguments t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e t o t a l i t y o f concept i s i d e n t i c a l 
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t o t h e u l t i m a t e t o t a l i t y o f being; 
" S p i n o z a d e f i n e s God a s s e l f - c a u s e d , causa sui. H i s c o n c e p t a n d 
d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g a r e i d e n t i c a l , o r i n o t h e r w o r d s God c a n n o t be 
g r a s p e d a s c o n c e p t a p a r t f r o m b e i n g . What i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y i s 
t h a t t h i s i s a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , s o t h a t when m e a s u r e d a g a i n s t i t 
t h e c o n c e p t m u s t o f n e c e s s i t y b e s o m e t h i n g s u b j e c t i v e , 
" B u t t h e f i n i t e a n d s u b j e c t i v e i s n o t j u s t s o m e t h i n g f i n i t e a s 
m e a s u r e d a g a i n s t t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n . I t i s f i n i t e i n i t s e l f , a n d 
h e n c e i t i s t h e a n t i t h e s i s o f i t s e l f l i e . i t i s t h e i n f i n i t e ] , " 
( Z W 3 , 3 5 5 ) 
Such c r i t i c i s m a g a i n s t t h i s presupposed u n i t y , then, c e n t r e s upon t h e 
argument t h a t t h e S p i n o z l s t l c c l a i m s f a l t e r because t h e y presuppose an 
u l t i m a t e l y i d e n t i c a l s t a t e , w i t h each, a c c o r d i n g t o Spinoza, t h e measure 
of t h e o t h e r . That i s t o say, f o r Spinoza, tho u g h t and e x t e n s i o n 
measure each o t h e r precisely® but, u n l i k e Hegel who advocates t h a t 
n e g a t i o n c r e a t e s (because t h e o p p o s i t e of n e g a t i o n i s a f f i r m a t i o n ) , 
Spinoza sees n e g a t i o n i n a f a r more l i m i t e d r o l e . Each, t h a t i s argues 
f o r d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n an a l l - e m b r a c i n g u n i t y , but w h i l s t Hegel r e g a r d s 
t h e n e g a t i v e a n t i t h e s i s as something t h a t l e a d s t o becoming, Spinoza 
c o n s i d e r s n e g a t i o n as s i m p l y t h e e f f e c t o f a f f i r m a t i o n , +A t -A. With 
Spinoza, t h e r e I s no p a s s i n g over of t h e o p p o s l t e s . As Stace w r i t e s , 
" t o p o s i t i s t o negate; t h i s i s Spinoza's p r i n c i p l e . To negate i s t o 
p o s i t : t h i s i s Hegel's."'"^ S i m i l a r l y , we may n o t e Fackenheim's comment 
t h a t " u n l i k e Splnozlsm .,, [ H e g e l ' s o n t o l o g y ] encompasses t h e f i n i t e -
i n b o t h i t s s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e forms - i n an a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g 
i n f i n i t y , 
The r e s u l t o f t h i s I s t h a t Spinoza i s unable t o r e c o n c i l e f u l l y t h e 
f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e ; he b e l i e v e s God t o be i n f i n i t e because thought and 
e x t e n s i o n f o r m t h e supposedly u n l i m i t e d whole, but because t h e d i s t i n c t 
a t t r i b u t e s a re not argued t o s y n t h e s l s e i n t h e H e g e l i a n manner, t o pass 
i n t o each o t h e r , t h e phenomenal a t t r i b u t e of e x t e n s i o n c o n t i n u e s t o 
s t a n d s t o u t l y over and a g a i n s t t h e noumenal a t t r i b u t e o f t h o u g h t , 
r e n d e r i n g t h e l a t t e r f i n i t e , and d e b a r r e d f r o m assuming i t s t r u e 
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c h a r a c t e r . That i s , t h e concept i s d e n i e d t h e freedom t o be a n y t h i n g 
o t h e r t h a n t h e a b s t r a c t measure o f i t s f i n i t e c o u n t e r p a r t , and because 
of t h i s i t i s t o t a l l y d e t e r m i n e d by being; i t i s t h e f i n i t e b e i n g o f X 
t h a t d e t e r m i n e s t h e concept t o be no more t h a n t h e concept of X, so t h a t 
where t h e b e i n g o f X I s l i m i t e d so t o o i s t h e concept. 
Thus, by acknowledging Kant's own c r i t i c i s m o f t h e o n t o l o g i c a l argument, 
Hegel I l l u s t r a t e s t h e p o v e r t y o f t h e S p l n o z i s t i c c l a i m s , i l l u m i n a t i n g 
t h e i n n e r a c t i v i t y o f t h e c o n c e p t - b e i n g p r o p o s i t i o n , t h e u n r e s t , against 
the background of the Idea. The n a t u r e o f being, i n i t s attachment t o 
t h e concept, s t r i v e s as s u b j e c t i v e f i n i t u d e , t o t r a n s c e n d beyond i t s own 
l i m i t a t i o n s , Being, t h e r e f o r e , b a t t l e s a g a i n s t I t s e l f , but t h i s i s o n l y 
p o s s i b l e w i t h i n t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e Idea, t h e I d e a p r o v i d i n g t h e 
a b s t r a c t concept of ' more-than-being', I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , Hegel's 
meaning t h a t b e i n g 'wakes up' t o t h e concept, t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of 
i n f i n i t u d e , or, i n o t h e r words, t h a t b e i n g r e a l i s e s i t s p o t e n t i a l t o 
t r a n s c e n d i t s apparent, f i n i t e l i m i t s , t o cast o f f t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t y 
t h a t c h a i n s i t t o t h e f i n i t e phenomenal. I m p o r t a n t l y , one s h o u l d n o t e 
t h a t i t i s t h e essence, t h e u n d e r l y i n g t r u t h , of b e i n g t h a t h o l d s t h i s 
p o t e n t i a l , and t h a t i t i s t h e f i n i t e t h a t i s abandoned f o r genuine 
( r a t h e r t h a n s p u r i o u s ) I n f i n i t y . T h i s i s a p o i n t some commentators, 
n o t a b l y C o l l i n s , seem unable t o a p p r e c i a t e , f o r C o l l i n s w r i t e s 
" f i n i t u d e i s not a s i m p l e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f a n y t h i n g , but expresses 
i t s complex u n i o n of d e t e r m i n a t e a c t t o g e t h e r w i t h an a c t i v e 
t r a n s c e n d e n c e o f i t s own boundaries,"''-^ I n I t s e l f , t h i s i s q u i t e wrong, 
f o r i t i s p a t e n t l y o b v i o u s t h a t f i n i t u d e does not t r a n s c e n d f i n i t u d e , an 
absurd s u g g e s t i o n , but r a t h e r i t i s b e i n g t h a t t r a n s c e n d s i t s l i m i t s ; 
f i n i t u d e i s t h a t which b e i n g seeks t o negate. 
The I m p o r t a n c e of t h e above p o i n t cannot r e a l l y be o v e r - s t r e s s e d . I f we 
summarise t h e c o n c e p t - b e i n g r e l a t i o n and u n i t y w i t h i n Hegel's 
o n t o l o g i c a l argument, t h e reasons as t o why t h i s i s so become more 
l u c i d . As w i t h t h e whole o f Hegel's t h e o l o g y (and t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of 
h i s p h i l o s o p h y ) , t h e o n t o l o g i c a l argument f o r t h e A b s o l u t e i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y based on t h e A b s o l u t e Idea as t h e i d e a l p i n n a c l e of a 
c y c l i c a l s t r u c t u r e ; '•-'^  i t d i v i d e s i n t o opposing elements ( f i n i t u d e and 
i n f i n i t u d e , concept and being , e t c ) , b e f o r e e x p o s i n g t h e s e c o n t r a d i c t o r y 
e l e m e n t s as b e i n g i n t r u t h i d e n t i c a l , o b j e c t i f y i n g i t s e l f t h r o u g h t h i s 
system, w i t h such o b j e c t i f I c a t i o n b e i n g almost, as I have mentioned, 
something c o i n c i d e n t a l , a bonus p r o v i d e d by t h e s t r u c t u r e . Thus, w i t h 
t h e o n t o l o g i c a l argument, t h e A b s o l u t e Idea i s viewed on t h e one hand as 
concept, and on t h e o t h e r as t h e a n t i t h e s i s o f t h i s , being, and w i t h i n 
t h i s a pparent r e l a t i o n a f u r t h e r s e r i e s o f o p p o s i t e s a re found, t h e <at 
t h i s p o i n t , s p u r i o u s ) i n f i n i t y of t h e concept a g a i n s t t h e f i n i t e 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y o f being, and so f o r t h . But from' t h i s Hegel argues t h a t 
such o p p o s i t i o n e v e n t u a l l y proves t h a t t h e two are i n f a c t one and i n 
u n i t y , each r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e i r over and a g a i n s t stances t o melt i n t o a 
u n l v o c a l oneness, 
The c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f Hegel's t h e o l o g y w i t h Anselm's b a s i c o n t o l o g i c a l 
argument, i s t h e r e f o r e q u i t e remarkable, even though, t a k i n g account of 
a l l t h e changes Hegel made t o t h e argument, we can a l s o agree w i t h 
Reardon t h a t "Hegel's own p o s i t i o n i s a good way fr o m Anselm's. " ^ I t 
i s n o t e w o r t h y t h a t some have suggested t h e argument t o be i n t r u t h t h e 
g o v e r n i n g f a c t o r b e h ind Hegel's e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e , i n c l u d i n g James 
C o l l i n s , d e s p i t e h i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g n o t e d above. I n a somewhat 
g r a n d i o s e f a s h i o n , he proposes t h a t " t h e r u l i n g framework of Hegel's 
•philosophy i s more p r e c i s e l y c a l l e d an onto-pnuema-logic, t o emphasise 
t h e c e n t r a l i t y o f h i s unique c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e s e l f - d e v e l o p i n g s p i r i t . 
What b i n d s t o g e t h e r o n t o l o g y and l o g i c i s t h e d o c t r i n e on s p i r i t as t h e 
l i v i n g , c o r r e l a t i n g whole w i t h i n which a l l t h e d i v i s i o n s , t r a n s i t i o n s , 
and u n i f i c a t i o n s of t h o u g h t and b e i n g a r i s e , Only by r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s 
• 
d o c t r i n a l c e n t r e does t h e p h i l o s o p h e r g a i n assurance t h a t thought and 
b e i n g s t a n d open t o each o t h e r , "^^ To go as f a r as C o l l i n s does here, 
and d e s c r i b e a c o m b i n a t i o n o f d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c and o n t o l o g y as b e i n g 
" t h e r u l i n g framework o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y , " i s p r o b a b l y t o o s i m p l i s t i c 
a c l a i m , and n e g l e c t s o t h e r i n f l u e n c e s p r e v i o u s l y discussed, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Hegel's use o f H e r a c l i t u s ' s t r i f e and u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s . 
N o n e t h e l e s s , i t does seem t o e x e r c i s e a major p o s i t i o n w i t h i n h i s 
t h o u g h t , 
( H i ) Problems within Hegel's ontological argument. 
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Of c o u r s e , I t i s no t d i f f i c u l t t o c r i t i c i s e H e g e l ' s use o f t h e 
o n t o l o g i c a l argument s i m p l y because he m a i n t a i n s no i n t e n t i o n o f 
e m p l o y i n g i t t o p rove a t r a n s c e n d e n t , t h e l s t i c God, but r a t h e r mere ly t o 
a r r i v e a t what e f f e c t i v e l y H e r a c l i t u s reached over 2 ,000 yea r s e a r l i e r ; 
namely , t h a t X cannot e x i s t by v i r t u e o f i t s e l f bu t r e q u i r e s an (o r more 
p r e c i s e l y i t s ) o t h e r t o d i s t i n g u i s h and t h e r e b y q u a l i f y i t w i t h i n a 
deeper , t r u e u n i t y . Indeed , as G r i s e z r a t h e r i r r i t a b l y p o i n t s ou t , 
"Hege l does no t a rgue t h a t God . . . e x i s t s . Rather Hegel h o l d s t h a t t h e 
t o t a l i t y o f r e a l i t y e x i s t s " ' ® and one can f e e l an e x t e n t o f sympathy 
t o w a r d s such c h a g r i n as Hege l does, i n a sense, a v o i d t h e r e a l i s s u e o f 
t h e argument by not a p p l y i n g t h e s o - c a l l e d ' p r o o f t o a n y t h i n g o t h e r 
t h a n h i s A b s o l u t e I d e a , and t h i s c l e a r l y does n o t c o n f o r m t o t h e 
o r t h o d o x u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f God w h i c h t h e argument was o r i g i n a l l y d e s i g n e d 
t o p r o v e . C o n t i n u i n g a l o n g t h i s t r a c k , one c o u l d even r a t h e r c y n i c a l l y 
sugges t t h a t Hegel uses t h e argument p u r e l y t o i l l u m i n a t e t h e sys tem o f 
h i s own, d i s t i n c t concep t , as e v i d e n c e o f t h e A b s o l u t e ' s d i r e m p t i o n i n t o 
f i n i t e m a n i f e s t a t i o n and s u p p o r t e d by l o g i c . As Jaeschke remarks , t h e r e 
i s l i t t l e t h a t " i s s p e c i f i c a l l y C h r i s t i a n about t h e i d e a o f t h e Id quo 
mains cogltori nequit o r t h e supremely r e a l or most p e r f e c t b e i n g . " ^ ^ 
But t h i s i s p r o b a b l y u n f a i r ; a f t e r a l l , why s h o u l d Hegel no t s u p p o r t h i s 
t h e o l o g y w i t h an argument p e r e n n i a l l y p o p u l a r w i t h p h i l o s o p h e r s and 
t h e o l o g i a n s a l i k e , r e g a r d l e s s o f whe the r t h e y propound i t o r n o t ? 
Though Jaeschke accuses Hegel o f t h e s i n o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , ^ ® he h i m s e l f 
i s g u i l t y o f t h e same f a u l t , i m p l i c i t l y assuming t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y must 
comply w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r n a t u r e ; p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , " s p e c i f i c a l l y 
C h r i s t i a n " i s , I con tend , a q u i t e n e b u l o u s phrase because i t presupposes 
p a r t i c u l a r pa rame te r s and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a t t a c h e d t o t h e f a i t h , 
Moreover , Hegel p o r t r a y s t h e argument i n a s t r o n g , m o n i s t i c t one , f o r i t 
i s t h e A b s o l u t e o b j e c t i f y i n g i t s e l f v i a t h e d i r e m p t i o n t h a t i s proposed, 
t h r o u g h i t s appearance as t h e f i n i t e , r a t h e r t h a n a case o f t r y i n g 
c o n c r e t e l y t o r e l a t e t h e f i n i t e and t h e i n f i n i t e as d i s t i n c t , 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t e l emen t s : 
" I t is wi th in i t s own process that the Idea produces that i l l u s i o n for 
i t s e l f ; i t posits an other confronting i t s e l f , and i t s action consists 
in sublating that i l l u s i o n , Only from th is error does the t ru th come 
f o r t h , and herein l i es our reconci l ia t ion with error and with 
f i n i t ude , Otherness or error, as sublated, is i t s e l f a necessary 
moment of the t ru th , which can only be in that i t makes i t s e l f into 
i t s own resul t , " (.Logjc, §212A) 
The A b s o l u t e , t h a t i s , i s n o t o b j e c t i f i e d by a genu ine o t h e r but by 
i t s e l f seeming t o be an o t h e r , and f r o m t h i s i t becomes e v i d e n t t h a t 
H e g e l ' s use o f t h e argument i s c e n t r e d e n t i r e l y on t h e A b s o l u t e and i t s 
d e s i r e f o r s e l f - i l l u m i n a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n as a means o f a t t e m p t i n g t o 
p r o v e t h e b e i n g o f a t h e i s t i c God. I n o t h e r words , Hegel i s v i r t u a l l y 
i g n o r i n g t h e o n t o l o g i c a l argument as a means f o r man c o n c r e t e l y t o 
i d e n t i f y t h e A b s o l u t e as a t r a n s c e n d e n t d e i t y , and o f f e r i n g i t i n s t e a d 
e x c l u s i v e l y f o r t h e A b s o l u t e ' s own s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . That i s t o say, 
he used t h e o n t o l o g i c a l argument as i t s e l f a way o f e x p l a i n i n g t h e 
A b s o l u t e ' s use o f t h e appa ren t - o r perhaps d e c e p t i v e - f i n i t e 
phenomenal . And, i n t h i s sense, i t i s no t even u n f a i r t o suggest t h a t 
t h e human p e r s p e c t i v e becomes q u i t e i n c i d e n t a l ; p h e n o m e n a l i t y , t h a t i s , 
neve r r i s e s t o any s t a t u s o t h e r t h a n t h e appa ren t , a n t i t h e t i c a l 
q u a l i f i e r o f t h e noumenal . 
T h i s l a t t e r p o i n t , however, c o n t a i n s t h e germ o f a p o t e n t i a l p rob lem, 
t h a t has c o n s i s t e n t l y r e s u r f a c e d t h r o u g h o u t t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . T h i s 
c o n c e r n s whe the r such c l a i m s as Hegel makes i n h i s h a n d l i n g o f t h e 
argument can s u s t a i n h i s b a s i c d o c t r i n e t h a t God i s u l t i m a t e l y Idea . 
W i t h i n h i s commentary t h e r e c o n t i n u a l l y l u r k s an i m p l i c i t dependency o f 
t h e i n f i n i t e on t h e f i n i t e f o r o b j e c t l f i c a t i o n , and t h e c o n n o t a t i o n s o f 
such a r e p e r i l o u s l y c l o s e t o u n d e r m i n i n g , i f n o t making u t t e r l y s e l f -
c o n t r a d i c t o r y , h i s e n t i r e t h e o l o g i c a l f r amework . 
What e f f e c t i v e l y s u r f a c e s i s a d i r e c t c h o i c e ; e i t h e r a) Hegel must 
concede d u a l i s m <ie . t h e e x i s t e n c e o f God and an a b s o l u t e , genu ine 
o t h e r ) , o r b> he must deny t h e apparen t r e a l i t y o f f i n i t u d e . T h i s 
c h o i c e e x i s t s because, q u i t e s i m p l y , i f Hege l i s p r o p o s i n g a genu ine , 
m o n i s t i c A b s o l u t e , h i s s t r u c t u r e cannot a f f o r d such a c l a i m t o e x i s t i n 
c o n f l i c t o v e r a g a i n s t an o t h e r ; i f a m o n i s t i c God i s argued, i t i s 
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a b s u r d f o r i t t o be i n o p p o s i t i o n t o what must e f f e c t i v e l y be c o n s i d e r e d 
as n o t - b e i n g ; i f God I s t h e whole , t h a t i s , i t cannot have a g e n u i n e 
o p p o s i t i o n . Thus, Hegel I s c o m p e l l e d t o e i t h e r acknowledge some 
c o n c r e t e s t a t u s f o r an o t h e r ( t h e r e b y r e n d e r i n g God n o t - t h e - A b s o l u t e ) , 
o r f o l l o w t h e c o u r s e t h a t he does and nega t e t h e appa ren t o p p o s i t i o n . 
Such a c h o i c e cannot acknowledge any t y p e o f h a l f - m e a s u r e ; i f t h e r e i s 
an o t h e r , a g e n u i n e o b j e c t i f y i n g c o u n t e r p a r t t o t h e A b s o l u t e , t h e n 
H e g e l ' s t h e o l o g y s p l i t s and c o l l a p s e s i n t o a c h a o t i c mess. C l e a r l y t h i s 
u n a c c e p t a b l e ; i f God i s t r u l y I d e a , a sys t em w h i c h i s t h e essence and 
o n l y t r u e d e f i n i t i o n o f r e a l i t y , t h e n t h e r e can be no accommodating t h e 
f i n i t e as an a c t u a l r e a l i t y t h a t s t a n d s i n a b s o l u t e o p p o s i t i o n t o t h i s 
same I d e a . To sugges t as much wou ld be t o deny t h e b a s i s o f e v e r y t h i n g 
Hegel has t h u s f a r propounded. F u r t h e r m o r e , i t I s i n s u f f i c i e n t mere ly 
t o a r g u e t h a t eve ry d i s t i n c t p a r t i c u l a r i s w i t h i n t h e one, a l l -
encompass ing God, f o r t h i s becomes vacuous as by 'God ' a l l t h a t i s 
r e f e r r e d t o i s a collection o f p a r t i c u l a r s . T h i s i s a p o i n t r a i s e d w i t h 
c o n s i d e r a b l e v i g o u r by Stace , '-^ and i s m e r e l y a r e p e t i t i o n o f t h e 
p r o b l e m s t h a t were f o u n d i n t h e m i s t a k e n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f f e r e d by 
G r i s e z and S o l i , 
Ra the r , t h e n , one must r e t u r n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s o n l y t h e 
i n f i n i t e b e i n g o f God h i m s e l f , a d e i t y w h i c h by d e f i n i t i o n u n i t e s t h e 
b e i n g and concep t o f I t s e l f n o t because i t i s i n need o f an o n t o l o g i c a l 
s t a t u s , bu t because i t s o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s r e f l e c t s i t s e x i s t e n c e . 
Thus, r a t h e r t h a n s e e k i n g a c o m p a t i b i l i t y between t h e b e i n g and concept 
o f God, a t a s k f o r t h e t h e o l o g i a n , God as t h e whole by d e f i n i t i o n i s 
o n t o l o g i c a l . Of c o u r s e t h i s I s , t o say t h e l e a s t , a somewhat vague 
n o t i o n i n t h a t ' i t does n o t t e l l us a n y t h i n g o f v a l u e about t h e c h a r a c t e r 
o f t h e A b s o l u t e , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h p rompts Jaeschke t o w r i t e t h a t " t h i s 
i d e a o f God can be r e j e c t e d as i n s u f f i c i e n t , " - ' ^ i But i s t h i s t h e 
c e n t r a l I s s u e a t s t a k e ? I sugges t no t f o r , as Hegel c o n s i s t e n t l y 
s t a t e s , h i s t h e o l o g y i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h sys tem and God as t h e A b s o l u t e i s 
a t t h i s p o i n t m e r e l y t o be i d e n t i f i e d as t h e p i n n a c l e o f t h i s sys tem. 
The a t t a c h m e n t o f a c h a r a c t e r f o r t h e d e i t y , h i s goodness, wisdom, and 
so f o r t h , can o n l y be c o n s i d e r e d a f t e r such an i n i t i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . 
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/Votes 
1. Jaeschke , p298. 
2. Anselm, p l l 7 . 
3. Hodgson p o i n t s out t h a t " I n h i s p r o o f , A n s l e l m does no t speak o f God 
as " a b s o l u t e l y p e r f e c t " i n t h e way Hegel he re i m p l i e s . . . i n o t h e r 
p l a c e s he uses e q u i v a l e n t s f o r " a b s o l u t e l y p e r f e c t , " such as 
"supreme good" iProsloglon, p r e f a c e ) , bu t no t as p remises o f t h e 
p r o o f . " CLPR 1. 434, n l 5 5 ) 
4. Hege l c r i t i c i s e s Anse lm f o r a r g u i n g t h a t a f e a t u r e o f t h e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f God i s t h a t God i s a b s o l u t e l y p e r f e c t , d e s c r i b i n g 
t h i s as "a v e r y i n d e t e r m i n a t e e x p r e s s i o n . " iLPR 1.434) However, see 
n o t e 3. 
5. Kant , B. 631 . 
6. S tace , p l 9 8 . 
7. Reardon, p99, 
8. G r i s e z , p l 9 0 . 
9. Sp inoza , 2 
10. S tace , p33. 
11 . Fackenheim, p l 8 3 . 
12. C o l l i n s , p296-7 . 
13. See c h a p t e r f o u r . 
14. Reardon, p98. 
15. C o l l i n s p279. 
16. G r i s e z , p l 9 0 . 
17. Jaeschke , p298. 
18. Jaeschke, p299. 
19. S tace , p78-84. 
20. See c h a p t e r seven. 
2 1 . Jaeschke , p302. 
Bibliography 
Primary texts. 
Hegel CWF (tr. Cerf & Harris), Faith and Knowledge, SUNY, 1977. 
Hegel CWF (tr. Knox & Mi l l e r ) , Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, OUP, 
1987. 
Hegel GWF (tr. Haldane & Simson), Lectures on the Histroy of Philosophy (3 vols), Kegan Paul, 
1986. 
Hegel CWF (tr. Hodgson P) , Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (3 vols). University of 
California Press, 1984-5. 
Hegel CWF (tr. Miller A V ) , Phenomenology of Spirit, OUP, 1977. 
Hegel CWF (tr. Ceraets, Suchting & Harris), The Encyclopaedia Logic, Hackett, 1991. 
Hegel CWF (tr. Wallace W ) , The Logic of Hegel, Clarendon, 1892. 
Secondary material. 
Caird E, Hegel, Blackwood, 1950. 
Collins J, The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion, Yale UP, 1967. 
Christensen DE (Ed), Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. 
Croce B, What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel (tr. Ainslie D ) , Macmillan, 
1915. 
Dickey L, Hegel, CUP, 1987. 
Fackenheim E L, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, Indiana, 1967. 
Findlay JN, Hegel: A Re-examination, Allen & Unwin, 1958. 
Crisez C, Beyond the New Theism, Notre Dame Press, 1975. 
Harris HS, Hegel's Development (3 vols), OUP, 1983. 
Inwood M , A Hegel Dictionary, Blackwell, 1992. 
Inwood M (Ed), Hegel, OUP, 1985. 
Jaeschke W, Reason in Religion, University of California Press, 1990. 
Kaufmann W, Hegel, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966. 
Lauer Q, Hegel's Idea of Philosophy, Fordham UP, 1983. 
McTaggart, A Commentary on Hegel's Logic, CUP, 1910. 
Mure CRC, A Study of Hegel's Logic, OUP, 1950. 
Mure CRC, The Philosophy of Hegel, OUP, 1965. 
Pippin RB, Hegel's Idealism, CUP, 1989. 
Reardon B, Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, Macmillan, 1977. 
Rosen S, CWF Hegel, Yale UP, 1974. 
Singer P, Hegel, OUP, 1983, 
Soli I , An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics, Chicago UP, 1969. 
Stace WT, The Philosophy of Hegel, Macmillan, 1924. 
Taylor C, Hegel, CUP, 1975. 
Other texts referred to. 
Allen RE (Ed), Creek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle, Free Press, 1985. 
Anselm, Proslogion, Notre Dame Press, 1979. 
Aristotle, Metaphysics (tr. Apostle H C ) , Indiana, 1966. 
Aristotle, Physics (tr. Apostle H C ) , Indiana, 1969. 
Barnes J (Ed), Early Creek Philosophy, Penguin, 1987. 
Descartes R, Discourse on Method and the Meditations (tr. Sutcliffe EE), Penguin, 1968. 
Fichte EC, The Science of Knowledge (tr. Heath & Lachs), Appleton, 197Q. 
Hesiod, Works and Days (tr. West M L ) , OUP, 1978. 
Kant I , Critique of Pure Reason, Macmillan, 1933. 
Kirk & Ravens (Eds), The Presocratic Philosophers, CUP, 1957. 
Radhakrishnan S, Indian Philosophy (2 vols), Unw/in Hyman, 1989. 
Saussure F de. Course in Ceneral Linguistics, London, 1978. 
Spinoza B, Ethics, Everyman, 1963. 
Thibaut C ( t r . ) , The Vedanta Sutras with the Commentary of Sankaracaiya, OUP, 1896. 
Thomson C, The First Pliilosopliers, Lawrence & Wishart, 1955. 
